n/dns.md: to ecs or not to ecs?

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Aminda Suomalainen 2024-04-20 17:40:37 +03:00
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@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ _For DNS resolvers, refer to [r/resolv.tsv](/r/resolv.tsv)_
<!-- DON'T EDIT THIS SECTION, INSTEAD RE-RUN doctoc TO UPDATE --> <!-- DON'T EDIT THIS SECTION, INSTEAD RE-RUN doctoc TO UPDATE -->
- [Identifying DNS resolver](#identifying-dns-resolver) - [Identifying DNS resolver](#identifying-dns-resolver)
- [Identifying support for client-subnet](#identifying-support-for-client-subnet) - [To ECS or not to ECS?](#to-ecs-or-not-to-ecs)
- [Identifying support for client-subnet](#identifying-support-for-client-subnet)
- [Mobile applications](#mobile-applications) - [Mobile applications](#mobile-applications)
- [Android](#android) - [Android](#android)
- [Rethink](#rethink) - [Rethink](#rethink)
@ -34,7 +35,44 @@ _For DNS resolvers, refer to [r/resolv.tsv](/r/resolv.tsv)_
The above list is based on [redirect2me/which-dns README alternatives section](https://github.com/redirect2me/which-dns/blob/main/README.md) The above list is based on [redirect2me/which-dns README alternatives section](https://github.com/redirect2me/which-dns/blob/main/README.md)
## Identifying support for client-subnet ## To ECS or not to ECS?
[_Understanding the Privacy Implications of ECS_](https://yacin.nadji.us/docs/pubs/dimva16_ecs.pdf)
brings up two bigger issues EDNS client-subnet:
- Authoritative nameserver is given part of the subnet, which can be
personally identifiable and as the connection between recursor and
authoritative is unencrypted, anyone between them can observe all the
queries.
- Think of VPNs where traffic within the VPN is encrypted, but it won't
magically encrypt plain traffic leaving it.
- Anyone between the recursive and authoritative nameservers can perform cache
poisoning attack and give it a narrow target. With short TTL, it may be
impossible to audit afterwards. Only DNSSEC can protect from this, but
DNSSEC signing isn't used that widely.
These issues bring additional questions:
- Do you care?
- If you run open wireless network and offer everyone ECS nameserver such as
Google DNS through DHCP while using manually configured encrypted DNS by
yourself, is there any cause for concern? You can always say it was
someone using your open network? Or if this is a multi-user system like
VPS running titlefetcher bot or Matrix homeserver, who knows who triggered
the original queries and where?
- How much does getting local content matter to you? More or less than
increased resource use of contacting a server further away? Is private ECS
an option? ([r/resolv.tsv](/r/resolv.tsv))
- What is the impact of domains you visit being surveilled?
- This page mentions cases like FFUpdater where the surveillance would
reveal that I interact with github.com and other sites it downloads apk
files from, which hardly matters, but how about you?
- What is the impact of cache poisoning tailored to you?
- Everything is encrypted and TLS certificates wouldn't match so would you
continue to the wrong site regardless of the prompt, or decide something
is wrong and try again later. How about your users?
### Identifying support for client-subnet
Or what is being sent to the authoritative servers. Or what is being sent to the authoritative servers.