n/dns.md: remove the long comment containing the old version of ECS

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Aminda Suomalainen 2024-05-07 12:59:29 +03:00
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@ -157,54 +157,6 @@ See also:
- [AdGuard DNS: Privacy-friendly EDNS Client Subnet](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/privacy-friendly-edns-client-subnet.html) - [AdGuard DNS: Privacy-friendly EDNS Client Subnet](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/privacy-friendly-edns-client-subnet.html)
- [DNS0 Privacy Policy](https://www.dns0.eu/privacy) - [DNS0 Privacy Policy](https://www.dns0.eu/privacy)
<!--
[_Understanding the Privacy Implications of ECS_](https://yacin.nadji.us/docs/pubs/dimva16_ecs.pdf)
brings up two bigger issues EDNS client-subnet:
- Authoritative nameserver is given part of the subnet, which can be
personally identifiable and as the connection between recursor and
authoritative is unencrypted, anyone between them can observe all the
queries.
- Think of VPNs where traffic within the VPN is encrypted, but it won't
magically encrypt plain traffic leaving it.
- The part given to the au4thoritative nameserver is `/24` on IPv4 and
`/56` on IPv6. These equal 192.0.2.x so if a MITM wanted to know who you
are there would be 254 options (assuming there are no NATs). On IPv6 a
`/56` includes 256 `/64` blocks and `/64` is the most used block and there
is a recommendation of giving customers a `/56` block, so it would point
directly to your connection. However some mobile operators give a `/64`
so it will again point to 256 options again. Not that many.
- Anyone between the recursive and authoritative nameservers can perform cache
poisoning attack and give it a narrow target. With short TTL, it may be
impossible to audit afterwards. Only DNSSEC can protect from this, but
DNSSEC signing isn't used that widely.
These issues bring additional questions:
- Do you care?
- If you run open wireless network and offer everyone ECS nameserver such as
Google DNS through DHCP while using manually configured encrypted DNS by
yourself, is there any cause for concern? You can always say it was
someone using your open network? Or if this is a multi-user system like
VPS running titlefetcher bot or Matrix homeserver, who knows who triggered
the original queries and where? SteamOS? Speed over all as it's only used
for gayming. Virtual machine lab? Who cares. Larger organization? That may
be a big target?
- How much does getting local content matter to you? More or less than
increased resource use of contacting a server further away? _Is private ECS
an option?_ ([r/resolv.tsv](/r/resolv.tsv))
- What is the impact of domains you visit being surveilled?
- This page mentions cases like FFUpdater where the surveillance would
reveal that I interact with github.com and other sites it downloads apk
files from, which hardly matters, but how about you?
- What is the impact of cache poisoning tailored to you?
- Everything is encrypted and TLS certificates wouldn't match so would you
continue to the wrong site regardless of the prompt, or decide something
is wrong and try again later. How about your users?
-->
### Identifying support for ECS ### Identifying support for ECS
Or what is being sent to the authoritative servers. Or what is being sent to the authoritative servers.