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n/dns.md: remove the long comment containing the old version of ECS
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n/dns.md
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n/dns.md
@ -157,54 +157,6 @@ See also:
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- [AdGuard DNS: Privacy-friendly EDNS Client Subnet](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/privacy-friendly-edns-client-subnet.html)
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- [DNS0 Privacy Policy](https://www.dns0.eu/privacy)
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<!--
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[_Understanding the Privacy Implications of ECS_](https://yacin.nadji.us/docs/pubs/dimva16_ecs.pdf)
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brings up two bigger issues EDNS client-subnet:
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- Authoritative nameserver is given part of the subnet, which can be
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personally identifiable and as the connection between recursor and
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authoritative is unencrypted, anyone between them can observe all the
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queries.
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- Think of VPNs where traffic within the VPN is encrypted, but it won't
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magically encrypt plain traffic leaving it.
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- The part given to the au4thoritative nameserver is `/24` on IPv4 and
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`/56` on IPv6. These equal 192.0.2.x so if a MITM wanted to know who you
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are there would be 254 options (assuming there are no NATs). On IPv6 a
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`/56` includes 256 `/64` blocks and `/64` is the most used block and there
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is a recommendation of giving customers a `/56` block, so it would point
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directly to your connection. However some mobile operators give a `/64`
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so it will again point to 256 options again. Not that many.
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- Anyone between the recursive and authoritative nameservers can perform cache
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poisoning attack and give it a narrow target. With short TTL, it may be
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impossible to audit afterwards. Only DNSSEC can protect from this, but
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DNSSEC signing isn't used that widely.
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These issues bring additional questions:
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- Do you care?
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- If you run open wireless network and offer everyone ECS nameserver such as
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Google DNS through DHCP while using manually configured encrypted DNS by
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yourself, is there any cause for concern? You can always say it was
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someone using your open network? Or if this is a multi-user system like
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VPS running titlefetcher bot or Matrix homeserver, who knows who triggered
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the original queries and where? SteamOS? Speed over all as it's only used
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for gayming. Virtual machine lab? Who cares. Larger organization? That may
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be a big target?
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- How much does getting local content matter to you? More or less than
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increased resource use of contacting a server further away? _Is private ECS
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an option?_ ([r/resolv.tsv](/r/resolv.tsv))
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- What is the impact of domains you visit being surveilled?
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- This page mentions cases like FFUpdater where the surveillance would
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reveal that I interact with github.com and other sites it downloads apk
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files from, which hardly matters, but how about you?
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- What is the impact of cache poisoning tailored to you?
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- Everything is encrypted and TLS certificates wouldn't match so would you
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continue to the wrong site regardless of the prompt, or decide something
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is wrong and try again later. How about your users?
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-->
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### Identifying support for ECS
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Or what is being sent to the authoritative servers.
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