tor: pkgs: - tor service: tor https_support_pkg: apt-transport-https config_torrc: '/etc/tor/torrc' config_torsocks: '/etc/tor/torsocks.conf' repo_url: 'https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org' repo_key_url: 'https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc' fingerprint: False torrc: ## Tor opens a SOCKS proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't ## configure one below. Set "SOCKSPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. #SOCKSPort: '9050' # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. #SOCKSPort: '192.168.0.1:9100' # Bind to this address:port too. SOCKSPort: '9050' # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. ## First entry that matches wins. If no SOCKSPolicy is set, we accept ## all (and only) requests that reach a SOCKSPort. Untrusted users who ## can access your SOCKSPort may be able to learn about the connections ## you make. #SOCKSPolicy: 'accept 192.168.0.0/16' #SOCKSPolicy: 'accept6 FC00::/7' #SOCKSPolicy: 'reject *' SOCKSPolicy: 'accept *' ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as ## you want. ## ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. ## ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log #'Log notice file': '/var/log/tor/notices.log' ## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log #'Log debug file': '/var/log/tor/debug.log' ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles #'Log notice': 'syslog' ## To send all messages to stderr: #'Log debug': 'stderr' ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. RunAsDaemon: '1' ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. DataDirectory: '/var/lib/tor' ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. #ControlPort: '9051' ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. #HashedControlPassword: '16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C' #CookieAuthentication: '1' ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address ## to tell people. ## ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the ## address y:z. #HiddenServiceDir: '/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/' #HiddenServicePort: '80 127.0.0.1:80' #HiddenServiceDir: '/var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/' #HiddenServicePort: '80 127.0.0.1:80' #HiddenServicePort: '22 127.0.0.1:22' ################ This section is just for relays ##################### # ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as ## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding ## yourself to make this work. #ORPort 443 NoListen #ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise ORPort: '9001' ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. #Address: 'noname.example.com' ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for ## outgoing traffic to use. #OutboundBindAddress: '10.0.0.5' ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. ## Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must ## contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. #Nickname: 'ididnteditheconfig' ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must ## be at least 75 kilobytes per second. ## Note that units for these config options are bytes (per second), not ## bits (per second), and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, ## 2^20, etc. #RelayBandwidthRate: '100 KBytes' # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) #RelayBandwidthBurst: '200 KBytes' # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb) ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes, ## not to their sum: setting "40 GB" may allow up to 80 GB total before ## hibernating. ## ## Set a maximum of 40 gigabytes each way per period. #AccountingMax: '40 GBytes' ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) #AccountingStart: 'day 00:00' ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax ## is per month) #AccountingStart: 'month 3 15:00' ## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line ## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or ## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all ## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so ## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that ## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose. #ContactInfo: 'Random Person ' ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: #ContactInfo: '0xFFFFFFFF Random Person ' ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do ## if you have enough bandwidth. #DirPort: '9030' # what port to advertise for directory connections ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as ## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port ## forwarding yourself to make this work. #DirPort: '80 NoListen' #DirPort: '127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise' ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source ## distribution for a sample. #DirPortFrontPage: '/etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html' ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would ## break its concealability and potentially reveal its IP/TCP address. #MyFamily: '$keyid,$keyid,...' ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first ## to last, and the first match wins. ## ## If you want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules ## using accept/reject *. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and ## IPv6, write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 *6, and your IPv4 rules ## using accept/reject *4. ## ## If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end this with either a ## reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) ## the default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is ## described in the man page or at ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html ## ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. ## ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall, ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor ## users will be told that those destinations are down. ## ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) ## networks, including to the configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, ## and any public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay. ## See the man page entry for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow ## "exit enclaving". ## #ExitPolicy: 'accept *:6660-6667,reject *:*' # allow irc ports on IPv4 and IPv6 but no more #ExitPolicy: 'accept *:119' # accept nntp ports on IPv4 and IPv6 as well as default exit policy #ExitPolicy: 'accept *4:119' # accept nntp ports on IPv4 only as well as default exit policy #ExitPolicy: 'accept6 *6:119' # accept nntp ports on IPv6 only as well as default exit policy #ExitPolicy: 'reject *:*' # no exits allowed ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! #BridgeRelay: '1' ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: #PublishServerDescriptor: '0' torsocks: # Default Tor address and port. By default, Tor will listen on localhost for # any SOCKS connection and relay the traffic on the Tor network. TorAddress: '127.0.0.1' TorPort: '9050' # Tor hidden sites do not have real IP addresses. This specifies what range of # IP addresses will be handed to the application as "cookies" for .onion names. # Of course, you should pick a block of addresses which you aren't going to # ever need to actually connect to. This is similar to the MapAddress feature # of the main tor daemon. OnionAddrRange: '127.42.42.0/24' # SOCKS5 Username and Password. This is used to isolate the torsocks connection # circuit from other streams in Tor. Use with option IsolateSOCKSAuth (on by # default) in tor(1). TORSOCKS_USERNAME and TORSOCKS_PASSWORD environment # variable overrides these options. #SOCKS5Username: #SOCKS5Password: # Set Torsocks to accept inbound connections. If set to 1, listen() and # accept() will be allowed to be used with non localhost address. (Default: 0) #AllowInbound: '1' # Set Torsocks to allow outbound connections to the loopback interface. # If set to 1, connect() will be allowed to be used to the loopback interface # bypassing Tor. If set to 2, in addition to TCP connect(), UDP operations to # the loopback interface will also be allowed, bypassing Tor. This option # should not be used by most users. (Default: 0) #AllowOutboundLocalhost: '1' # Set Torsocks to use an automatically generated SOCKS5 username/password based # on the process ID and current time, that makes the connections to Tor use a # different circuit from other existing streams in Tor on a per-process basis. # If set, the SOCKS5Username and SOCKS5Password options must not be set. # (Default: 0) #IsolatePID: '1'