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ergo/oragono.yaml

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# oragono IRCd config
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# network configuration
network:
# name of the network
name: OragonoTest
# server configuration
server:
# server name
name: oragono.test
# addresses to listen on
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listeners:
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# The standard plaintext port for IRC is 6667. This will listen on all interfaces:
":6667":
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# Allowing plaintext over the public Internet poses security and privacy issues,
# so if possible, we recommend that you comment out the above line and replace
# it with these two, which listen only on local interfaces:
# "127.0.0.1:6667": # (loopback ipv4, localhost-only)
# "[::1]:6667": # (loopback ipv6, localhost-only)
# Alternately, if you have a TLS certificate issued by a recognized CA,
# you can configure port 6667 as an STS-only listener that only serves
# "redirects" to the TLS port, but doesn't allow chat. See the manual
# for details.
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# The standard SSL/TLS port for IRC is 6697. This will listen on all interfaces:
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":6697":
tls:
key: tls.key
cert: tls.crt
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# 'proxy' should typically be false. It's only for Kubernetes-style load
# balancing that does not terminate TLS, but sends an initial PROXY line
# in plaintext.
proxy: false
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# Example of a Unix domain socket for proxying:
# "/tmp/oragono_sock":
# Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will
# be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener
# *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain:
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# "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock":
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# tor: true
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# sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system,
# the default is 0775 or 0755, which prevents other users/groups from connecting
# to the socket. With 0777, it behaves like a normal TCP socket
# where anyone can connect.
unix-bind-mode: 0777
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# configure the behavior of Tor listeners (ignored if you didn't enable any):
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tor-listeners:
# if this is true, connections from Tor must authenticate with SASL
require-sasl: false
# what hostname should be displayed for Tor connections?
vhost: "tor-network.onion"
# allow at most this many connections at once (0 for no limit):
max-connections: 64
# connection throttling (limit how many connection attempts are allowed at once):
throttle-duration: 10m
# set to 0 to disable throttling:
max-connections-per-duration: 64
# strict transport security, to get clients to automagically use TLS
sts:
# whether to advertise STS
#
# to stop advertising STS, leave this enabled and set 'duration' below to "0". this will
# advertise to connecting users that the STS policy they have saved is no longer valid
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enabled: false
# how long clients should be forced to use TLS for.
# setting this to a too-long time will mean bad things if you later remove your TLS.
# the default duration below is 1 month, 2 days and 5 minutes.
duration: 1mo2d5m
# tls port - you should be listening on this port above
port: 6697
# should clients include this STS policy when they ship their inbuilt preload lists?
preload: false
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# casemapping controls what kinds of strings are permitted as identifiers (nicknames,
# channel names, account names, etc.), and how they are normalized for case.
# with the recommended default of 'precis', utf-8 identifiers that are "sane"
# (according to RFC 8265) are allowed, and the server additionally tries to protect
# against confusable characters ("homoglyph attacks").
# the other options are 'ascii' (traditional ASCII-only identifiers), and 'permissive',
# which allows identifiers to contain unusual characters like emoji, but makes users
# vulnerable to homoglyph attacks. unless you're really confident in your decision,
# we recommend leaving this value at its default (changing it once the network is
# already up and running is problematic).
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casemapping: "precis"
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# whether to look up user hostnames with reverse DNS
# (to suppress this for privacy purposes, use the ip-cloaking options below)
lookup-hostnames: true
# whether to confirm hostname lookups using "forward-confirmed reverse DNS", i.e., for
# any hostname returned from reverse DNS, resolve it back to an IP address and reject it
# unless it matches the connecting IP
forward-confirm-hostnames: true
# use ident protocol to get usernames
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check-ident: false
# password to login to the server
# generated using "oragono genpasswd"
#password: ""
# motd filename
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# if you change the motd, you should move it to ircd.motd
motd: oragono.motd
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# motd formatting codes
# if this is true, the motd is escaped using formatting codes like $c, $b, and $i
motd-formatting: true
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# addresses/CIDRs the PROXY command can be used from
# this should be restricted to 127.0.0.1/8 and ::1/128 (unless you have a good reason)
# you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
proxy-allowed-from:
# - localhost
# - "192.168.1.1"
# - "192.168.10.1/24"
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# controls the use of the WEBIRC command (by IRC<->web interfaces, bouncers and similar)
webirc:
# one webirc block -- should correspond to one set of gateways
-
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# SHA-256 fingerprint of the TLS certificate the gateway must use to connect
# (comment this out to use passwords only)
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fingerprint: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
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# password the gateway uses to connect, made with oragono genpasswd
password: "$2a$04$sLEFDpIOyUp55e6gTMKbOeroT6tMXTjPFvA0eGvwvImVR9pkwv7ee"
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# addresses/CIDRs that can use this webirc command
# you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
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hosts:
# - localhost
# - "192.168.1.1"
# - "192.168.10.1/24"
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# allow use of the RESUME extension over plaintext connections:
# do not enable this unless the ircd is only accessible over internal networks
allow-plaintext-resume: false
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# maximum length of clients' sendQ in bytes
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# this should be big enough to hold bursts of channel/direct messages
max-sendq: 96k
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# compatibility with legacy clients
compatibility:
# many clients require that the final parameter of certain messages be an
# RFC1459 trailing parameter, i.e., prefixed with :, whether or not this is
# actually required. this forces Oragono to send those parameters
# as trailings. this is recommended unless you're testing clients for conformance;
# defaults to true when unset for that reason.
force-trailing: true
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# some clients (ZNC 1.6.x and lower, Pidgin 2.12 and lower) do not
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# respond correctly to SASL messages with the server name as a prefix:
# https://github.com/znc/znc/issues/1212
# this works around that bug, allowing them to use SASL.
send-unprefixed-sasl: true
# IP-based DoS protection
ip-limits:
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# whether to limit the total number of concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
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count: true
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# maximum concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
max-concurrent-connections: 16
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# whether to restrict the rate of new connections per IP/CIDR
throttle: true
# how long to keep track of connections for
window: 10m
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# maximum number of new connections per IP/CIDR within the given duration
max-connections-per-window: 32
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# how long to ban offenders for. after banning them, the number of connections is
# reset, which lets you use /UNDLINE to unban people
throttle-ban-duration: 10m
# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv4 (a /32 is a fully specified IPv4 address)
cidr-len-ipv4: 32
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# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv6 (a /64 is the typical prefix assigned
# by an ISP to an individual customer for their LAN)
cidr-len-ipv6: 64
# IPs/networks which are exempted from connection limits
exempted:
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- "localhost"
# - "192.168.1.1"
# - "2001:0db8::/32"
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# custom connection limits for certain IPs/networks. note that CIDR
# widths defined here override the default CIDR width --- the limit
# will apply to the entire CIDR no matter how large or small it is
custom-limits:
# "8.8.0.0/16":
# max-concurrent-connections: 128
# max-connections-per-window: 1024
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# IP cloaking hides users' IP addresses from other users and from channel admins
# (but not from server admins), while still allowing channel admins to ban
# offending IP addresses or networks. In place of hostnames derived from reverse
# DNS, users see fake domain names like pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono. These names are
# generated deterministically from the underlying IP address, but if the underlying
# IP is not already known, it is infeasible to recover it from the cloaked name.
ip-cloaking:
# whether to enable IP cloaking
enabled: false
# fake TLD at the end of the hostname, e.g., pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono
netname: "oragono"
# secret key to prevent dictionary attacks against cloaked IPs
# any high-entropy secret is valid for this purpose:
# you MUST generate a new one for your installation.
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# suggestion: use the output of `oragono mksecret`
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# note that rotating this key will invalidate all existing ban masks.
secret: "siaELnk6Kaeo65K3RCrwJjlWaZ-Bt3WuZ2L8MXLbNb4"
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# name of an environment variable to pull the secret from, for use with
# k8s secret distribution:
# secret-environment-variable: "ORAGONO_CLOAKING_SECRET"
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# the cloaked hostname is derived only from the CIDR (most significant bits
# of the IP address), up to a configurable number of bits. this is the
# granularity at which bans will take effect for IPv4. Note that changing
# this value will invalidate any stored bans.
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cidr-len-ipv4: 32
# analogous granularity for IPv6
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cidr-len-ipv6: 64
# number of bits of hash output to include in the cloaked hostname.
# more bits means less likelihood of distinct IPs colliding,
# at the cost of a longer cloaked hostname. if this value is set to 0,
# all users will receive simply `netname` as their cloaked hostname.
num-bits: 80
# account options
accounts:
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# is account authentication enabled, i.e., can users log into existing accounts?
authentication-enabled: true
# account registration
registration:
# can users register new accounts for themselves? if this is false, operators with
# the `accreg` capability can still create accounts with `/NICKSERV SAREGISTER`
enabled: true
# this is the bcrypt cost we'll use for account passwords
bcrypt-cost: 12
# length of time a user has to verify their account before it can be re-registered
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verify-timeout: "32h"
# callbacks to allow
enabled-callbacks:
- none # no verification needed, will instantly register successfully
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# example configuration for sending verification emails via a local mail relay
# callbacks:
# mailto:
# server: localhost
# port: 25
# tls:
# enabled: false
# username: ""
# password: ""
# sender: "admin@my.network"
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# throttle account login attempts (to prevent either password guessing, or DoS
# attacks on the server aimed at forcing repeated expensive bcrypt computations)
login-throttling:
enabled: true
# window
duration: 1m
# number of attempts allowed within the window
max-attempts: 3
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# some clients (notably Pidgin and Hexchat) offer only a single password field,
# which makes it impossible to specify a separate server password (for the PASS
# command) and SASL password. if this option is set to true, a client that
# successfully authenticates with SASL will not be required to send
# PASS as well, so it can be configured to authenticate with SASL only.
skip-server-password: false
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# require-sasl controls whether clients are required to have accounts
# (and sign into them using SASL) to connect to the server
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require-sasl:
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# if this is enabled, all clients must authenticate with SASL while connecting
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enabled: false
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# IPs/CIDRs which are exempted from the account requirement
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exempted:
- "localhost"
# - '10.10.0.0/16'
# nick-reservation controls how, and whether, nicknames are linked to accounts
nick-reservation:
# is there any enforcement of reserved nicknames?
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enabled: true
# how many nicknames, in addition to the account name, can be reserved?
additional-nick-limit: 2
# method describes how nickname reservation is handled
# timeout: let the user change to the registered nickname, give them X seconds
# to login and then rename them if they haven't done so
# strict: don't let the user change to the registered nickname unless they're
# already logged-in using SASL or NickServ
# optional: no enforcement by default, but allow users to opt in to
# the enforcement level of their choice
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#
# 'optional' matches the behavior of other NickServs, but 'strict' is
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# preferable if all your users can enable SASL.
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method: optional
# allow users to set their own nickname enforcement status, e.g.,
# to opt in to strict enforcement
allow-custom-enforcement: true
# rename-timeout - this is how long users have 'til they're renamed
rename-timeout: 30s
# rename-prefix - this is the prefix to use when renaming clients (e.g. Guest-AB54U31)
rename-prefix: Guest-
# bouncer controls whether oragono can act as a bouncer, i.e., allowing
# multiple connections to attach to the same client/nickname identity
bouncer:
# when disabled, each connection must use a separate nickname (as is the
# typical behavior of IRC servers). when enabled, a new connection that
# has authenticated with SASL can associate itself with an existing
# client
enabled: true
# clients can opt in to bouncer functionality using the cap system, or
# via nickserv. if this is enabled, then they have to opt out instead
allowed-by-default: false
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# vhosts controls the assignment of vhosts (strings displayed in place of the user's
# hostname/IP) by the HostServ service
vhosts:
# are vhosts enabled at all?
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enabled: true
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# maximum length of a vhost
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max-length: 64
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# regexp for testing the validity of a vhost
# (make sure any changes you make here are RFC-compliant)
valid-regexp: '^[0-9A-Za-z.\-_/]+$'
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# options controlling users requesting vhosts:
user-requests:
# can users request vhosts at all? if this is false, operators with the
# 'vhosts' capability can still assign vhosts manually
enabled: false
# if uncommented, all new vhost requests will be dumped into the given
# channel, so opers can review them as they are sent in. ensure that you
# have registered and restricted the channel appropriately before you
# uncomment this.
#channel: "#vhosts"
# after a user's vhost has been approved or rejected, they need to wait
# this long (starting from the time of their original request)
# before they can request a new one.
cooldown: 168h
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# vhosts that users can take without approval, using `/HS TAKE`
offer-list:
#- "oragono.test"
# channel options
channels:
# modes that are set when new channels are created
# +n is no-external-messages and +t is op-only-topic
# see /QUOTE HELP cmodes for more channel modes
default-modes: +nt
# how many channels can a client be in at once?
max-channels-per-client: 100
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# if this is true, new channels can only be created by operators with the
# `chanreg` operator capability
operator-only-creation: false
# channel registration - requires an account
registration:
# can users register new channels?
enabled: true
# how many channels can each account register?
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max-channels-per-account: 15
# operator classes
oper-classes:
# local operator
"local-oper":
# title shown in WHOIS
title: Local Operator
# capability names
capabilities:
- "oper:local_kill"
- "oper:local_ban"
- "oper:local_unban"
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- "nofakelag"
# network operator
"network-oper":
# title shown in WHOIS
title: Network Operator
# oper class this extends from
extends: "local-oper"
# capability names
capabilities:
- "oper:remote_kill"
- "oper:remote_ban"
- "oper:remote_unban"
# server admin
"server-admin":
# title shown in WHOIS
title: Server Admin
# oper class this extends from
extends: "local-oper"
# capability names
capabilities:
- "oper:rehash"
- "oper:die"
- "accreg"
- "sajoin"
- "samode"
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- "vhosts"
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- "chanreg"
# ircd operators
opers:
# operator named 'dan'
dan:
# which capabilities this oper has access to
class: "server-admin"
# custom whois line
whois-line: is a cool dude
# custom hostname
vhost: "n"
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# modes are the modes to auto-set upon opering-up
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modes: +is acjknoqtuxv
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# operators can be authenticated either by password (with the /OPER command),
# or by certificate fingerprint, or both. if a password hash is set, then a
# password is required to oper up (e.g., /OPER dan mypassword). to generate
# the hash, use `oragono genpasswd`.
password: "$2a$04$LiytCxaY0lI.guDj2pBN4eLRD5cdM2OLDwqmGAgB6M2OPirbF5Jcu"
# if a SHA-256 certificate fingerprint is configured here, then it will be
# required to /OPER. if you comment out the password hash above, then you can
# /OPER without a password.
#fingerprint: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
# if 'auto' is set (and no password hash is set), operator permissions will be
# granted automatically as soon as you connect with the right fingerprint.
#auto: true
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# logging, takes inspiration from Insp
logging:
-
# how to log these messages
#
# file log to given target filename
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# stdout log to stdout
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# stderr log to stderr
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# (you can specify multiple methods, e.g., to log to both stderr and a file)
method: stderr
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# filename to log to, if file method is selected
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# filename: ircd.log
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# type(s) of logs to keep here. you can use - to exclude those types
#
# exclusions take precedent over inclusions, so if you exclude a type it will NEVER
# be logged, even if you explicitly include it
#
# useful types include:
# * everything (usually used with exclusing some types below)
# server server startup, rehash, and shutdown events
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# accounts account registration and authentication
# channels channel creation and operations
# commands command calling and operations
# opers oper actions, authentication, etc
# services actions related to NickServ, ChanServ, etc.
# internal unexpected runtime behavior, including potential bugs
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# userinput raw lines sent by users
# useroutput raw lines sent to users
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type: "* -userinput -useroutput"
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# one of: debug info warn error
level: info
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#-
# # example of a file log that avoids logging IP addresses
# method: file
# filename: ircd.log
# type: "* -userinput -useroutput -localconnect -localconnect-ip"
# level: debug
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# debug options
debug:
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# when enabled, oragono will attempt to recover from certain kinds of
# client-triggered runtime errors that would normally crash the server.
# this makes the server more resilient to DoS, but could result in incorrect
# behavior. deployments that would prefer to "start from scratch", e.g., by
# letting the process crash and auto-restarting it with systemd, can set
# this to false.
recover-from-errors: true
# optionally expose a pprof http endpoint: https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/pprof/
# it is strongly recommended that you don't expose this on a public interface;
# if you need to access it remotely, you can use an SSH tunnel.
# set to `null`, "", leave blank, or omit to disable
# pprof-listener: "localhost:6060"
# datastore configuration
datastore:
# path to the datastore
path: ircd.db
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# if the database schema requires an upgrade, `autoupgrade` will attempt to
# perform it automatically on startup. the database will be backed
# up, and if the upgrade fails, the original database will be restored.
autoupgrade: true
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# languages config
languages:
# whether to load languages
enabled: true
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# default language to use for new clients
# 'en' is the default English language in the code
default: en
# which directory contains our language files
path: languages
# limits - these need to be the same across the network
limits:
# nicklen is the max nick length allowed
nicklen: 32
# identlen is the max ident length allowed
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identlen: 20
# channellen is the max channel length allowed
channellen: 64
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# awaylen is the maximum length of an away message
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awaylen: 500
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# kicklen is the maximum length of a kick message
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kicklen: 1000
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# topiclen is the maximum length of a channel topic
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topiclen: 1000
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# maximum number of monitor entries a client can have
monitor-entries: 100
# whowas entries to store
whowas-entries: 100
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# maximum length of channel lists (beI modes)
chan-list-modes: 60
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# maximum number of messages to accept during registration (prevents
# DoS / resource exhaustion attacks):
registration-messages: 1024
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# message length limits for the new multiline cap
multiline:
max-bytes: 4096 # 0 means disabled
max-lines: 100 # 0 means no limit
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# fakelag: prevents clients from spamming commands too rapidly
fakelag:
# whether to enforce fakelag
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enabled: true
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# time unit for counting command rates
window: 1s
# clients can send this many commands without fakelag being imposed
burst-limit: 5
# once clients have exceeded their burst allowance, they can send only
# this many commands per `window`:
messages-per-window: 2
# client status resets to the default state if they go this long without
# sending any commands:
cooldown: 2s
# message history tracking, for the RESUME extension and possibly other uses in future
history:
# should we store messages for later playback?
2019-02-05 10:29:32 +01:00
# the current implementation stores messages in RAM only; they do not persist
2019-02-10 12:06:11 +01:00
# across server restarts. however, you should not enable this unless you understand
2019-02-05 10:29:32 +01:00
# how it interacts with the GDPR and/or any data privacy laws that apply
# in your country and the countries of your users.
2019-02-10 12:06:11 +01:00
enabled: false
# how many channel-specific events (messages, joins, parts) should be tracked per channel?
2019-05-19 22:34:52 +02:00
channel-length: 1024
# how many direct messages and notices should be tracked per user?
2019-05-19 22:34:52 +02:00
client-length: 256
# how long should we try to preserve messages?
# if `autoresize-window` is 0, the in-memory message buffers are preallocated to
# their maximum length. if it is nonzero, the buffers are initially small and
# are dynamically expanded up to the maximum length. if the buffer is full
# and the oldest message is older than `autoresize-window`, then it will overwrite
# the oldest message rather than resize; otherwise, it will expand if possible.
autoresize-window: 1h
2018-12-28 19:45:55 +01:00
# number of messages to automatically play back on channel join (0 to disable):
autoreplay-on-join: 0
2019-02-04 18:16:28 +01:00
# maximum number of CHATHISTORY messages that can be
# requested at once (0 disables support for CHATHISTORY)
chathistory-maxmessages: 100