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update tor guidelines
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@ -706,9 +706,9 @@ kline = "DLINE ANDKILL 2h %i :Open proxy found on your host.";
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## Tor
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Oragono has code support for adding an .onion address to an IRC server, or operating an IRC server as a Tor hidden service. This is subtle, so you should be familiar with the [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/) and the concept of a [hidden service](https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-onion-service.html.en).
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Oragono has code support for adding an .onion address to an IRC server, or operating an IRC server as a Tor onion service ("hidden service"). This is subtle, so you should be familiar with the [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/) and the concept of an [onion service](https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-onion-service.html.en).
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There are two possible ways to serve Oragono over Tor. One is to add a .onion address to a server that also serves non-Tor clients, and whose IP address is public information. This is relatively straightforward. Add a separate listener, for example `127.0.0.2:6668`, to Oragono's `server.listen`, then add it to `server.tor-listeners.listeners`. Then configure Tor like this:
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There are two possible ways to serve Oragono over Tor. One is to add a .onion address to a server that also serves non-Tor clients, and whose IP address is public information. This is relatively straightforward. Add a separate listener, for example `127.0.0.2:6668`, to Oragono's `server.listeners`, then configure it with `tor: true`. Then configure Tor like this:
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````
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/oragono_hidden_service
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@ -720,13 +720,13 @@ HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1
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HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1
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````
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Tor provides end-to-end encryption for hidden services, so there's no need to enable TLS in Oragono for the listener (`127.0.0.2:6668` in this example). Doing so is not recommended, given the difficulty in obtaining a TLS certificate valid for an .onion address.
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Tor provides end-to-end encryption for onion services, so there's no need to enable TLS in Oragono for the listener (`127.0.0.2:6668` in this example). Doing so is not recommended, given the difficulty in obtaining a TLS certificate valid for an .onion address.
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The second way is to run Oragono as a true hidden service, where the server's actual IP address is a secret. This requires hardening measures on the Oragono side:
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* Oragono should not accept any connections on its public interfaces. You should remove any listener that starts with the address of a public interface, or with `:`, which means "listen on all available interfaces". You should listen only on `127.0.0.1:6667` and a Unix domain socket such as `/hidden_service_sockets/oragono.sock`.
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* In this mode, it is especially important that all operator passwords are strong and all operators are trusted (operators have a larger attack surface to deanonymize the server).
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* Tor hidden services are at risk of being deanonymized if a client can trick the server into performing a non-Tor network request. Oragono should not perform any such requests (such as hostname resolution or ident lookups) in response to input received over a correctly configured Tor listener. However, Oragono has not been thoroughly audited against such deanonymization attacks --- therefore, Oragono should be deployed with additional sandboxing to protect against this:
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* Onion services are at risk of being deanonymized if a client can trick the server into performing a non-Tor network request. Oragono should not perform any such requests (such as hostname resolution or ident lookups) in response to input received over a correctly configured Tor listener. However, Oragono has not been thoroughly audited against such deanonymization attacks --- therefore, Oragono should be deployed with additional sandboxing to protect against this:
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* Oragono should run with no direct network connectivity, e.g., by running in its own Linux network namespace. systemd implements this with the [PrivateNetwork](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html) configuration option: add `PrivateNetwork=true` to Oragono's systemd unit file.
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* Since the loopback adapters are local to a specific network namespace, and the Tor daemon will run in the root namespace, Tor will be unable to connect to Oragono over loopback TCP. Instead, Oragono must listen on a named Unix domain socket that the Tor daemon can connect to. However, distributions typically package Tor with its own hardening profiles, which restrict which sockets it can access. Below is a recipe for configuring this with the official Tor packages for Debian:
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ server:
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# Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will
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# be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener
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# *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain:
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# "/tmp/oragono_tor_sock":
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# "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock":
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# tor: true
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# sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system,
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