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iwd/src/eapol.c
Denis Kenzior 7604762013 eapol: Fix bogus warning 
src/eapol.c:1041:9: error: ‘buf’ may be used uninitialized [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
 1041 |         l_put_be16(0, &frame->header.packet_len);
      |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This warning is bogus since the buffer is initialized through use of
eapol_frame members.  EAPoL-Start is a very simple frame.
2024-08-19 11:43:24 -05:00

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/*
*
* Wireless daemon for Linux
*
* Copyright (C) 2013-2019 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
*
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include <config.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <alloca.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ell/ell.h>
#include "ell/useful.h"
#include "src/missing.h"
#include "src/module.h"
#include "src/crypto.h"
#include "src/eapol.h"
#include "src/ie.h"
#include "src/util.h"
#include "src/mpdu.h"
#include "src/eap.h"
#include "src/handshake.h"
#include "src/watchlist.h"
#include "src/erp.h"
#include "src/iwd.h"
#include "src/band.h"
static struct l_queue *state_machines;
static struct l_queue *preauths;
static struct watchlist frame_watches;
static uint32_t eapol_4way_handshake_time = 2;
static eapol_rekey_offload_func_t rekey_offload = NULL;
static eapol_tx_packet_func_t tx_packet = NULL;
static eapol_install_pmk_func_t install_pmk = NULL;
static void *tx_user_data;
#define VERIFY_IS_ZERO(field) \
do { \
if (!l_memeqzero((field), sizeof((field)))) \
return false; \
} while (false) \
#define MIC_MAXLEN 32
static bool eapol_aes_siv_encrypt(const uint8_t *kek, size_t kek_len,
struct eapol_key *frame,
const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
{
uint8_t encr[16 + len];
struct iovec ad[1];
ad[0].iov_base = frame;
ad[0].iov_len = EAPOL_KEY_DATA(frame, 0) - (uint8_t *)frame;
if (!aes_siv_encrypt(kek, kek_len, EAPOL_KEY_DATA(frame, 0),
len, ad, 1, encr))
return false;
memcpy(EAPOL_KEY_DATA(frame, 0), encr, sizeof(encr));
return true;
}
/*
* MIC calculation depends on the selected hash function. The has function
* is given in the EAPoL Key Descriptor Version field.
*
* The input struct eapol_key *frame should have a zero-d MIC field
*/
bool eapol_calculate_mic(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kck,
const struct eapol_key *frame, uint8_t *mic,
size_t mic_len)
{
size_t frame_len = EAPOL_FRAME_LEN(mic_len) +
EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(frame, mic_len);
switch (frame->key_descriptor_version) {
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_MD5_ARC4:
return hmac_md5(kck, 16, frame, frame_len, mic, mic_len);
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_SHA1_AES:
return hmac_sha1(kck, 16, frame, frame_len, mic, mic_len);
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AES_128_CMAC_AES:
return cmac_aes(kck, 16, frame, frame_len, mic, mic_len);
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AKM_DEFINED:
switch (akm) {
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OSEN:
return cmac_aes(kck, 16, frame, frame_len,
mic, mic_len);
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
return hmac_sha384(kck, 24, frame, frame_len,
mic, mic_len);
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
switch (mic_len) {
case 16:
return hmac_sha256(kck, mic_len, frame,
frame_len, mic,
mic_len);
case 24:
return hmac_sha384(kck, 24, frame, frame_len,
mic, mic_len);
}
/* fall through */
default:
return false;
}
default:
return false;
}
}
bool eapol_verify_mic(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kck,
const struct eapol_key *frame, size_t mic_len)
{
uint8_t mic[MIC_MAXLEN];
struct iovec iov[3];
struct l_checksum *checksum = NULL;
iov[0].iov_base = (void *) frame;
iov[0].iov_len = offsetof(struct eapol_key, key_data);
memset(mic, 0, sizeof(mic));
iov[1].iov_base = mic;
iov[1].iov_len = mic_len;
iov[2].iov_base = (void *) EAPOL_KEY_DATA(frame, mic_len) - 2;
iov[2].iov_len = EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(frame, mic_len) + 2;
switch (frame->key_descriptor_version) {
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_MD5_ARC4:
checksum = l_checksum_new_hmac(L_CHECKSUM_MD5, kck, 16);
break;
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_SHA1_AES:
checksum = l_checksum_new_hmac(L_CHECKSUM_SHA1, kck, 16);
break;
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AES_128_CMAC_AES:
checksum = l_checksum_new_cmac_aes(kck, 16);
break;
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AKM_DEFINED:
switch (akm) {
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OSEN:
checksum = l_checksum_new_cmac_aes(kck, 16);
break;
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
checksum = l_checksum_new_hmac(L_CHECKSUM_SHA384,
kck, 24);
break;
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
switch (mic_len) {
case 16:
checksum = l_checksum_new_hmac(
L_CHECKSUM_SHA256,
kck, 16);
break;
case 24:
checksum = l_checksum_new_hmac(
L_CHECKSUM_SHA384,
kck, 24);
break;
case 32:
checksum = l_checksum_new_hmac(
L_CHECKSUM_SHA512,
kck, 32);
break;
default:
l_error("Invalid MIC length of %zu for OWE",
mic_len);
return false;
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
if (checksum == NULL)
return false;
l_checksum_updatev(checksum, iov, 3);
l_checksum_get_digest(checksum, mic, mic_len);
l_checksum_free(checksum);
if (!memcmp(frame->key_data, mic, mic_len))
return true;
return false;
}
/*
* IEEE 802.11 Table 12-8 -- Integrity and key-wrap algorithms
*/
static size_t eapol_get_mic_length(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, size_t pmk_len)
{
switch (akm) {
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SUITE_B_SHA384:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
return 24;
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
switch (pmk_len) {
case 32:
return 16;
case 48:
return 24;
case 64:
return 32;
default:
l_error("Invalid PMK length of %zu for OWE", pmk_len);
return 0;
}
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA384:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384:
return 0;
default:
return 16;
}
}
uint8_t *eapol_decrypt_key_data(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kek,
const struct eapol_key *frame,
size_t *decrypted_size, size_t mic_len)
{
size_t key_data_len = EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(frame, mic_len);
const uint8_t *key_data = EAPOL_KEY_DATA(frame, mic_len);
size_t expected_len;
uint8_t *buf;
size_t kek_len;
switch (frame->key_descriptor_version) {
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_MD5_ARC4:
expected_len = key_data_len;
break;
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AKM_DEFINED:
switch (akm) {
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA384:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384:
if (key_data_len < 16)
return NULL;
expected_len = key_data_len - 16;
break;
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OSEN:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
if (key_data_len < 24 || key_data_len % 8)
return NULL;
expected_len = key_data_len - 8;
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
break;
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_SHA1_AES:
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AES_128_CMAC_AES:
if (key_data_len < 24 || key_data_len % 8)
return NULL;
expected_len = key_data_len - 8;
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
buf = l_new(uint8_t, expected_len);
switch (frame->key_descriptor_version) {
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_MD5_ARC4:
{
uint8_t key[32];
bool ret;
memcpy(key, frame->eapol_key_iv, 16);
memcpy(key + 16, kek, 16);
ret = arc4_skip(key, 32, 256, key_data, key_data_len, buf);
explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
if (!ret)
goto error;
break;
}
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_SHA1_AES:
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AES_128_CMAC_AES:
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AKM_DEFINED:
switch (akm) {
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
switch (mic_len) {
case 16:
kek_len = 16;
break;
case 24:
case 32:
kek_len = 32;
break;
default:
l_error("Invalid MIC length of %zu for OWE",
mic_len);
goto error;
}
if (!aes_unwrap(kek, kek_len, key_data,
key_data_len, buf))
goto error;
break;
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA384:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384:
{
struct iovec ad[1];
ad[0].iov_base = (void *)frame;
ad[0].iov_len = key_data - (const uint8_t *)frame;
if (akm == IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256 || akm ==
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256)
kek_len = 32;
else
kek_len = 64;
if (!aes_siv_decrypt(kek, kek_len, key_data,
key_data_len, ad, 1, buf))
goto error;
break;
}
default:
kek_len = 16;
if (!aes_unwrap(kek, kek_len, key_data,
key_data_len, buf))
goto error;
break;
}
break;
}
if (decrypted_size)
*decrypted_size = expected_len;
return buf;
error:
l_free(buf);
return NULL;
}
static int padded_aes_wrap(const uint8_t *kek, uint8_t *key_data,
size_t *key_data_len,
struct eapol_key *out_frame, size_t mic_len)
{
if (*key_data_len < 16 || *key_data_len % 8)
key_data[(*key_data_len)++] = 0xdd;
while (*key_data_len < 16 || *key_data_len % 8)
key_data[(*key_data_len)++] = 0x00;
if (!aes_wrap(kek, key_data, *key_data_len,
EAPOL_KEY_DATA(out_frame, mic_len)))
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
*key_data_len += 8;
return 0;
}
/*
* Pad and encrypt the plaintext Key Data contents in @key_data using
* the encryption scheme required by @out_frame->key_descriptor_version,
* write results to @out_frame->key_data and @out_frame->key_data_len.
*
* Note that for efficiency @key_data is being modified, including in
* case of failure, so it must be sufficiently larger than @key_data_len.
*/
static int eapol_encrypt_key_data(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kek,
uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_len,
struct eapol_key *out_frame, size_t mic_len)
{
uint8_t key[32];
int ret;
switch (out_frame->key_descriptor_version) {
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_MD5_ARC4:
/*
* Not following the spec to generate the IV. The spec outlines
* a procedure where a 32 byte buffer is held and incremented
* each time nonces are created, and the IV comes from this
* buffer. In the end randomizing the IV every time should be
* just as good. This is how we handle the GTK in AP mode.
*/
l_getrandom(out_frame->eapol_key_iv, 16);
memcpy(key, out_frame->eapol_key_iv, 16);
memcpy(key + 16, kek, 16);
ret = arc4_skip(key, 32, 256, key_data, key_data_len,
EAPOL_KEY_DATA(out_frame, mic_len));
explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
if (!ret)
return -ENOTSUP;
break;
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_HMAC_SHA1_AES:
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AES_128_CMAC_AES:
ret = padded_aes_wrap(kek, key_data, &key_data_len,
out_frame, mic_len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
break;
case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AKM_DEFINED:
switch (akm) {
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256:
ret = padded_aes_wrap(kek, key_data, &key_data_len,
out_frame, mic_len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
break;
default:
return -ENOTSUP;
}
}
l_put_be16(key_data_len, EAPOL_KEY_DATA(out_frame, mic_len) - 2);
return key_data_len;
}
static void eapol_key_data_append(struct eapol_key *ek,
size_t mic_len,
enum handshake_kde selector,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
{
uint16_t key_data_len = EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(ek, mic_len);
uint8_t *ptr = EAPOL_KEY_DATA(ek, mic_len);
ptr[key_data_len++] = IE_TYPE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
ptr[key_data_len++] = 4 + data_len;
l_put_be32(selector, ptr + key_data_len);
key_data_len += 4;
memcpy(ptr + key_data_len, data, data_len);
key_data_len += data_len;
l_put_be16(key_data_len, ek->key_data + mic_len);
}
#define VERIFY_PTK_COMMON(ek) \
if (!ek->key_type) \
return false; \
if (ek->smk_message) \
return false; \
if (ek->request) \
return false; \
if (ek->error) \
return false \
bool eapol_verify_ptk_1_of_4(const struct eapol_key *ek, size_t mic_len,
bool ptk_complete)
{
/* Verify according to 802.11, Section 11.6.6.2 */
VERIFY_PTK_COMMON(ek);
if (ek->install)
return false;
if (!ek->key_ack)
return false;
if (ek->key_mic)
return false;
L_WARN_ON(ek->secure != ptk_complete);
if (ek->encrypted_key_data)
return false;
if (ek->wpa_key_id)
return false;
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->key_rsc);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->reserved);
if (!l_memeqzero(EAPOL_KEY_MIC(ek), mic_len))
return false;
return true;
}
bool eapol_verify_ptk_2_of_4(const struct eapol_key *ek, bool ptk_complete)
{
uint16_t key_len;
/* Verify according to 802.11, Section 11.6.6.3 */
VERIFY_PTK_COMMON(ek);
if (ek->install)
return false;
if (ek->key_ack)
return false;
if (!ek->key_mic)
return false;
L_WARN_ON(ek->secure != ptk_complete);
if (ek->encrypted_key_data)
return false;
if (ek->wpa_key_id)
return false;
if (ek->request)
return false;
key_len = L_BE16_TO_CPU(ek->key_length);
L_WARN_ON(key_len != 0);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->eapol_key_iv);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->key_rsc);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->reserved);
return true;
}
bool eapol_verify_ptk_3_of_4(const struct eapol_key *ek, bool is_wpa,
size_t mic_len)
{
uint16_t key_len;
/* Verify according to 802.11, Section 11.6.6.4 */
VERIFY_PTK_COMMON(ek);
/*
* TODO: Handle cases where install might be 0:
* For PTK generation, 0 only if the AP does not support key mapping
* keys, or if the STA has the No Pairwise bit (in the RSN Capabilities
* field) equal to 1 and only the group key is used.
*/
if (!ek->install)
return false;
if (!ek->key_ack)
return false;
if (mic_len && !ek->key_mic)
return false;
if (ek->secure != !is_wpa)
return false;
/* Must be encrypted when GTK is present but reserved in WPA */
if (!ek->encrypted_key_data && !is_wpa)
return false;
if (ek->wpa_key_id)
return false;
key_len = L_BE16_TO_CPU(ek->key_length);
if (key_len != 16 && key_len != 32)
return false;
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->reserved);
return true;
}
bool eapol_verify_ptk_4_of_4(const struct eapol_key *ek, bool is_wpa)
{
uint16_t key_len;
/* Verify according to 802.11, Section 11.6.6.5 */
VERIFY_PTK_COMMON(ek);
if (ek->install)
return false;
if (ek->key_ack)
return false;
if (!ek->key_mic)
return false;
if (ek->secure != !is_wpa)
return false;
if (ek->encrypted_key_data)
return false;
if (ek->wpa_key_id)
return false;
if (ek->request)
return false;
key_len = L_BE16_TO_CPU(ek->key_length);
L_WARN_ON(key_len != 0);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->key_nonce);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->eapol_key_iv);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->key_rsc);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->reserved);
return true;
}
#define VERIFY_GTK_COMMON(ek) \
if (ek->key_type) \
return false; \
if (ek->smk_message) \
return false; \
if (ek->request) \
return false; \
if (ek->error) \
return false; \
if (ek->install) \
return false \
bool eapol_verify_gtk_1_of_2(const struct eapol_key *ek, bool is_wpa,
size_t mic_len)
{
uint16_t key_len;
VERIFY_GTK_COMMON(ek);
if (!ek->key_ack)
return false;
if (mic_len && !ek->key_mic)
return false;
if (!ek->secure)
return false;
/* Must be encrypted when GTK is present but reserved in WPA */
if (!ek->encrypted_key_data && !is_wpa)
return false;
/*
* In P802.11i/D3.0 the Key Length should be 16 for WPA but hostapd
* uses 16 for CCMP and 32 for TKIP. Since 802.11i-2004 there's
* inconsistency in the required value, for example 0 is clearly
* specified in 802.11-2012 11.6.7.2 but 11.6.2 doesn't list 0 and
* makes the value depend on the pairwise key type.
*/
key_len = L_BE16_TO_CPU(ek->key_length);
if (key_len != 0 && key_len != 16 && key_len != 32)
return false;
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->reserved);
/*
* WPA_80211_v3_1, Section 2.2.4:
* "Key Index (bits 4 and 5): specifies the key id of the temporal
* key of the key derived from the message. The value of this shall be
* zero (0) if the value of Key Type (bit 4) is Pairwise (1). The Key
* Type and Key Index shall not both be 0 in the same message.
*
* Group keys shall not use key id 0. This means that key ids 1 to 3
* are available to be used to identify Group keys. This document
* recommends that implementations reserve key ids 1 and 2 for Group
* Keys, and that key id 3 is not used.
*/
if (is_wpa && !ek->wpa_key_id)
return false;
return true;
}
bool eapol_verify_gtk_2_of_2(const struct eapol_key *ek, bool is_wpa)
{
uint16_t key_len;
/* Verify according to 802.11, Section 11.6.7.3 */
VERIFY_GTK_COMMON(ek);
if (ek->key_ack)
return false;
if (!ek->key_mic)
return false;
if (!ek->secure)
return false;
if (ek->encrypted_key_data)
return false;
key_len = L_BE16_TO_CPU(ek->key_length);
if (key_len != 0)
return false;
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->key_nonce);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->eapol_key_iv);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->key_rsc);
VERIFY_IS_ZERO(ek->reserved);
return true;
}
static struct eapol_key *eapol_create_common(
enum eapol_protocol_version protocol,
enum eapol_key_descriptor_version version,
bool secure,
uint64_t key_replay_counter,
const uint8_t snonce[],
size_t extra_len,
const uint8_t *extra_data,
int key_type,
bool is_wpa,
size_t mic_len)
{
size_t extra_key_len = (mic_len == 0) ? 16 : 0;
size_t to_alloc = EAPOL_FRAME_LEN(mic_len);
struct eapol_key *out_frame = l_malloc(to_alloc + extra_len +
extra_key_len);
memset(out_frame, 0, to_alloc + extra_len + extra_key_len);
out_frame->header.protocol_version = protocol;
out_frame->header.packet_type = 0x3;
out_frame->header.packet_len = L_CPU_TO_BE16(to_alloc + extra_len +
extra_key_len - 4);
out_frame->descriptor_type = is_wpa ? EAPOL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_WPA :
EAPOL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_80211;
out_frame->key_descriptor_version = version;
out_frame->key_type = key_type;
out_frame->install = false;
out_frame->key_ack = false;
out_frame->key_mic = (mic_len) ? true : false;
out_frame->secure = secure;
out_frame->error = false;
out_frame->request = false;
out_frame->encrypted_key_data = (mic_len) ? false : true;
out_frame->smk_message = false;
out_frame->key_length = 0;
out_frame->key_replay_counter = L_CPU_TO_BE64(key_replay_counter);
memcpy(out_frame->key_nonce, snonce, sizeof(out_frame->key_nonce));
l_put_be16(extra_len + extra_key_len, out_frame->key_data + mic_len);
if (extra_len)
memcpy(EAPOL_KEY_DATA(out_frame, mic_len), extra_data,
extra_len);
return out_frame;
}
struct eapol_key *eapol_create_ptk_2_of_4(
enum eapol_protocol_version protocol,
enum eapol_key_descriptor_version version,
uint64_t key_replay_counter,
const uint8_t snonce[],
size_t extra_len,
const uint8_t *extra_data,
bool is_wpa,
size_t mic_len,
bool secure)
{
return eapol_create_common(protocol, version, secure,
key_replay_counter, snonce, extra_len,
extra_data, 1, is_wpa, mic_len);
}
struct eapol_key *eapol_create_ptk_4_of_4(
enum eapol_protocol_version protocol,
enum eapol_key_descriptor_version version,
uint64_t key_replay_counter,
bool is_wpa,
size_t mic_len)
{
uint8_t snonce[32];
memset(snonce, 0, sizeof(snonce));
return eapol_create_common(protocol, version,
is_wpa ? false : true,
key_replay_counter, snonce, 0, NULL,
1, is_wpa, mic_len);
}
struct eapol_key *eapol_create_gtk_2_of_2(
enum eapol_protocol_version protocol,
enum eapol_key_descriptor_version version,
uint64_t key_replay_counter,
size_t extra_len,
const uint8_t *extra_data,
bool is_wpa, uint8_t wpa_key_id, size_t mic_len)
{
uint8_t snonce[32];
struct eapol_key *step2;
memset(snonce, 0, sizeof(snonce));
step2 = eapol_create_common(protocol, version, true,
key_replay_counter, snonce,
extra_len, extra_data, 0, is_wpa,
mic_len);
if (!step2)
return step2;
/*
* WPA_80211_v3_1, Section 2.2.4:
* "The Key Type and Key Index shall not both be 0 in the same message"
*
* The above means that even though sending the key index back to the
* AP has no practical value, we must still do so.
*/
if (is_wpa)
step2->wpa_key_id = wpa_key_id;
return step2;
}
struct eapol_frame_watch {
uint32_t ifindex;
struct watchlist_item super;
};
static void eapol_frame_watch_free(struct watchlist_item *item)
{
struct eapol_frame_watch *efw =
l_container_of(item, struct eapol_frame_watch, super);
l_free(efw);
}
static const struct watchlist_ops eapol_frame_watch_ops = {
.item_free = eapol_frame_watch_free,
};
static int32_t eapol_frame_watch_add(uint32_t ifindex,
eapol_frame_watch_func_t handler,
void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_frame_watch *efw;
efw = l_new(struct eapol_frame_watch, 1);
efw->ifindex = ifindex;
return watchlist_link(&frame_watches, &efw->super,
handler, user_data, NULL);
}
static bool eapol_frame_watch_remove(uint32_t id)
{
return watchlist_remove(&frame_watches, id);
}
struct eapol_sm {
struct handshake_state *handshake;
enum eapol_protocol_version protocol_version;
uint64_t replay_counter;
void *user_data;
struct l_timeout *timeout;
struct l_timeout *eapol_start_timeout;
unsigned int frame_retry;
uint16_t listen_interval;
bool have_replay:1;
bool started:1;
bool use_eapol_start:1;
bool require_handshake:1;
bool eap_exchanged:1;
bool last_eap_unencrypted:1;
struct eap_state *eap;
struct eapol_frame *early_frame;
bool early_frame_unencrypted : 1;
uint32_t watch_id;
uint8_t installed_gtk_len;
uint8_t installed_gtk[CRYPTO_MAX_GTK_LEN];
uint8_t installed_igtk_len;
uint8_t installed_igtk[CRYPTO_MAX_IGTK_LEN];
unsigned int mic_len;
bool rekey : 1;
};
static void eapol_sm_destroy(void *value)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = value;
l_timeout_remove(sm->timeout);
l_timeout_remove(sm->eapol_start_timeout);
if (sm->eap)
eap_free(sm->eap);
l_free(sm->early_frame);
eapol_frame_watch_remove(sm->watch_id);
sm->installed_gtk_len = 0;
explicit_bzero(sm->installed_gtk, sizeof(sm->installed_gtk));
sm->installed_igtk_len = 0;
explicit_bzero(sm->installed_igtk, sizeof(sm->installed_igtk));
l_free(sm);
}
struct eapol_sm *eapol_sm_new(struct handshake_state *hs)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm;
sm = l_new(struct eapol_sm, 1);
sm->handshake = hs;
if (hs->settings_8021x && !hs->authenticator)
sm->use_eapol_start = true;
sm->require_handshake = true;
return sm;
}
void eapol_sm_free(struct eapol_sm *sm)
{
l_queue_remove(state_machines, sm);
eapol_sm_destroy(sm);
}
void eapol_sm_set_listen_interval(struct eapol_sm *sm, uint16_t interval)
{
sm->listen_interval = interval;
}
void eapol_sm_set_user_data(struct eapol_sm *sm, void *user_data)
{
sm->user_data = user_data;
}
static void eapol_sm_write(struct eapol_sm *sm, const struct eapol_frame *ef,
bool noencrypt)
{
const uint8_t *dst = sm->handshake->authenticator ?
sm->handshake->spa : sm->handshake->aa;
__eapol_tx_packet(sm->handshake->ifindex, dst, ETH_P_PAE, ef,
noencrypt);
}
static inline void handshake_failed(struct eapol_sm *sm, uint16_t reason_code)
{
handshake_event(sm->handshake, HANDSHAKE_EVENT_FAILED, reason_code);
eapol_sm_free(sm);
}
static void eapol_timeout(struct l_timeout *timeout, void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
l_timeout_remove(sm->timeout);
sm->timeout = NULL;
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT);
}
static void eapol_install_gtk(struct eapol_sm *sm, uint8_t gtk_key_index,
const uint8_t *gtk, size_t gtk_len,
const uint8_t *rsc)
{
/*
* Don't install the same GTK. On older kernels this resets the
* replay counters, etc and can lead to various attacks
*/
if (sm->installed_gtk_len == gtk_len &&
!memcmp(sm->installed_gtk, gtk, gtk_len))
return;
handshake_state_install_gtk(sm->handshake, gtk_key_index,
gtk, gtk_len, rsc, 6);
memcpy(sm->installed_gtk, gtk, gtk_len);
sm->installed_gtk_len = gtk_len;
}
static void eapol_install_igtk(struct eapol_sm *sm, uint16_t igtk_key_index,
const uint8_t *igtk, size_t igtk_len)
{
/*
* Don't install the same IGTK. On older kernels this resets the
* replay counters, etc and can lead to various attacks
*/
if (sm->installed_igtk_len == igtk_len - 6 &&
!memcmp(sm->installed_igtk, igtk + 6, igtk_len - 6))
return;
handshake_state_install_igtk(sm->handshake, igtk_key_index,
igtk + 6, igtk_len - 6, igtk);
memcpy(sm->installed_igtk, igtk + 6, igtk_len - 6);
sm->installed_igtk_len = igtk_len - 6;
}
static void __send_eapol_start(struct eapol_sm *sm, bool noencrypt)
{
uint8_t buf[sizeof(struct eapol_frame)] = {};
struct eapol_frame *frame = (struct eapol_frame *) buf;
frame->header.protocol_version = EAPOL_PROTOCOL_VERSION_2001;
frame->header.packet_type = 1;
l_put_be16(0, &frame->header.packet_len);
eapol_sm_write(sm, frame, noencrypt);
}
static void send_eapol_start(struct l_timeout *timeout, void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
l_timeout_remove(sm->eapol_start_timeout);
sm->eapol_start_timeout = NULL;
/*
* AP is probably waiting for us to start, so always send unencrypted
* since the key hasn't been established yet
*/
__send_eapol_start(sm, true);
}
static void eapol_set_key_timeout(struct eapol_sm *sm,
l_timeout_notify_cb_t cb)
{
/*
* 802.11-2016 12.7.6.6: "The retransmit timeout value shall be
* 100 ms for the first timeout, half the listen interval for the
* second timeout, and the listen interval for subsequent timeouts.
* If there is no listen interval or the listen interval is zero,
* then 100 ms shall be used for all timeout values."
*/
unsigned int timeout_ms = 100;
unsigned int beacon_us = 100 * 1024;
sm->frame_retry++;
if (sm->frame_retry == 2 &&
sm->listen_interval != 0)
timeout_ms = sm->listen_interval * beacon_us / 2000;
else if (sm->frame_retry > 2 &&
sm->listen_interval != 0)
timeout_ms = sm->listen_interval * beacon_us / 1000;
if (sm->frame_retry > 1)
l_timeout_modify_ms(sm->timeout, timeout_ms);
else {
if (sm->timeout)
l_timeout_remove(sm->timeout);
sm->timeout = l_timeout_create_ms(timeout_ms, cb, sm,
NULL);
}
}
/*
* GCC version 8.3 seems to have trouble correctly calculating
* ek->header.packet_len when optimization is enabled. This results in iwd
* sending invalid 1_of_4 packets (with the KDE payload missing). Work
* around this by dropping to O0 for this function when old GCC versions
* are used
*/
#if __GNUC__ < 9
#pragma GCC optimize ("O0")
#endif
/* 802.11-2016 Section 12.7.6.2 */
static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm)
{
const uint8_t *aa = sm->handshake->aa;
uint8_t frame_buf[512];
struct eapol_key *ek = (struct eapol_key *) frame_buf;
enum crypto_cipher cipher = ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(
sm->handshake->pairwise_cipher);
uint8_t pmkid[16];
uint8_t key_descriptor_version;
handshake_state_new_anonce(sm->handshake);
sm->replay_counter++;
memset(ek, 0, EAPOL_FRAME_LEN(sm->mic_len));
ek->header.protocol_version = sm->protocol_version;
ek->header.packet_type = 0x3;
ek->descriptor_type = EAPOL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_80211;
L_WARN_ON(eapol_key_descriptor_version_from_akm(
sm->handshake->akm_suite,
sm->handshake->pairwise_cipher,
&key_descriptor_version) < 0);
ek->key_descriptor_version = key_descriptor_version;
ek->key_type = true;
ek->key_ack = true;
ek->key_length = L_CPU_TO_BE16(crypto_cipher_key_len(cipher));
ek->key_replay_counter = L_CPU_TO_BE64(sm->replay_counter);
memcpy(ek->key_nonce, sm->handshake->anonce, sizeof(ek->key_nonce));
/* Write the PMKID KDE into Key Data field unencrypted */
crypto_derive_pmkid(sm->handshake->pmk, 32, sm->handshake->spa, aa,
pmkid, L_CHECKSUM_SHA1);
eapol_key_data_append(ek, sm->mic_len, HANDSHAKE_KDE_PMKID, pmkid, 16);
if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete) {
sm->rekey = true;
sm->handshake->ptk_complete = false;
}
ek->secure = sm->rekey;
ek->header.packet_len = L_CPU_TO_BE16(EAPOL_FRAME_LEN(sm->mic_len) +
EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(ek, sm->mic_len) - 4);
l_debug("STA: "MAC" retries=%u", MAC_STR(sm->handshake->spa),
sm->frame_retry);
eapol_sm_write(sm, (struct eapol_frame *) ek, false);
}
#if __GNUC__ < 9
#pragma GCC reset_options
#endif
static void eapol_ptk_1_of_4_retry(struct l_timeout *timeout, void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
if (sm->frame_retry >= 3) {
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT);
return;
}
eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(sm);
eapol_set_key_timeout(sm, eapol_ptk_1_of_4_retry);
}
static inline size_t append_ie(uint8_t *ies, const uint8_t *ie)
{
if (!ie)
return 0;
memcpy(ies, ie, ie[1] + 2);
return ie[1] + 2;
}
static size_t append_oci(uint8_t *ies, const struct band_chandef *chandef)
{
unsigned int len = 0;
ies[len++] = IE_TYPE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
ies[len++] = 4 + 3;
l_put_be32(HANDSHAKE_KDE_OCI, ies + len);
len += 4;
oci_from_chandef(chandef, ies + len);
len += 3;
return len;
}
static void eapol_handle_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const struct eapol_key *ek,
bool unencrypted)
{
const uint8_t *kck;
struct eapol_key *step2;
uint8_t mic[MIC_MAXLEN];
uint8_t ies[1024];
size_t ies_len;
const uint8_t *own_ie = sm->handshake->supplicant_ie;
const uint8_t *pmkid;
struct ie_rsn_info rsn_info;
l_debug("ifindex=%u", sm->handshake->ifindex);
if (!eapol_verify_ptk_1_of_4(ek, sm->mic_len,
sm->handshake->ptk_complete))
return;
if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete && unencrypted) {
l_debug("Dropping unexpectedly unencrypted PTK 1/4 frame");
return;
}
pmkid = handshake_util_find_pmkid_kde(EAPOL_KEY_DATA(ek, sm->mic_len),
EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(ek, sm->mic_len));
if (!sm->handshake->wpa_ie) {
if (ie_parse_rsne_from_data(own_ie, own_ie[1] + 2,
&rsn_info) < 0)
goto error_unspecified;
}
/*
* Require the PMKID KDE whenever we've sent a list of PMKIDs in
* our RSNE and we've haven't seen any EAPOL-EAP frame since
* (sm->eap_exchanged is false), otherwise treat it as optional and
* only validate it against our PMK. Some 802.11-2012 sections
* show message 1/4 without a PMKID KDE and there are APs that
* send no PMKID KDE.
*/
if (!sm->eap_exchanged && !sm->handshake->wpa_ie &&
rsn_info.num_pmkids &&
sm->require_handshake) {
bool found = false;
int i;
if (!pmkid)
goto error_unspecified;
for (i = 0; i < rsn_info.num_pmkids; i++)
if (!l_secure_memcmp(rsn_info.pmkids + i * 16,
pmkid, 16)) {
found = true;
break;
}
if (!found)
goto error_unspecified;
} else if (pmkid) {
if (!handshake_state_pmkid_matches(sm->handshake, pmkid)) {
l_debug("Authenticator sent a PMKID that didn't match");
/*
* If the AP has a different PMKSA from ours and we
* have means to create a new PMKSA through EAP then
* try that, otherwise give up.
*/
if (sm->eap) {
__send_eapol_start(sm, unencrypted);
return;
}
/*
* Some APs are known to send a PMKID KDE with all
* zeros for the PMKID. Others just send seemingly
* random data. Likely we can still
* successfully negotiate a handshake, so ignore this
* for now and treat it as if the PMKID KDE was not
* included
*/
}
}
/*
* If we're in a state where we have successfully processed Message 3,
* then assume that the new message 1 is a PTK rekey and start a new
* handshake
*/
if (!sm->handshake->have_snonce ||
memcmp(sm->handshake->anonce,
ek->key_nonce, sizeof(ek->key_nonce)) ||
sm->handshake->ptk_complete) {
if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete && sm->handshake->no_rekey) {
/*
* In case of rekey not being allowed, signal to upper
* layers that we need to do a full reauth
*/
handshake_event(sm->handshake,
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_REKEY_FAILED);
return;
}
if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete)
sm->rekey = true;
handshake_state_new_snonce(sm->handshake);
handshake_state_set_anonce(sm->handshake, ek->key_nonce);
if (!handshake_state_derive_ptk(sm->handshake))
goto error_unspecified;
}
if (IE_AKM_IS_FT(sm->handshake->akm_suite)) {
/*
* Rebuild the RSNE to include the PMKR1Name and append
* MDE + FTE.
*/
rsn_info.num_pmkids = 1;
rsn_info.pmkids = sm->handshake->pmk_r1_name;
ie_build_rsne(&rsn_info, ies);
ies_len = ies[1] + 2;
ies_len += append_ie(ies + ies_len, sm->handshake->mde);
ies_len += append_ie(ies + ies_len,
sm->handshake->authenticator_fte);
} else {
ies_len = append_ie(ies, own_ie);
}
if (sm->handshake->support_ip_allocation) {
/* Wi-Fi P2P Technical Specification v1.7 Table 58 */
ies[ies_len++] = IE_TYPE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
ies[ies_len++] = 4 + 1;
l_put_be32(HANDSHAKE_KDE_IP_ADDRESS_REQ, ies + ies_len);
ies_len += 4;
ies[ies_len++] = 0x01;
}
/*
* IEEE 802.11-2020 Section 12.7.6.3
* "Additionally, contains an OCI KDE when
* dot11RSNAOperatingChannelValidationActivated is true on the
* Supplicant."
*/
if (sm->handshake->supplicant_ocvc && sm->handshake->chandef)
ies_len += append_oci(ies + ies_len, sm->handshake->chandef);
/*
* 802.11-2020, Section 12.7.6.3:
* "The RSNXE that the Supplicant sent in its (Re)Association Request
* frame, if this element is present in the (Re)Association Request
* frame that the Supplicant sent."
*/
ies_len += append_ie(ies + ies_len, sm->handshake->supplicant_rsnxe);
step2 = eapol_create_ptk_2_of_4(sm->protocol_version,
ek->key_descriptor_version,
L_BE64_TO_CPU(ek->key_replay_counter),
sm->handshake->snonce, ies_len, ies,
sm->handshake->wpa_ie, sm->mic_len,
sm->rekey);
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(sm->handshake);
if (sm->mic_len) {
if (!eapol_calculate_mic(sm->handshake->akm_suite, kck,
step2, mic, sm->mic_len)) {
l_info("MIC calculation failed. "
"Ensure Kernel Crypto is available.");
l_free(step2);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
memcpy(EAPOL_KEY_MIC(step2), mic, sm->mic_len);
} else {
if (!eapol_aes_siv_encrypt(
handshake_state_get_kek(sm->handshake),
handshake_state_get_kek_len(sm->handshake),
step2, ies, ies_len)) {
l_debug("AES-SIV encryption failed");
l_free(step2);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
}
eapol_sm_write(sm, (struct eapol_frame *) step2, unencrypted);
l_free(step2);
l_timeout_remove(sm->eapol_start_timeout);
sm->eapol_start_timeout = NULL;
return;
error_unspecified:
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
}
#define EAPOL_PAIRWISE_UPDATE_COUNT 3
/* 802.11-2016 Section 12.7.6.4 */
static void eapol_send_ptk_3_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm)
{
uint8_t frame_buf[512];
unsigned int rsne_len = sm->handshake->authenticator_ie[1] + 2;
uint8_t key_data_buf[128 + rsne_len];
int key_data_len = rsne_len;
struct eapol_key *ek = (struct eapol_key *) frame_buf;
enum crypto_cipher cipher = ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(
sm->handshake->pairwise_cipher);
enum crypto_cipher group_cipher = ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(
sm->handshake->group_cipher);
const uint8_t *kck;
const uint8_t *kek;
uint8_t key_descriptor_version;
sm->replay_counter++;
memset(ek, 0, EAPOL_FRAME_LEN(sm->mic_len));
ek->header.protocol_version = sm->protocol_version;
ek->header.packet_type = 0x3;
ek->descriptor_type = EAPOL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_80211;
L_WARN_ON(eapol_key_descriptor_version_from_akm(
sm->handshake->akm_suite,
sm->handshake->pairwise_cipher,
&key_descriptor_version) < 0);
ek->key_descriptor_version = key_descriptor_version;
ek->key_type = true;
ek->install = true;
ek->key_ack = true;
ek->key_mic = true;
ek->secure = true;
ek->encrypted_key_data = true;
ek->key_length = L_CPU_TO_BE16(crypto_cipher_key_len(cipher));
ek->key_replay_counter = L_CPU_TO_BE64(sm->replay_counter);
memcpy(ek->key_nonce, sm->handshake->anonce, sizeof(ek->key_nonce));
memcpy(ek->key_rsc, sm->handshake->gtk_rsc, 6);
ek->key_rsc[6] = 0;
ek->key_rsc[7] = 0;
/*
* Just one RSNE in Key Data as we either accept the single pairwise
* cipher in the supplicant IE or fail.
*/
memcpy(key_data_buf, sm->handshake->authenticator_ie, rsne_len);
if (group_cipher) {
uint8_t *gtk_kde = key_data_buf + key_data_len;
handshake_util_build_gtk_kde(group_cipher,
sm->handshake->gtk,
sm->handshake->gtk_index,
gtk_kde);
key_data_len += gtk_kde[1] + 2;
}
if (sm->handshake->mfp) {
enum crypto_cipher group_management_cipher =
ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(
sm->handshake->group_management_cipher);
uint8_t *igtk_kde = key_data_buf + key_data_len;
handshake_util_build_igtk_kde(group_management_cipher,
sm->handshake->igtk,
sm->handshake->igtk_index,
igtk_kde);
key_data_len += igtk_kde[1] + 2;
}
if (sm->handshake->support_ip_allocation &&
!sm->handshake->client_ip_addr) {
handshake_event(sm->handshake, HANDSHAKE_EVENT_P2P_IP_REQUEST);
/*
* If .support_ip_allocation was set, the
* HANDSHAKE_EVENT_P2P_IP_REQUEST handler is expected to set
* .client_ip_addr if not already set. Check if the handler
* was successful in allocating an address, if it wasn't we'll
* just skip the IP Address Allocation KDE. In either case if
* we need to resend message 3/4 the event callback won't be
* triggered again because the condition above will be false.
*/
if (!sm->handshake->client_ip_addr)
sm->handshake->support_ip_allocation = false;
}
if (sm->handshake->support_ip_allocation) {
/* Wi-Fi P2P Technical Specification v1.7 Table 59 */
key_data_buf[key_data_len++] = IE_TYPE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
key_data_buf[key_data_len++] = 4 + 12;
l_put_be32(HANDSHAKE_KDE_IP_ADDRESS_ALLOC,
key_data_buf + key_data_len + 0);
l_put_u32(sm->handshake->client_ip_addr,
key_data_buf + key_data_len + 4);
l_put_u32(sm->handshake->subnet_mask,
key_data_buf + key_data_len + 8);
l_put_u32(sm->handshake->go_ip_addr,
key_data_buf + key_data_len + 12);
key_data_len += 4 + 12;
}
kek = handshake_state_get_kek(sm->handshake);
key_data_len = eapol_encrypt_key_data(sm->handshake->akm_suite, kek,
key_data_buf, key_data_len, ek,
sm->mic_len);
explicit_bzero(key_data_buf, sizeof(key_data_buf));
if (key_data_len < 0)
return;
ek->header.packet_len = L_CPU_TO_BE16(EAPOL_FRAME_LEN(sm->mic_len) +
key_data_len - 4);
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(sm->handshake);
if (!eapol_calculate_mic(sm->handshake->akm_suite, kck, ek,
EAPOL_KEY_MIC(ek), sm->mic_len))
return;
l_debug("STA: "MAC" retries=%u", MAC_STR(sm->handshake->spa),
sm->frame_retry);
eapol_sm_write(sm, (struct eapol_frame *) ek, false);
}
static void eapol_ptk_3_of_4_retry(struct l_timeout *timeout,
void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
if (sm->frame_retry >= EAPOL_PAIRWISE_UPDATE_COUNT) {
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_4WAY_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT);
return;
}
eapol_send_ptk_3_of_4(sm);
eapol_set_key_timeout(sm, eapol_ptk_3_of_4_retry);
l_debug("attempt %i", sm->frame_retry);
}
static const uint8_t *eapol_find_rsne(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
const uint8_t **optional)
{
struct ie_tlv_iter iter;
const uint8_t *first = NULL;
ie_tlv_iter_init(&iter, data, data_len);
while (ie_tlv_iter_next(&iter)) {
if (ie_tlv_iter_get_tag(&iter) != IE_TYPE_RSN)
continue;
if (!first) {
first = ie_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter) - 2;
continue;
}
if (optional)
*optional = ie_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter) - 2;
return first;
}
return first;
}
static const uint8_t *eapol_find_wfa_kde(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
uint8_t oi_type)
{
struct ie_tlv_iter iter;
ie_tlv_iter_init(&iter, data, data_len);
while (ie_tlv_iter_next(&iter)) {
if (ie_tlv_iter_get_tag(&iter) == IE_TYPE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) {
if (!is_ie_wfa_ie(iter.data, iter.len, oi_type))
continue;
} else
continue;
return ie_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter) - 2;
}
return NULL;
}
/* 802.11-2016 Section 12.7.6.3 */
static void eapol_handle_ptk_2_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const struct eapol_key *ek)
{
const uint8_t *rsne;
size_t ptk_size;
const uint8_t *kck;
const uint8_t *aa = sm->handshake->aa;
enum l_checksum_type type;
l_debug("ifindex=%u", sm->handshake->ifindex);
if (!eapol_verify_ptk_2_of_4(ek, sm->rekey))
return;
if (L_BE64_TO_CPU(ek->key_replay_counter) != sm->replay_counter)
return;
ptk_size = handshake_state_get_ptk_size(sm->handshake);
type = L_CHECKSUM_SHA1;
if (sm->handshake->akm_suite == IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256)
type = L_CHECKSUM_SHA256;
if (!crypto_derive_pairwise_ptk(sm->handshake->pmk,
sm->handshake->pmk_len,
sm->handshake->spa, aa,
sm->handshake->anonce, ek->key_nonce,
sm->handshake->ptk, ptk_size,
type))
return;
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(sm->handshake);
if (!eapol_verify_mic(sm->handshake->akm_suite, kck, ek,
sm->mic_len))
return;
/*
* 12.7.6.3 b) 2) "the Authenticator checks that the RSNE bitwise
* matches that from the (Re)Association Request frame.
*/
rsne = eapol_find_rsne(EAPOL_KEY_DATA(ek, sm->mic_len),
EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(ek, sm->mic_len), NULL);
if (!rsne || rsne[1] != sm->handshake->supplicant_ie[1] ||
memcmp(rsne + 2, sm->handshake->supplicant_ie + 2,
rsne[1])) {
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_IE_DIFFERENT);
return;
}
if (sm->handshake->support_ip_allocation) {
size_t len;
const uint8_t *ip_req_kde =
handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_IP_ADDRESS_REQ,
EAPOL_KEY_DATA(ek, sm->mic_len),
EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(ek, sm->mic_len),
&len);
if (ip_req_kde && (len < 1 || ip_req_kde[0] != 0x01)) {
l_debug("Invalid IP Address Request KDE in frame 2/4");
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_INVALID_IE);
return;
}
sm->handshake->support_ip_allocation = ip_req_kde != NULL;
}
/*
* If the snonce is already set don't reset the retry counter as this
* is a rekey. To be safe take the most recent snonce (in this frame)
* in case the station created a new one.
*/
if (!sm->handshake->have_snonce)
sm->frame_retry = 0;
memcpy(sm->handshake->snonce, ek->key_nonce,
sizeof(sm->handshake->snonce));
sm->handshake->have_snonce = true;
eapol_ptk_3_of_4_retry(NULL, sm);
}
static const uint8_t *eapol_find_wpa_ie(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
{
struct ie_tlv_iter iter;
ie_tlv_iter_init(&iter, data, data_len);
while (ie_tlv_iter_next(&iter)) {
if (ie_tlv_iter_get_tag(&iter) != IE_TYPE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC)
continue;
if (is_ie_wpa_ie(ie_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter),
ie_tlv_iter_get_length(&iter)))
return ie_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter) - 2;
}
return NULL;
}
static bool eapol_check_ip_mask(const uint8_t *mask,
const uint8_t *ip1, const uint8_t *ip2)
{
uint32_t mask_uint = l_get_be32(mask);
uint32_t ip1_uint = l_get_be32(ip1);
uint32_t ip2_uint = l_get_be32(ip2);
return
/* Check IPs are in the same subnet */
((ip1_uint ^ ip2_uint) & mask_uint) == 0 &&
/* Check IPs are different */
ip1_uint != ip2_uint &&
/* Check IPs are not subnet addresses */
(ip1_uint & ~mask_uint) != 0 &&
(ip2_uint & ~mask_uint) != 0 &&
/* Check IPs are not broadcast addresses */
(ip1_uint | mask_uint) != 0xffffffff &&
(ip2_uint | mask_uint) != 0xffffffff &&
/* Check the 1s are at the start of the mask */
(uint32_t) (mask_uint << __builtin_popcountl(mask_uint)) == 0;
}
static int eapol_ie_matches(const void *ies, size_t ies_len,
enum ie_type type, uint8_t *target_ie)
{
struct ie_tlv_iter iter;
ie_tlv_iter_init(&iter, ies, ies_len);
while (ie_tlv_iter_next(&iter)) {
if (ie_tlv_iter_get_tag(&iter) != type)
continue;
if (!target_ie)
return -EINVAL;
if (memcmp(ie_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter) - 2,
target_ie, target_ie[1] + 2))
return -EBADMSG;
return 0;
}
if (!target_ie)
return 0;
return -ENOENT;
}
static void eapol_handle_ptk_3_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const struct eapol_key *ek,
const uint8_t *decrypted_key_data,
size_t decrypted_key_data_size,
bool unencrypted)
{
struct handshake_state *hs = sm->handshake;
const uint8_t *kck;
const uint8_t *kek;
_auto_(l_free) struct eapol_key *step4 = NULL;
uint8_t mic[MIC_MAXLEN];
const uint8_t *gtk = NULL;
size_t gtk_len;
const uint8_t *igtk = NULL;
size_t igtk_len;
const uint8_t *key_id = NULL;
size_t key_id_len;
const uint8_t *rsne;
struct ie_rsn_info rsn_info;
const uint8_t *optional_rsne = NULL;
const uint8_t *transition_disable;
size_t transition_disable_len;
uint8_t gtk_key_index;
uint16_t igtk_key_index;
const uint8_t *oci;
size_t oci_len;
int r;
l_debug("ifindex=%u", hs->ifindex);
if (!eapol_verify_ptk_3_of_4(ek, hs->wpa_ie, sm->mic_len))
return;
/*
* 802.11-2016, Section 12.7.6.4:
* "On reception of message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the
* message if the Key Replay Counter field value has already been used
* or if the ANonce value in message 3 differs from the ANonce value
* in message 1."
*/
if (memcmp(hs->anonce, ek->key_nonce, sizeof(ek->key_nonce)))
return;
/*
* 11.6.6.4: "Verifies the RSNE. If it is part of a Fast BSS Transition
* Initial Mobility Domain Association, see 12.4.2. Otherwise, if it is
* not identical to that the STA received in the Beacon or Probe
* Response frame, the STA shall disassociate.
*/
if (hs->wpa_ie)
rsne = eapol_find_wpa_ie(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size);
else if (hs->osen_ie)
rsne = eapol_find_wfa_kde(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
IE_WFA_OI_OSEN);
else
rsne = eapol_find_rsne(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
&optional_rsne);
if (!rsne)
goto error_ie_different;
if (!hs->wpa_ie)
r = ie_parse_rsne_from_data(rsne, rsne[1] + 2, &rsn_info);
else
r = ie_parse_wpa_from_data(rsne, rsne[1] + 2, &rsn_info);
if (r < 0)
goto error_ie_different;
if ((rsne[1] != hs->authenticator_ie[1] ||
memcmp(rsne + 2, hs->authenticator_ie + 2, rsne[1])) &&
!handshake_util_ap_ie_matches(&rsn_info,
hs->authenticator_ie,
hs->wpa_ie))
goto error_ie_different;
oci = handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_OCI, decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size, &oci_len);
if (hs->akm_suite &
(IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256)) {
if (rsn_info.num_pmkids != 1 || memcmp(rsn_info.pmkids,
hs->pmk_r1_name, 16))
goto error_ie_different;
if (eapol_ie_matches(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
IE_TYPE_MOBILITY_DOMAIN,
hs->mde) < 0)
goto error_ie_different;
if (eapol_ie_matches(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
IE_TYPE_FAST_BSS_TRANSITION,
hs->authenticator_fte) < 0)
goto error_ie_different;
}
/*
* 802.11-2020, Section 12.7.6.4:
* "If the RSNXE is present, the Supplicant verifies that the RSNXE is
* identical to that the STA received in the Beacon or Probe Response
* frame."
*
* Verify only if RSN is used
*/
if (!hs->osen_ie && !hs->wpa_ie &&
eapol_ie_matches(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
IE_TYPE_RSNX,
hs->authenticator_rsnxe) < 0)
goto error_ie_different;
/*
* 802.11-2020, Section 12.7.6.4
* If dot11RSNAOperatingChannelValidationActivated is true and
* Authenticator RSNE indicates OCVC capability, the Supplicant
* silently discards message 3 if any of the following are true:
* - OCI KDE or FTE OCI subelement is missing in the message
* - Channel information in the OCI does not match current operating
* channel parameters (see 12.2.9)
*/
if (hs->authenticator_ocvc &&
handshake_state_verify_oci(hs, oci, oci_len) < 0)
return;
/*
* If ptk_complete is set, then we are receiving Message 3 again.
* It must be a retransmission, otherwise the anonce wouldn't match
* and we wouldn't get here. Skip processing the rest of the message
* and send our reply. Do not install the keys again.
*/
if (hs->ptk_complete)
goto retransmit;
/*
* 11.6.6.4: "If a second RSNE is provided in the message, the
* Supplicant uses the pairwise cipher suite specified in the second
* RSNE or deauthenticates."
*/
if (optional_rsne) {
struct ie_rsn_info info2;
uint16_t override;
if (ie_parse_rsne_from_data(optional_rsne, optional_rsne[1] + 2,
&info2) < 0)
goto error_ie_different;
/*
* 11.6.2:
* It may happen, for example, that a Supplicant selects a
* pairwise cipher suite which is advertised by an AP, but
* which policy disallows for this particular STA. An
* Authenticator may, therefore, insert a second RSNE to
* overrule the STA's selection. An Authenticator's SME shall
* insert the second RSNE, after the first RSNE, only for this
* purpose. The pairwise cipher suite in the second RSNE
* included shall be one of the ciphers advertised by the
* Authenticator. All other fields in the second RSNE shall be
* identical to the first RSNE.
*
* - Check that akm_suites and group_cipher are the same
* between rsne1 and rsne2
* - Check that pairwise_ciphers is not the same between rsne1
* and rsne2
* - Check that rsne2 pairwise_ciphers is a subset of rsne
*/
if (rsn_info.akm_suites != info2.akm_suites ||
rsn_info.group_cipher != info2.group_cipher)
goto error_ie_different;
override = info2.pairwise_ciphers;
if (override == rsn_info.pairwise_ciphers ||
!(rsn_info.pairwise_ciphers & override) ||
__builtin_popcount(override) != 1) {
handshake_failed(sm,
MMPDU_REASON_CODE_INVALID_PAIRWISE_CIPHER);
return;
}
handshake_state_override_pairwise_cipher(hs, override);
}
if (!hs->wpa_ie && hs->group_cipher !=
IE_RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_TRAFFIC) {
gtk = handshake_util_find_gtk_kde(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
&gtk_len);
if (!gtk) {
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
/* TODO: Handle tx bit */
gtk_key_index = bit_field(gtk[0], 0, 2);
gtk += 2;
gtk_len -= 2;
}
if (hs->mfp) {
igtk = handshake_util_find_igtk_kde(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
&igtk_len);
if (!igtk) {
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
igtk_key_index = l_get_le16(igtk);
igtk += 2;
igtk_len -= 2;
}
key_id = handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_KEY_ID,
decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size, &key_id_len);
if (hs->ext_key_id_capable) {
uint8_t idx;
if (!key_id) {
l_debug("No extended key KDE in frame 3/4");
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_INVALID_IE);
return;
}
if (key_id_len != 2) {
l_error("invalid Key ID KDE format");
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_INVALID_IE);
return;
}
idx = bit_field(key_id[0], 0, 2);
/*
* IEEE 802.11-2020 - 12.7.6.4 4-way handshake message 3
* "... the Authenticator assigns a new Key ID for the PTKSA in
* the range of 0 to 1 that is different from the Key ID
* assigned in the previous handshake"
*/
if ((idx != 0 && idx != 1) || (sm->rekey &&
idx == hs->active_tk_index)) {
l_error("invalid Key ID KDE value (%u)", idx);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_INVALID_IE);
return;
}
hs->active_tk_index = idx;
l_debug("using Extended key ID %u", hs->active_tk_index);
}
if (hs->support_ip_allocation) {
size_t len;
const uint8_t *ip_alloc_kde =
handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_IP_ADDRESS_ALLOC,
decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
&len);
if (ip_alloc_kde && (len < 12 ||
!eapol_check_ip_mask(ip_alloc_kde + 4,
ip_alloc_kde,
ip_alloc_kde + 8))) {
l_debug("Invalid IP Allocation KDE in frame 3/4");
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_INVALID_IE);
return;
}
hs->support_ip_allocation = ip_alloc_kde != NULL;
if (ip_alloc_kde) {
hs->client_ip_addr = l_get_u32(ip_alloc_kde);
hs->subnet_mask = l_get_u32(ip_alloc_kde + 4);
hs->go_ip_addr = l_get_u32(ip_alloc_kde + 8);
} else
l_debug("Authenticator ignored our IP Address Request");
}
transition_disable =
handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_TRANSITION_DISABLE,
decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
&transition_disable_len);
if (transition_disable)
handshake_event(hs, HANDSHAKE_EVENT_TRANSITION_DISABLE,
transition_disable, transition_disable_len);
retransmit:
/*
* 802.11-2016, Section 12.7.6.4:
* "b) Verifies the message 3 MIC. If the calculated MIC does not match
* the MIC that the Authenticator included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the
* Supplicant silently discards message 3."
* "c) Updates the last-seen value of the Key Replay Counter field."
*
* Note that part b was done in eapol_key_handle
*/
sm->replay_counter = L_BE64_TO_CPU(ek->key_replay_counter);
sm->have_replay = true;
step4 = eapol_create_ptk_4_of_4(sm->protocol_version,
ek->key_descriptor_version,
sm->replay_counter,
hs->wpa_ie, sm->mic_len);
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(hs);
kek = handshake_state_get_kek(hs);
if (sm->mic_len) {
if (!eapol_calculate_mic(hs->akm_suite, kck,
step4, mic, sm->mic_len)) {
l_debug("MIC Calculation failed");
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
memcpy(EAPOL_KEY_MIC(step4), mic, sm->mic_len);
} else {
if (!eapol_aes_siv_encrypt(handshake_state_get_kek(hs),
handshake_state_get_kek_len(hs),
step4, NULL, 0)) {
l_debug("AES-SIV encryption failed");
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
}
/*
* For WPA1 the group handshake should be happening after we set the
* ptk, this flag tells netdev to wait for the gtk/igtk before
* completing the connection.
*/
if (!gtk && hs->group_cipher != IE_RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_TRAFFIC)
hs->wait_for_gtk = true;
if (gtk)
eapol_install_gtk(sm, gtk_key_index, gtk, gtk_len, ek->key_rsc);
if (igtk)
eapol_install_igtk(sm, igtk_key_index, igtk, igtk_len);
/*
* Only install if this is the first 3/4 message (not retransmitting)
* and a rekey. Initial associations don't need the special RX -> TX
* procedure and can install the TK normally
*/
if (key_id && hs->ext_key_id_capable && sm->rekey) {
handshake_state_install_ext_ptk(hs, hs->active_tk_index,
(struct eapol_frame *) step4,
ETH_P_PAE, unencrypted);
return;
}
eapol_sm_write(sm, (struct eapol_frame *) step4, unencrypted);
if (hs->ptk_complete)
return;
handshake_state_install_ptk(hs);
if (rekey_offload)
rekey_offload(hs->ifindex, kek, kck,
sm->replay_counter, sm->user_data);
l_timeout_remove(sm->timeout);
sm->timeout = NULL;
return;
error_ie_different:
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_IE_DIFFERENT);
}
/* 802.11-2016 Section 12.7.6.5 */
static void eapol_handle_ptk_4_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const struct eapol_key *ek)
{
const uint8_t *kck;
l_debug("ifindex=%u", sm->handshake->ifindex);
if (!eapol_verify_ptk_4_of_4(ek, false))
return;
if (L_BE64_TO_CPU(ek->key_replay_counter) != sm->replay_counter)
return;
/* Ensure we received Message 2 and thus have a PTK to verify MIC */
if (!sm->handshake->have_snonce)
return;
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(sm->handshake);
if (!eapol_verify_mic(sm->handshake->akm_suite, kck, ek,
sm->mic_len))
return;
l_timeout_remove(sm->timeout);
sm->timeout = NULL;
/*
* If ptk_complete is set, then we are receiving Message 4 again.
* This might be a retransmission, so accept but don't install
* the keys again.
*/
if (!sm->handshake->ptk_complete)
handshake_state_install_ptk(sm->handshake);
sm->handshake->ptk_complete = true;
}
static void eapol_handle_gtk_1_of_2(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const struct eapol_key *ek,
const uint8_t *decrypted_key_data,
size_t decrypted_key_data_size,
bool unencrypted)
{
struct handshake_state *hs = sm->handshake;
const uint8_t *kck;
struct eapol_key *step2;
uint8_t mic[MIC_MAXLEN];
const uint8_t *gtk;
size_t gtk_len;
uint8_t gtk_key_index;
const uint8_t *igtk;
size_t igtk_len;
uint16_t igtk_key_index;
const uint8_t *oci;
size_t oci_len;
uint8_t ies[1024];
size_t ies_len = 0;
l_debug("ifindex=%u", hs->ifindex);
if (!eapol_verify_gtk_1_of_2(ek, hs->wpa_ie, sm->mic_len))
return;
oci = handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_OCI, decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size, &oci_len);
/*
* 802.11-2020, Section 12.7.2.2
* If dot11RSNAOperatingChannelValidationActivated is true and
* Authenticator RSNE indicates OCVC capability, the Supplicant
* silently discards message 1 if any of the following are true:
* - OCI KDE is missing in the message
* - Channel information in the OCI KDE does not match current
* operating channel parameters (see 12.2.9)
*/
if (hs->authenticator_ocvc &&
handshake_state_verify_oci(hs, oci, oci_len) < 0)
return;
if (!hs->wpa_ie) {
gtk = handshake_util_find_gtk_kde(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
&gtk_len);
if (!gtk)
return;
gtk_key_index = bit_field(gtk[0], 0, 2);
gtk += 2;
gtk_len -= 2;
} else {
gtk = decrypted_key_data;
gtk_len = decrypted_key_data_size;
if (!gtk || gtk_len < CRYPTO_MIN_GTK_LEN ||
gtk_len > CRYPTO_MAX_GTK_LEN)
return;
gtk_key_index = ek->wpa_key_id;
}
if (hs->mfp) {
igtk = handshake_util_find_igtk_kde(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size,
&igtk_len);
if (!igtk)
return;
igtk_key_index = l_get_le16(igtk);
igtk += 2;
igtk_len -= 2;
} else
igtk = NULL;
/*
* IEEE 802.11-2020 Section 12.7.7.3
* "Key Data = OCI KDE when dot11RSNAOperatingChannelValidationActivated
* on the [Supplicant]"
*
* Note: The spec reads "Authenticator" but this is incorrect and
* appears to be a copy-paste from a previous section. Above it has been
* changed to Supplicant.
*/
if (sm->handshake->supplicant_ocvc && sm->handshake->chandef)
ies_len += append_oci(ies + ies_len, sm->handshake->chandef);
/*
* 802.11-2016, Section 12.7.7.2:
* "
* a) Verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value has not yet been
* seen before, i.e., its value is strictly larger than that in any
* other EAPOL-Key frame received thus far during this session.
* b) Verifies that the MIC is valid, i.e., it uses the KCK that is
* part of the PTK to verify that there is no data integrity error.
* c) Uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request primitive to configure the temporal
* GTK and, when present, IGTK into its IEEE 802.11 MAC.
* d) Responds by creating and sending message 2 of the group key
* handshake to the Authenticator and incrementing the replay counter.
* "
* Note: steps a & b are performed in eapol_key_handle
*/
sm->replay_counter = L_BE64_TO_CPU(ek->key_replay_counter);
sm->have_replay = true;
step2 = eapol_create_gtk_2_of_2(sm->protocol_version,
ek->key_descriptor_version,
sm->replay_counter,
ies_len, ies,
hs->wpa_ie, ek->wpa_key_id,
sm->mic_len);
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(hs);
if (sm->mic_len) {
if (!eapol_calculate_mic(hs->akm_suite, kck,
step2, mic, sm->mic_len)) {
l_debug("MIC calculation failed");
l_free(step2);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
memcpy(EAPOL_KEY_MIC(step2), mic, sm->mic_len);
} else {
if (!eapol_aes_siv_encrypt(handshake_state_get_kek(hs),
handshake_state_get_kek_len(hs),
step2, NULL, 0)) {
l_debug("AES-SIV encryption failed");
l_free(step2);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
}
eapol_sm_write(sm, (struct eapol_frame *) step2, unencrypted);
l_free(step2);
eapol_install_gtk(sm, gtk_key_index, gtk, gtk_len, ek->key_rsc);
if (igtk)
eapol_install_igtk(sm, igtk_key_index, igtk, igtk_len);
}
static struct eapol_sm *eapol_find_sm(uint32_t ifindex, const uint8_t *aa)
{
const struct l_queue_entry *entry;
struct eapol_sm *sm;
for (entry = l_queue_get_entries(state_machines); entry;
entry = entry->next) {
sm = entry->data;
if (sm->handshake->ifindex != ifindex)
continue;
if (memcmp(sm->handshake->aa, aa, ETH_ALEN))
continue;
return sm;
}
return NULL;
}
static void eapol_key_handle(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const struct eapol_frame *frame,
bool unencrypted)
{
struct handshake_state *hs = sm->handshake;
const struct eapol_key *ek;
const uint8_t *kck;
const uint8_t *kek;
uint8_t *decrypted_key_data = NULL;
size_t key_data_len = 0;
uint64_t replay_counter;
uint8_t expected_key_descriptor_version;
ek = eapol_key_validate((const uint8_t *) frame,
sizeof(struct eapol_header) +
L_BE16_TO_CPU(frame->header.packet_len),
sm->mic_len);
if (!ek)
return;
/* Wrong direction */
if (!ek->key_ack)
return;
if (L_WARN_ON(eapol_key_descriptor_version_from_akm(hs->akm_suite,
hs->pairwise_cipher,
&expected_key_descriptor_version) < 0))
return;
if (L_WARN_ON(expected_key_descriptor_version !=
ek->key_descriptor_version))
return;
/* Further Descriptor Type check */
if (!hs->wpa_ie && ek->descriptor_type != EAPOL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_80211)
return;
else if (hs->wpa_ie &&
ek->descriptor_type != EAPOL_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE_WPA)
return;
replay_counter = L_BE64_TO_CPU(ek->key_replay_counter);
/*
* 802.11-2016, Section 12.7.2:
* "The Supplicant and Authenticator shall track the key replay counter
* per security association. The key replay counter shall be
* initialized to 0 on (re)association. The Authenticator shall
* increment the key replay counter on each successive EAPOL-Key frame."
*
* and
*
* "The Supplicant should also use the key replay counter and ignore
* EAPOL-Key frames with a Key Replay Counter field value smaller than
* or equal to any received in a valid message. The local Key Replay
* Counter field should not be updated until after the EAPOL-Key MIC is
* checked and is found to be valid. In other words, the Supplicant
* never updates the Key Replay Counter field for message 1 in the
* 4-way handshake, as it includes no MIC. This implies the Supplicant
* needs to allow for retransmission of message 1 when checking for
* the key replay counter of message 3."
*
* Note: The latter condition implies that Message 1 and Message 3
* can have the same replay counter, though other parts of the spec
* mandate that the Authenticator has to increment the replay counter
* for each frame sent. Contradictory.
*/
if (sm->have_replay && sm->replay_counter >= replay_counter)
return;
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(hs);
if (ek->key_mic) {
/* Haven't received step 1 yet, so no ptk */
if (!hs->have_snonce)
return;
if (!eapol_verify_mic(hs->akm_suite, kck, ek, sm->mic_len))
return;
}
if ((ek->encrypted_key_data && !hs->wpa_ie) ||
(ek->key_type == 0 && hs->wpa_ie)) {
/*
* If using a MIC (non-FILS) but haven't received step 1 yet
* we disregard since there will be no ptk
*/
if (sm->mic_len && !hs->have_snonce)
return;
kek = handshake_state_get_kek(hs);
decrypted_key_data = eapol_decrypt_key_data(
hs->akm_suite, kek,
ek, &key_data_len, sm->mic_len);
if (!decrypted_key_data)
return;
} else
key_data_len = EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(ek, sm->mic_len);
if (ek->key_type == 0) {
/* GTK handshake allowed only after PTK handshake complete */
if (!hs->ptk_complete)
goto done;
if (hs->group_cipher == IE_RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_TRAFFIC)
goto done;
if (!decrypted_key_data)
goto done;
eapol_handle_gtk_1_of_2(sm, ek, decrypted_key_data,
key_data_len, unencrypted);
goto done;
}
/* If no MIC, then assume packet 1, otherwise packet 3 */
if (!ek->key_mic && !ek->encrypted_key_data)
eapol_handle_ptk_1_of_4(sm, ek, unencrypted);
else {
if (!key_data_len)
goto done;
eapol_handle_ptk_3_of_4(sm, ek,
decrypted_key_data ?:
EAPOL_KEY_DATA(ek, sm->mic_len),
key_data_len, unencrypted);
}
done:
if (decrypted_key_data)
explicit_bzero(decrypted_key_data, key_data_len);
l_free(decrypted_key_data);
}
/* This respresentes the eapMsg message in 802.1X Figure 8-1 */
static void eapol_eap_msg_cb(const uint8_t *eap_data, size_t len,
void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
uint8_t buf[sizeof(struct eapol_frame) + len];
struct eapol_frame *frame = (struct eapol_frame *) buf;
frame->header.protocol_version = sm->protocol_version;
frame->header.packet_type = 0;
l_put_be16(len, &frame->header.packet_len);
memcpy(frame->data, eap_data, len);
eapol_sm_write(sm, frame, sm->last_eap_unencrypted);
}
/* This respresentes the eapTimout, eapFail and eapSuccess messages */
static void eapol_eap_complete_cb(enum eap_result result, void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
l_info("EAP completed with %s", result == EAP_RESULT_SUCCESS ?
"eapSuccess" : (result == EAP_RESULT_FAIL ?
"eapFail" : "eapTimeout"));
if (result != EAP_RESULT_SUCCESS) {
eap_free(sm->eap);
sm->eap = NULL;
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_IEEE8021X_FAILED);
return;
}
if (install_pmk)
install_pmk(sm->handshake, sm->handshake->pmk,
sm->handshake->pmk_len);
eap_reset(sm->eap);
if (sm->handshake->authenticator) {
if (L_WARN_ON(!sm->handshake->have_pmk)) {
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return;
}
/* sm->mic_len will have been set in eapol_eap_results_cb */
sm->frame_retry = 0;
/* Kick off 4-Way Handshake */
eapol_ptk_1_of_4_retry(NULL, sm);
}
}
/* This respresentes the eapResults message */
static void eapol_eap_results_cb(const uint8_t *msk_data, size_t msk_len,
const uint8_t *emsk_data, size_t emsk_len,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_len,
const uint8_t *session_id, size_t session_len,
void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
l_debug("EAP key material received");
/*
* 802.11i 8.5.1.2:
* "When not using a PSK, the PMK is derived from the AAA key.
* The PMK shall be computed as the first 256 bits (bits 0-255)
* of the AAA key: PMK = L(PTK, 0, 256)."
* 802.11-2016 12.7.1.3:
* "When not using a PSK, the PMK is derived from the MSK.
* The PMK shall be computed as the first PMK_bits bits
* (bits 0 to PMK_bits-1) of the MSK: PMK = L(MSK, 0, PMK_bits)."
* RFC5247 explains AAA-Key refers to the MSK and confirms the
* first 32 bytes of the MSK are used. MSK is at least 64 octets
* long per RFC3748. Note WEP derives the PTK from MSK differently.
*
* In a Fast Transition initial mobility domain association the PMK
* maps to the XXKey, except with EAP:
* 802.11-2016 12.7.1.7.3:
* "If the AKM negotiated is 00-0F-AC:3, then [...] XXKey shall be
* the second 256 bits of the MSK (which is derived from the IEEE
* 802.1X authentication), i.e., XXKey = L(MSK, 256, 256)."
* So we need to save the first 64 bytes at minimum.
*/
if (sm->handshake->akm_suite == IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X) {
if (msk_len < 64)
goto msk_short;
} else {
if (msk_len < 32)
goto msk_short;
}
if (msk_len > sizeof(sm->handshake->pmk))
msk_len = sizeof(sm->handshake->pmk);
sm->mic_len = eapol_get_mic_length(sm->handshake->akm_suite,
sm->handshake->pmk_len);
switch (sm->handshake->akm_suite) {
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X:
msk_len = 64;
break;
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SUITE_B_SHA384:
case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
msk_len = 48;
break;
default:
msk_len = 32;
break;
}
handshake_state_set_pmk(sm->handshake, msk_data, msk_len);
if (sm->handshake->support_fils && emsk_data && session_id)
erp_cache_add(eap_get_identity(sm->eap), session_id,
session_len, emsk_data, emsk_len,
sm->handshake->ssid, sm->handshake->ssid_len);
return;
msk_short:
l_error("EAP method's MSK too short for AKM suite %u",
sm->handshake->akm_suite);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_IEEE8021X_FAILED);
}
static void eapol_eap_event_cb(unsigned int event,
const void *event_data, void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
handshake_event(sm->handshake, HANDSHAKE_EVENT_EAP_NOTIFY, event,
event_data);
}
void eapol_sm_set_use_eapol_start(struct eapol_sm *sm, bool enabled)
{
sm->use_eapol_start = enabled;
}
void eapol_sm_set_require_handshake(struct eapol_sm *sm, bool enabled)
{
sm->require_handshake = enabled;
if (!sm->require_handshake)
sm->use_eapol_start = false;
}
static void eapol_auth_key_handle(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const struct eapol_frame *frame)
{
size_t frame_len = 4 + L_BE16_TO_CPU(frame->header.packet_len);
const struct eapol_key *ek = eapol_key_validate((const void *) frame,
frame_len, sm->mic_len);
uint16_t key_data_len;
if (!ek)
return;
/* Wrong direction */
if (ek->key_ack)
return;
if (ek->request)
return; /* Not supported */
if (!sm->handshake->have_anonce)
return; /* Not expecting an EAPoL-Key yet */
key_data_len = EAPOL_KEY_DATA_LEN(ek, sm->mic_len);
if (key_data_len != 0)
eapol_handle_ptk_2_of_4(sm, ek);
else
eapol_handle_ptk_4_of_4(sm, ek);
}
static void eapol_rx_auth_packet(uint16_t proto, const uint8_t *from,
const struct eapol_frame *frame,
bool noencrypt,
void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
if (proto != ETH_P_PAE || memcmp(from, sm->handshake->spa, 6))
return;
if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete && noencrypt) {
l_debug("Dropping unexpected unencrypted EAPoL frame");
return;
}
switch (frame->header.packet_type) {
case 0: /* EAPOL-EAP */
if (!sm->eap) {
l_error("Authenticator received an unexpected "
"EAPOL-EAP frame from %s",
util_address_to_string(from));
return;
}
eap_rx_packet(sm->eap, frame->data,
L_BE16_TO_CPU(frame->header.packet_len));
break;
case 1: /* EAPOL-Start */
/*
* The supplicant may have sent an EAPoL-Start even before
* we queued our EAP Identity Request or it may have missed our
* early Identity Request and may need a retransmission. Tell
* sm->eap so it can decide whether to send a new Identity
* Request or ignore this.
*
* TODO: if we're already past the full handshake, send a
* new msg 1/4.
*/
if (sm->eap)
eap_start(sm->eap);
break;
case 3: /* EAPOL-Key */
eapol_auth_key_handle(sm, frame);
break;
default:
l_error("Authenticator received unknown packet type %i from %s",
frame->header.packet_type,
util_address_to_string(from));
return;
}
}
static void eapol_rx_packet(uint16_t proto, const uint8_t *from,
const struct eapol_frame *frame,
bool unencrypted,
void *user_data)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm = user_data;
if (proto != ETH_P_PAE || memcmp(from, sm->handshake->aa, 6))
return;
if (!sm->started) {
size_t len = sizeof(struct eapol_header) +
L_BE16_TO_CPU(frame->header.packet_len);
/*
* If the state machine hasn't started yet save the frame
* for processing later.
*/
if (sm->early_frame) /* Is the 1-element queue full */
return;
sm->early_frame = l_memdup(frame, len);
sm->early_frame_unencrypted = unencrypted;
return;
}
if (!sm->protocol_version)
sm->protocol_version = frame->header.protocol_version;
switch (frame->header.packet_type) {
case 0: /* EAPOL-EAP */
if (sm->handshake->ptk_complete && unencrypted) {
l_debug("Dropping unexpected unencrypted EAP frame");
return;
}
l_timeout_remove(sm->eapol_start_timeout);
sm->eapol_start_timeout = 0;
if (!sm->eap) {
/* If we're not configured for EAP, send a NAK */
sm->eap = eap_new(eapol_eap_msg_cb,
eapol_eap_complete_cb, sm);
if (!sm->eap)
return;
eap_set_key_material_func(sm->eap,
eapol_eap_results_cb);
}
sm->eap_exchanged = true;
sm->last_eap_unencrypted = unencrypted;
eap_rx_packet(sm->eap, frame->data,
L_BE16_TO_CPU(frame->header.packet_len));
break;
case 3: /* EAPOL-Key */
if (!sm->handshake->have_pmk) {
if (!sm->eap)
return;
/*
* Either this is an error (EAP negotiation in
* progress) or the server is giving us a chance to
* use a cached PMK. We don't yet cache PMKs so
* send an EAPOL-Start if we haven't sent one yet.
*/
if (sm->eapol_start_timeout) {
l_timeout_remove(sm->eapol_start_timeout);
sm->eapol_start_timeout = NULL;
__send_eapol_start(sm, unencrypted);
}
return;
}
eapol_key_handle(sm, frame, unencrypted);
break;
default:
return;
}
}
void __eapol_update_replay_counter(uint32_t ifindex, const uint8_t *spa,
const uint8_t *aa, uint64_t replay_counter)
{
struct eapol_sm *sm;
sm = eapol_find_sm(ifindex, aa);
if (!sm)
return;
if (sm->replay_counter >= replay_counter)
return;
sm->replay_counter = replay_counter;
}
void __eapol_set_tx_packet_func(eapol_tx_packet_func_t func)
{
tx_packet = func;
}
void __eapol_set_tx_user_data(void *user_data)
{
tx_user_data = user_data;
}
void __eapol_set_rekey_offload_func(eapol_rekey_offload_func_t func)
{
rekey_offload = func;
}
void __eapol_set_install_pmk_func(eapol_install_pmk_func_t func)
{
install_pmk = func;
}
void eapol_register(struct eapol_sm *sm)
{
eapol_frame_watch_func_t rx_handler = sm->handshake->authenticator ?
eapol_rx_auth_packet : eapol_rx_packet;
l_queue_push_head(state_machines, sm);
sm->watch_id = eapol_frame_watch_add(sm->handshake->ifindex,
rx_handler, sm);
sm->protocol_version = sm->handshake->proto_version;
}
bool eapol_start(struct eapol_sm *sm)
{
l_debug("");
if (sm->handshake->settings_8021x) {
_auto_(l_free) char *network_id = NULL;
sm->eap = eap_new(eapol_eap_msg_cb, eapol_eap_complete_cb, sm);
if (!sm->eap)
goto eap_error;
if (!eap_load_settings(sm->eap, sm->handshake->settings_8021x,
"EAP-")) {
eap_free(sm->eap);
sm->eap = NULL;
goto eap_error;
}
eap_set_key_material_func(sm->eap, eapol_eap_results_cb);
eap_set_event_func(sm->eap, eapol_eap_event_cb);
network_id = l_util_hexstring(sm->handshake->ssid,
sm->handshake->ssid_len);
eap_set_peer_id(sm->eap, network_id);
}
handshake_event(sm->handshake, HANDSHAKE_EVENT_STARTED);
sm->started = true;
if (sm->require_handshake)
sm->timeout = l_timeout_create(eapol_4way_handshake_time,
eapol_timeout, sm, NULL);
if (!sm->handshake->authenticator && sm->use_eapol_start) {
/*
* We start a short timeout, if EAP packets are not received
* from AP, then we send the EAPoL-Start
*/
sm->eapol_start_timeout =
l_timeout_create(1, send_eapol_start, sm, NULL);
}
sm->mic_len = eapol_get_mic_length(sm->handshake->akm_suite,
sm->handshake->pmk_len);
/* Process any frames received early due to scheduling */
if (sm->early_frame) {
eapol_rx_packet(ETH_P_PAE, sm->handshake->aa,
sm->early_frame, sm->early_frame_unencrypted,
sm);
l_free(sm->early_frame);
sm->early_frame = NULL;
}
if (sm->handshake->authenticator) {
if (!sm->protocol_version)
sm->protocol_version = EAPOL_PROTOCOL_VERSION_2004;
if (sm->handshake->settings_8021x) {
/*
* If we're allowed to, send EAP Identity request
* immediately, otherwise wait for an EAPoL-Start.
*/
if (!sm->use_eapol_start)
eap_start(sm->eap);
} else {
if (L_WARN_ON(!sm->handshake->have_pmk))
return false;
sm->frame_retry = 0;
/* Kick off handshake */
eapol_ptk_1_of_4_retry(NULL, sm);
}
}
return true;
eap_error:
l_error("Error initializing EAP for ifindex %i",
(int) sm->handshake->ifindex);
return false;
}
struct preauth_sm {
uint32_t ifindex;
uint8_t aa[6];
uint8_t spa[6];
struct eap_state *eap;
uint8_t pmk[32];
eapol_preauth_cb_t cb;
eapol_preauth_destroy_func_t destroy;
void *user_data;
struct l_timeout *timeout;
uint32_t watch_id;
bool initial_rx:1;
};
#define EAPOL_TIMEOUT_SEC 1
static void preauth_sm_destroy(void *value)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm = value;
if (sm->destroy)
sm->destroy(sm->user_data);
eap_free(sm->eap);
l_timeout_remove(sm->timeout);
eapol_frame_watch_remove(sm->watch_id);
l_free(sm);
}
static void preauth_frame(struct preauth_sm *sm, uint8_t packet_type,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
{
uint8_t buf[sizeof(struct eapol_frame) + data_len];
struct eapol_frame *frame = (struct eapol_frame *) buf;
frame->header.protocol_version = EAPOL_PROTOCOL_VERSION_2001;
frame->header.packet_type = packet_type;
l_put_be16(data_len, &frame->header.packet_len);
if (data_len)
memcpy(frame->data, data, data_len);
__eapol_tx_packet(sm->ifindex, sm->aa, 0x88c7, frame, false);
}
static void preauth_rx_packet(uint16_t proto, const uint8_t *from,
const struct eapol_frame *frame,
bool unencrypted,
void *user_data)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm = user_data;
if (proto != 0x88c7 || memcmp(from, sm->aa, 6))
return;
/*
* We do not expect any pre-auth packets to be unencrypted
* since we're authenticating via the currently connected AP
* and pre-authentication implies we are already connected
* and the keys are set
*/
if (L_WARN_ON(unencrypted))
return;
if (frame->header.packet_type != 0) /* EAPOL-EAP */
return;
if (!sm->initial_rx) {
sm->initial_rx = true;
/*
* Initial frame from authenticator received, it's alive
* so set a longer timeout. The timeout is for the whole
* EAP exchange as we have no way to monitor the
* negotiation progress and keep rearming the timer each
* time progress is made.
*/
l_timeout_modify(sm->timeout, EAPOL_TIMEOUT_SEC * 3);
}
eap_rx_packet(sm->eap, frame->data,
L_BE16_TO_CPU(frame->header.packet_len));
}
static void preauth_eap_msg_cb(const uint8_t *eap_data, size_t len,
void *user_data)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm = user_data;
preauth_frame(sm, 0, eap_data, len);
}
static void preauth_eap_complete_cb(enum eap_result result, void *user_data)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm = user_data;
l_info("Preauthentication completed with %s",
result == EAP_RESULT_SUCCESS ? "eapSuccess" :
(result == EAP_RESULT_FAIL ? "eapFail" : "eapTimeout"));
l_queue_remove(preauths, sm);
if (result == EAP_RESULT_SUCCESS)
sm->cb(sm->pmk, sm->user_data);
else
sm->cb(NULL, sm->user_data);
preauth_sm_destroy(sm);
}
/* See eapol_eap_results_cb for documentation */
static void preauth_eap_results_cb(const uint8_t *msk_data, size_t msk_len,
const uint8_t *emsk_data, size_t emsk_len,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_len,
const uint8_t *session_id, size_t session_len,
void *user_data)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm = user_data;
l_debug("Preauthentication EAP key material received");
if (msk_len < 32)
goto msk_short;
memcpy(sm->pmk, msk_data, 32);
return;
msk_short:
l_error("Preauthentication MSK too short");
l_queue_remove(preauths, sm);
sm->cb(NULL, sm->user_data);
preauth_sm_destroy(sm);
}
static void preauth_timeout(struct l_timeout *timeout, void *user_data)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm = user_data;
l_error("Preauthentication timeout");
l_queue_remove(preauths, sm);
sm->cb(NULL, sm->user_data);
preauth_sm_destroy(sm);
}
struct preauth_sm *eapol_preauth_start(const uint8_t *aa,
const struct handshake_state *hs,
eapol_preauth_cb_t cb, void *user_data,
eapol_preauth_destroy_func_t destroy)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm;
sm = l_new(struct preauth_sm, 1);
sm->ifindex = hs->ifindex;
memcpy(sm->aa, aa, 6);
memcpy(sm->spa, hs->spa, 6);
sm->cb = cb;
sm->destroy = destroy;
sm->user_data = user_data;
sm->eap = eap_new(preauth_eap_msg_cb, preauth_eap_complete_cb, sm);
if (!sm->eap)
goto err_free_sm;
if (!eap_load_settings(sm->eap, hs->settings_8021x, "EAP-"))
goto err_free_eap;
eap_set_key_material_func(sm->eap, preauth_eap_results_cb);
sm->timeout = l_timeout_create(EAPOL_TIMEOUT_SEC, preauth_timeout,
sm, NULL);
sm->watch_id = eapol_frame_watch_add(sm->ifindex,
preauth_rx_packet, sm);
l_queue_push_head(preauths, sm);
/* Send EAPOL-Start */
preauth_frame(sm, 1, NULL, 0);
return sm;
err_free_eap:
eap_free(sm->eap);
err_free_sm:
l_free(sm);
return NULL;
}
static bool preauth_remove_by_ifindex(void *data, void *user_data)
{
struct preauth_sm *sm = data;
if (sm->ifindex != L_PTR_TO_UINT(user_data))
return false;
preauth_sm_destroy(sm);
return true;
}
void eapol_preauth_cancel(uint32_t ifindex)
{
l_queue_foreach_remove(preauths, preauth_remove_by_ifindex,
L_UINT_TO_PTR(ifindex));
}
static bool eapol_frame_watch_match_ifindex(const void *a, const void *b)
{
struct eapol_frame_watch *efw =
l_container_of(a, struct eapol_frame_watch, super);
return efw->ifindex == L_PTR_TO_UINT(b);
}
void __eapol_rx_packet(uint32_t ifindex, const uint8_t *src, uint16_t proto,
const uint8_t *frame, size_t len,
bool noencrypt)
{
const struct eapol_header *eh;
/* Validate Header */
if (len < sizeof(struct eapol_header))
return;
eh = (const struct eapol_header *) frame;
switch (eh->protocol_version) {
case EAPOL_PROTOCOL_VERSION_2001:
case EAPOL_PROTOCOL_VERSION_2004:
case EAPOL_PROTOCOL_VERSION_2010:
break;
default:
return;
}
if (len < sizeof(struct eapol_header) + L_BE16_TO_CPU(eh->packet_len))
return;
WATCHLIST_NOTIFY_MATCHES(&frame_watches,
eapol_frame_watch_match_ifindex,
L_UINT_TO_PTR(ifindex),
eapol_frame_watch_func_t, proto, src,
(const struct eapol_frame *) eh,
noencrypt);
}
void __eapol_tx_packet(uint32_t ifindex, const uint8_t *dst, uint16_t proto,
const struct eapol_frame *frame, bool noencrypt)
{
if (!tx_packet)
return;
tx_packet(ifindex, dst, proto, frame, noencrypt, tx_user_data);
}
void __eapol_set_config(struct l_settings *config)
{
if (!l_settings_get_uint(config, "EAPoL",
"MaxHandshakeTime", &eapol_4way_handshake_time))
eapol_4way_handshake_time = 5;
}
int eapol_init(void)
{
state_machines = l_queue_new();
preauths = l_queue_new();
watchlist_init(&frame_watches, &eapol_frame_watch_ops);
return 0;
}
void eapol_exit(void)
{
if (!l_queue_isempty(state_machines))
l_warn("stale eapol state machines found");
l_queue_destroy(state_machines, eapol_sm_destroy);
if (!l_queue_isempty(preauths))
l_warn("stale preauth state machines found");
l_queue_destroy(preauths, preauth_sm_destroy);
watchlist_destroy(&frame_watches);
}
IWD_MODULE(eapol, eapol_init, eapol_exit);
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