2019-06-30 12:31:16 +02:00
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# WARNING: This config uses two guards by default instead of just one,
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# search for NumEntryGuards 2, this may make Tor instance doing this more
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# identifiable and same applies to some other changes I am doing.
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# Run by your own responsibility.
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2019-05-03 11:31:33 +02:00
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DataDirectory /var/lib/tor-client
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Log notice syslog
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2019-05-04 15:55:08 +02:00
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# This instance will appear in syslog as "Tor-client"
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2019-05-03 11:31:33 +02:00
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SyslogIdentityTag client
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2019-05-04 15:55:08 +02:00
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# Use the default SocksPort, but also isolate streams going to different
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# destination addresses and in case of DualStack Exits prefer IPv6, because
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# they aren't publicly listed and may let through Tor blocks.
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# https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16947
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2019-05-22 10:58:05 +02:00
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SocksPort 9050 IsolateDestAddr PreferIPv6 IsolateSOCKSAuth
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SocksPort 9052 PreferIPv6 IsolateSOCKSAuth
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SocksPort 9060 OnionTrafficOnly IsolateSOCKSAuth
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# HTTP Proxy port
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2019-06-30 12:31:16 +02:00
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# This works only for HTTPS and similar, so I ended up using Privoxy to get
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# apt-listchanges and apt-listbugs also through Tor.
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#HTTPTunnelPort 8118 IsolateDestAddr PreferIPv6 IsolateSOCKSAuth
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2019-05-03 11:31:33 +02:00
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# Uncomment to disable IPv4
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#ClientUseIPv4 0
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2019-05-04 15:55:08 +02:00
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# Allow Tor to connect to relay/bridge over IPv6. As the default is
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# IPv4-only, this may cause less anonymity if the guard is bad (and
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# especially if you are behind CGN?)
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ClientUseIPv6 1
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# Always prefer IPv6 over IPv4 (see previous), maybe this would be useful
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# in a DS network preventing Tor over IPv4.
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2019-08-25 17:39:12 +02:00
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ClientPreferIPv6ORPort 1
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2019-05-03 11:31:33 +02:00
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2019-06-30 13:27:20 +02:00
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## Mapping clearnet domains to onions for certificate validation if
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## accessed through Tor
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# Other valid domains (that I am unlikely to use) in normal IRC:
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# fi.pirateirc.net (I use it in Biboumi though) / irc.piraattipuolue.fi
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MapAddress roubaix-fr.pirateirc.net tll4bxf546kzf6iv4n2m4pbbjnifrfewe3kcritva2tuuuiowygx2cqd.onion
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# Freenode has a lot of valid names, but zettel is the name of their Tor
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# server
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MapAddress zettel.freenode.net ajnvpgl6prmkb7yktvue6im5wiedlz2w32uhcwaamdiecdrfpwwgnlqd.onion
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2019-05-04 19:17:21 +02:00
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# Disable control access
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2019-06-30 12:31:16 +02:00
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#ControlPort 0
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#ControlSocket 0
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2019-05-04 19:17:21 +02:00
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# If these have been disabled in the main Tor or OneHopOnion and something
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# should work with the Debian defaults (e.g. zeronet)
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2019-06-30 12:31:16 +02:00
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# Uncommented due to how I would uncomment them anyway in my setup. See ###
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# below
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2019-05-03 11:31:33 +02:00
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CookieAuthentication 1
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2019-06-30 12:31:16 +02:00
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CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1
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CookieAuthFile /run/tor/control.authcookie
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ControlPort 9051
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ControlSocket /run/tor/control GroupWritable RelaxDirModeCheck
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ControlSocketsGroupWritable 1
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SocksPort unix:/run/tor/socks WorldWritable IsolateDestAddr PreferIPv6
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### Disabling the Above in Debian Torrc (judging by my running system)
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##ControlPort 0
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##ControlSocket 0
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##CookieAuthentication 0
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##CookieAuthFile 0
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2019-05-15 09:31:47 +02:00
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# https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/291-two-guard-nodes.txt
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2019-06-30 12:31:16 +02:00
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# Possibly dangerous or more easily fingerprintable as it's not the default
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# yet!
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NumEntryGuards 2
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