These checks allow both a station and authenticator to use
the same netdev key install functions. For NEW_KEY and
SET_STATION, the iftype is checked and either handshake->aa
or ->spa is used as the station address for the KEY/STATION
commands. Also, in the failure cases, a disconnect command
is issued only if the iftype is station as this doesn't
apply to AP.
Handshake related netdev events were removed in favor of
handshake events. Now events will be emitted on the handshake
object related to the 4-way handshake and key settings. Events
are:
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_STARTED
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_SETTING_KEYS
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_COMPLETE
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_FAILED
Right now, since netdev only operates in station mode, nothing
listens for COMPLETE/FAILED, as device/wsc gets notified by the
connect_cb when the connection was successful. The COMPLETE/
FAILED were added in preperation for AP moving into eapol/netdev.
==1057== 32 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 1
==1057== at 0x4C2AF0F: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)
==1057== by 0x15E9A2: l_malloc (util.c:62)
==1057== by 0x15EA9D: l_memdup (util.c:121)
==1057== by 0x133D9A: network_set_psk (network.c:350)
==1057== by 0x13BD29: wsc_try_credentials (wsc.c:136)
==1057== by 0x13C121: wsc_connect_cb (wsc.c:220)
==1057== by 0x110FAF: netdev_connect_failed (netdev.c:525)
==1057== by 0x16AAF4: process_unicast (genl.c:390)
==1057== by 0x16AF03: received_data (genl.c:509)
==1057== by 0x166CB6: io_callback (io.c:123)
==1057== by 0x16580D: l_main_iterate (main.c:376)
==1057== by 0x16594B: l_main_run (main.c:423)
load_settings ensures that ttls->eap is correctly initialized. So this
code should be treated as an error condition.
We also do not support EAP chaining, so remove that logic as well
CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211 isn't an option for the kernel. Maybe it was
mistakenly added based on the hostap configuration instructions in
doc/test-runner.txt
If the intent was to add CONFIG_CFG80211 and CONFIG_MAC80211, they're
already in the relevant kernel defconfigs.
dbus_init() currently does not check for the g_dbus object being
properly initialized and this leads to crashes when dbus is not yet
running.
Ensure g_dbus is properly initialized and return false otherwise.
In this case the caller can understand that something went wrong and
stop the initialization procedure.
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00005555555bc089 in l_dbus_add_service_watch (dbus=0x0,
name=0x5555555e5b0a "org.ofono",
connect_func=0x5555555aa81e <ofono_found>,
disconnect_func=0x5555555aa8e6 <ofono_disappeared>,
user_data=0x0, destroy=0x0) at ell/dbus.c:1621
1621 if (!dbus->name_cache)
(gdb) bt
name=0x5555555e5b0a "org.ofono",
connect_func=0x5555555aa81e <ofono_found>,
disconnect_func=0x5555555aa8e6 <ofono_disappeared>,
user_data=0x0, destroy=0x0) at ell/dbus.c:1621
user_data=0x0) at ell/plugin.c:115
function=0x5555555b40fd <plugin_start>,
user_data=0x0) at ell/queue.c:441
version=0x0) at ell/plugin.c:201
src/plugin.c:82
src/main.c:417
When the response structure is generated, not all of the memory was
initialized to 0.
==1045== Syscall param socketcall.sendto(msg) points to uninitialised byte(s)
==1045== at 0x5134D52: send (in /lib64/libc-2.25.so)
==1045== by 0x168AB5: l_checksum_update (checksum.c:338)
==1045== by 0x186777: tls_write_mac (tls-record.c:58)
==1045== by 0x1869D1: tls_tx_record_plaintext (tls-record.c:120)
==1045== by 0x186DEA: tls_tx_record (tls-record.c:201)
==1045== by 0x185A3B: l_tls_write (tls.c:2064)
==1045== by 0x14584F: eap_ttls_eap_tx_packet (eap-ttls.c:321)
==1045== by 0x14236C: eap_send_response (eap.c:165)
==1045== by 0x147904: eap_mschapv2_send_response (eap-mschapv2.c:468)
==1045== by 0x147A10: eap_mschapv2_handle_challenge (eap-mschapv2.c:492)
==1045== by 0x147E9A: eap_mschapv2_handle_request (eap-mschapv2.c:615)
==1045== by 0x142693: __eap_handle_request (eap.c:240)
==1045== Address 0x1ffeffe7f9 is on thread 1's stack
==1045== in frame #4, created by tls_tx_record (tls-record.c:177)
==1045== Uninitialised value was created by a stack allocation
==1045== at 0x1477AE: eap_mschapv2_send_response (eap-mschapv2.c:443)
==1045==
==1045== Syscall param sendmsg(msg.msg_iov[0]) points to uninitialised byte(s)
==1045== at 0x5134E3B: sendmsg (in /lib64/libc-2.25.so)
==1045== by 0x17F691: operate_cipher (cipher.c:356)
==1045== by 0x17F9D8: l_cipher_encrypt (cipher.c:446)
==1045== by 0x186BAA: tls_tx_record_plaintext (tls-record.c:152)
==1045== by 0x186DEA: tls_tx_record (tls-record.c:201)
==1045== by 0x185A3B: l_tls_write (tls.c:2064)
==1045== by 0x14584F: eap_ttls_eap_tx_packet (eap-ttls.c:321)
==1045== by 0x14236C: eap_send_response (eap.c:165)
==1045== by 0x147904: eap_mschapv2_send_response (eap-mschapv2.c:468)
==1045== by 0x147A10: eap_mschapv2_handle_challenge (eap-mschapv2.c:492)
==1045== by 0x147E9A: eap_mschapv2_handle_request (eap-mschapv2.c:615)
==1045== by 0x142693: __eap_handle_request (eap.c:240)
==1045== Address 0x1ffeffe7f9 is on thread 1's stack
==1045== in frame #4, created by tls_tx_record (tls-record.c:177)
==1045== Uninitialised value was created by a stack allocation
==1045== at 0x1477AE: eap_mschapv2_send_response (eap-mschapv2.c:443)
==1045==
Since PEAP & TTLS expect to use eap_check_settings recursively, make
them use a private version of that API that does not perform cleanup and
can contain side-effects.
eap_check_settings itself will guarantee that no side effects happen on
error. It is meant to be used by code outside of the eap subsystem.
Missing secrets are freed by eap_send_agent_req() even in case of
failure, so it was erroneous to try to free them on error.
==1048== Invalid read of size 8
==1048== at 0x1603EC: l_queue_clear (queue.c:101)
==1048== by 0x1603B8: l_queue_destroy (queue.c:82)
==1048== by 0x135328: network_connect_8021x (network.c:943)
==1048== by 0x1354C4: network_connect (network.c:987)
==1048== by 0x178DD2: _dbus_object_tree_dispatch (dbus-service.c:1690)
==1048== by 0x16D32A: message_read_handler (dbus.c:285)
==1048== by 0x166EC3: io_callback (io.c:123)
==1048== by 0x165A1A: l_main_iterate (main.c:376)
==1048== by 0x165B58: l_main_run (main.c:423)
==1048== by 0x1102DA: main (main.c:458)
==1048== Address 0x5461850 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 24 free'd
==1048== at 0x4C2C13B: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:530)
==1048== by 0x15ED03: l_free (util.c:136)
==1048== by 0x1603C4: l_queue_destroy (queue.c:83)
==1048== by 0x134BD5: eap_secret_request_free (network.c:719)
==1048== by 0x134EF9: eap_send_agent_req (network.c:817)
==1048== by 0x1352F7: network_connect_8021x (network.c:936)
==1048== by 0x1354C4: network_connect (network.c:987)
==1048== by 0x178DD2: _dbus_object_tree_dispatch (dbus-service.c:1690)
==1048== by 0x16D32A: message_read_handler (dbus.c:285)
==1048== by 0x166EC3: io_callback (io.c:123)
==1048== by 0x165A1A: l_main_iterate (main.c:376)
==1048== by 0x165B58: l_main_run (main.c:423)
Kernel command line arguments were not being parsed properly, $PATH in
particular was completely screwed up and causing commands in user's
$PATH to fail
In eap_check_settings move the check for the EAP-Identity setting so
that the method's check_setting call back has a chance to request it
from the agent. Note the check can be also moved to the EAP methods
so that they are free to skip it if not NULL identity is ok.
Replace usages of l_settings_get_value with l_settings_get_string, which
will make sure the returned strings are unescaped but also allocates
memeory and forces us to use l_free on most of the strings. Some of
these strings we explicitly set with l_settings_set_string() in our code
so when we retrieved them with l_settings_get_value() we would receive a
different string if there were any escapable characters in the string.
I didn't replace any of the l_settings_get_value() uses where we're just
checking whether a setting is present, or those which are hexstrings or
EAP method names assuming that they can't have any special characters,
although this isn't future proof. I did use l_settings_get_string() for
file paths though.
Accept two setting IDs in eap_append_secret, first for the username and
second for the password in case of the EAP_SECRET_REMOTE_USER_PASSWORD
EAP secret type. In all other cases only the first setting is used.
Until now for EAP_SECRET_REMOTE_USER_PASSWORD secrets we'd generate the
two setting names by adding different suffixes to the ID parameter.
Using the two different setting names automatically fixes the issues
with using the EAP Identity returned by the agent in EAP-MSCHAPv2 and
EAP-PWD.
The WDS dbus property of a Device directly maps to the 4ADDR property
of a real netdevice. It can be activated or deactivated at any point
in time.
The name WDS comes from the fact that this feature allows a STA
interface to be bridged and thus create a Wireless Distribution
System (the same name is used in OpenWRT and hostapd).
To implement this feature, the 'powered callback' data structure has
been renamed and re-used.
When a wifi interface is added/removed to/from a bridge, a
RTM_NEW/DELLINK event is issued. This is the same event used to signal
when an interface is created/deleted.
For this reason the event generated by the bridge code has to be
properly distinguished and handled accordingly. Failing to do so will
result in inconsistencies in iwd which will think an interface has been
deleted when it was actually not.
Detect incoming NEW/DELLINK bridge events and reacts accordingly. For
now, this simply means printing a simple message, as there is no
special logic in iwd for this yet.
