Remove irrelevant defaults
Prefer Tor built-in defaults. Only set data directory to allow for management of files inside it. Signed-off-by: Georg Pfuetzenreuter <mail@georg-pfuetzenreuter.net>
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@ -10,237 +10,4 @@ tor:
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fingerprint: False
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torrc:
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## Tor opens a SOCKS proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
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## configure one below. Set "SOCKSPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
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## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
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#SOCKSPort: '9050' # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
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#SOCKSPort: '192.168.0.1:9100' # Bind to this address:port too.
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SOCKSPort: '9050' # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
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## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
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## First entry that matches wins. If no SOCKSPolicy is set, we accept
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## all (and only) requests that reach a SOCKSPort. Untrusted users who
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## can access your SOCKSPort may be able to learn about the connections
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## you make.
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#SOCKSPolicy: 'accept 192.168.0.0/16'
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#SOCKSPolicy: 'accept6 FC00::/7'
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#SOCKSPolicy: 'reject *'
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SOCKSPolicy: 'accept *'
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## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
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## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
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## you want.
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##
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## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
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## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
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##
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## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
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#'Log notice file': '/var/log/tor/notices.log'
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## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
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#'Log debug file': '/var/log/tor/debug.log'
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## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
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#'Log notice': 'syslog'
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## To send all messages to stderr:
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#'Log debug': 'stderr'
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## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
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## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
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## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
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RunAsDaemon: '1'
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## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
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## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
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DataDirectory: '/var/lib/tor'
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## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
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## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
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#ControlPort: '9051'
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## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
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## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
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#HashedControlPassword: '16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C'
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#CookieAuthentication: '1'
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############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
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## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
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## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
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## to tell people.
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##
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## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
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## address y:z.
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#HiddenServiceDir: '/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/'
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#HiddenServicePort: '80 127.0.0.1:80'
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#HiddenServiceDir: '/var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/'
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#HiddenServicePort: '80 127.0.0.1:80'
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#HiddenServicePort: '22 127.0.0.1:22'
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################ This section is just for relays #####################
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#
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## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
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## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
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## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
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## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
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## yourself to make this work.
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#ORPort 443 NoListen
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#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
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ORPort: '9001'
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## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
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## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
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#Address: 'noname.example.com'
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## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
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## outgoing traffic to use.
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#OutboundBindAddress: '10.0.0.5'
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## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
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## Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must
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## contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
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#Nickname: 'ididnteditheconfig'
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## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
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## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
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## be at least 75 kilobytes per second.
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## Note that units for these config options are bytes (per second), not
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## bits (per second), and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10,
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## 2^20, etc.
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#RelayBandwidthRate: '100 KBytes' # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
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#RelayBandwidthBurst: '200 KBytes' # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb)
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## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
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## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
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## not to their sum: setting "40 GB" may allow up to 80 GB total before
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## hibernating.
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##
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## Set a maximum of 40 gigabytes each way per period.
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#AccountingMax: '40 GBytes'
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## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
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#AccountingStart: 'day 00:00'
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## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
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## is per month)
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#AccountingStart: 'month 3 15:00'
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## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
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## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
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## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
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## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
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## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
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## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
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#ContactInfo: 'Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>'
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## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
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#ContactInfo: '0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>'
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## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
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## if you have enough bandwidth.
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#DirPort: '9030' # what port to advertise for directory connections
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
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## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
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## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
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## forwarding yourself to make this work.
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#DirPort: '80 NoListen'
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#DirPort: '127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise'
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## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
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## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
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## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
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## distribution for a sample.
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#DirPortFrontPage: '/etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html'
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## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
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## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
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## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
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## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
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## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
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## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
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## break its concealability and potentially reveal its IP/TCP address.
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#MyFamily: '$keyid,$keyid,...'
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## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
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## to last, and the first match wins.
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##
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## If you want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules
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## using accept/reject *. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and
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## IPv6, write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 *6, and your IPv4 rules
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## using accept/reject *4.
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##
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## If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end this with either a
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## reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to)
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## the default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
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## described in the man page or at
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## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
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##
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## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
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## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
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##
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## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
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## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
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## users will be told that those destinations are down.
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##
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## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
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## networks, including to the configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
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## and any public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay.
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## See the man page entry for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow
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## "exit enclaving".
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##
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#ExitPolicy: 'accept *:6660-6667,reject *:*' # allow irc ports on IPv4 and IPv6 but no more
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#ExitPolicy: 'accept *:119' # accept nntp ports on IPv4 and IPv6 as well as default exit policy
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#ExitPolicy: 'accept *4:119' # accept nntp ports on IPv4 only as well as default exit policy
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#ExitPolicy: 'accept6 *6:119' # accept nntp ports on IPv6 only as well as default exit policy
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#ExitPolicy: 'reject *:*' # no exits allowed
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## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
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## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
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## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
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## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
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## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
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## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
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#BridgeRelay: '1'
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## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
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## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
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## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
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## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
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#PublishServerDescriptor: '0'
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torsocks:
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# Default Tor address and port. By default, Tor will listen on localhost for
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# any SOCKS connection and relay the traffic on the Tor network.
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TorAddress: '127.0.0.1'
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TorPort: '9050'
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# Tor hidden sites do not have real IP addresses. This specifies what range of
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# IP addresses will be handed to the application as "cookies" for .onion names.
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# Of course, you should pick a block of addresses which you aren't going to
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# ever need to actually connect to. This is similar to the MapAddress feature
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# of the main tor daemon.
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OnionAddrRange: '127.42.42.0/24'
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# SOCKS5 Username and Password. This is used to isolate the torsocks connection
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# circuit from other streams in Tor. Use with option IsolateSOCKSAuth (on by
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# default) in tor(1). TORSOCKS_USERNAME and TORSOCKS_PASSWORD environment
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# variable overrides these options.
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#SOCKS5Username: <username>
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#SOCKS5Password: <password>
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# Set Torsocks to accept inbound connections. If set to 1, listen() and
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# accept() will be allowed to be used with non localhost address. (Default: 0)
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#AllowInbound: '1'
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# Set Torsocks to allow outbound connections to the loopback interface.
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# If set to 1, connect() will be allowed to be used to the loopback interface
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# bypassing Tor. If set to 2, in addition to TCP connect(), UDP operations to
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# the loopback interface will also be allowed, bypassing Tor. This option
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# should not be used by most users. (Default: 0)
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#AllowOutboundLocalhost: '1'
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# Set Torsocks to use an automatically generated SOCKS5 username/password based
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# on the process ID and current time, that makes the connections to Tor use a
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# different circuit from other existing streams in Tor on a per-process basis.
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# If set, the SOCKS5Username and SOCKS5Password options must not be set.
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# (Default: 0)
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#IsolatePID: '1'
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