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mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git synced 2024-11-22 06:29:23 +01:00
iwd/src/eap-aka.c
James Prestwood 4bcfa21ca4 eap-aka: round to nearest word on message buffers
One of these message buffers was overflowing due to padding not
being taken into account (caught by sanitizers). Wrapped the length
of all message buffers with EAP_SIM_ROUND as to account for any
padding that attributes may add.
2021-07-30 10:38:26 -05:00

793 lines
18 KiB
C

/*
*
* Wireless daemon for Linux
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
*
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include <config.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ell/ell.h>
#include "src/missing.h"
#include "src/eap.h"
#include "src/eap-private.h"
#include "src/crypto.h"
#include "src/simutil.h"
#include "src/simauth.h"
/*
* EAP-AKA specific values
*/
#define EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN 16
#define EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN 14
#define EAP_AKA_RES_LEN 8
#define EAP_AKA_K_RE_LEN 32
#define EAP_AKA_KDF_DEFAULT 0x0001
#define EAP_AKA_ST_CHALLENGE 0x01
#define EAP_AKA_ST_AUTH_REJECT 0x02
#define EAP_AKA_ST_SYNC_FAILURE 0x04
#define EAP_AKA_ST_IDENTITY 0x05
#define EAP_AKA_ST_NOTIFICATION 0x0c
#define EAP_AKA_ST_CLIENT_ERROR 0x0e
/*
* Internal client state, tracked to ensure that we are receiving the right
* messages at the right time.
*/
enum eap_aka_state {
EAP_AKA_STATE_UNCONNECTED = 0,
EAP_AKA_STATE_IDENTITY,
EAP_AKA_STATE_CHALLENGE,
EAP_AKA_STATE_SUCCESS,
EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR
};
struct eap_aka_handle {
enum eap_aka_state state;
enum eap_type type;
/* Identity from SIM */
char *identity;
/* Derived master key */
uint8_t mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN];
/* Derived K_encr key from PRNG */
uint8_t k_encr[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN];
/* Derived K_aut key from PRNG, extended for AKA' */
uint8_t k_aut[EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN];
/* Derived MSK from PRNG */
uint8_t msk[EAP_SIM_MSK_LEN];
/* Derived EMSK from PRNG */
uint8_t emsk[EAP_SIM_EMSK_LEN];
/* Flag set if AT_ANY_ID_REQ was present */
bool any_id_req : 1;
/* Flag to indicate protected status indications */
bool protected : 1;
/* Authentication value from AuC */
uint8_t autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
/* re-auth key */
uint8_t k_re[EAP_AKA_K_RE_LEN];
uint8_t rand[EAP_SIM_RAND_LEN];
char *kdf_in;
uint8_t *chal_pkt;
uint32_t pkt_len;
struct iwd_sim_auth *auth;
unsigned int auth_watch;
};
static void eap_aka_clear_secrets(struct eap_aka_handle *aka)
{
explicit_bzero(aka->mk, sizeof(aka->mk));
explicit_bzero(aka->k_encr, sizeof(aka->k_encr));
explicit_bzero(aka->k_aut, sizeof(aka->k_aut));
explicit_bzero(aka->k_re, sizeof(aka->k_re));
explicit_bzero(aka->msk, sizeof(aka->msk));
explicit_bzero(aka->emsk, sizeof(aka->emsk));
}
static void eap_aka_free(struct eap_state *eap)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
if (aka->auth)
sim_auth_unregistered_watch_remove(aka->auth, aka->auth_watch);
eap_aka_clear_secrets(aka);
l_free(aka->identity);
l_free(aka->kdf_in);
l_free(aka);
eap_set_data(eap, NULL);
}
static bool derive_aka_mk(const char *identity, const uint8_t *ik,
const uint8_t *ck, uint8_t *mk)
{
int ret;
struct iovec iov[5];
struct l_checksum *checksum = l_checksum_new(L_CHECKSUM_SHA1);
if (!checksum) {
l_error("could not create SHA1 checksum");
return false;
}
iov[0].iov_base = (void *)identity;
iov[0].iov_len = strlen(identity);
iov[1].iov_base = (void *)ik;
iov[1].iov_len = EAP_AKA_IK_LEN;
iov[2].iov_base = (void *)ck;
iov[2].iov_len = EAP_AKA_CK_LEN;
if (!l_checksum_updatev(checksum, iov, 3))
goto mk_error;
ret = l_checksum_get_digest(checksum, mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
l_checksum_free(checksum);
return (ret == EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
mk_error:
l_checksum_free(checksum);
l_error("error deriving master key");
return false;
}
static void eap_aka_finish(struct eap_state *eap)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
uint8_t session_id[1 + EAP_SIM_RAND_LEN + EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_AKA;
memcpy(session_id + 1, aka->rand, EAP_SIM_RAND_LEN);
memcpy(session_id + 1 + EAP_SIM_RAND_LEN, aka->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
eap_method_success(eap);
eap_set_key_material(eap, aka->msk, 32, aka->emsk, 32, NULL, 0,
session_id, sizeof(session_id));
}
static void check_milenage_cb(const uint8_t *res, const uint8_t *ck,
const uint8_t *ik, const uint8_t *auts, void *data)
{
struct eap_state *eap = data;
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
size_t resp_len = aka->protected ? 44 : 40;
uint8_t response[EAP_SIM_ROUND(resp_len + 4)];
uint8_t *pos = response;
if (auts) {
/*
* If AUTS is non NULL then the SQN was not correct, send AUTS
* to server which will update the SQN and send another
* challenge packet.
*/
l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
aka->chal_pkt = NULL;
pos += eap_sim_build_header(eap, aka->type,
EAP_AKA_ST_SYNC_FAILURE, pos, 24);
pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_AUTS,
EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE, auts, EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN);
eap_method_respond(eap, response, 24);
return;
}
if (!res || !ck || !ik)
goto chal_error;
if (aka->type == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
bool r;
uint8_t ik_p[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN];
uint8_t ck_p[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN];
if (!eap_aka_derive_primes(ck, ik, aka->autn,
(uint8_t *)aka->kdf_in, strlen(aka->kdf_in),
ck_p, ik_p)) {
l_error("could not derive primes");
goto chal_fatal;
}
r = eap_aka_prf_prime(ik_p, ck_p, aka->identity, aka->k_encr,
aka->k_aut, aka->k_re, aka->msk, aka->emsk);
explicit_bzero(ik_p, sizeof(ik_p));
explicit_bzero(ck_p, sizeof(ck_p));
if (!r) {
l_error("could not derive encryption keys");
goto chal_fatal;
}
} else {
uint8_t prng_buf[160];
bool r;
if (!derive_aka_mk(aka->identity, ik, ck, aka->mk)) {
l_error("error deriving MK");
goto chal_fatal;
}
eap_sim_fips_prf(aka->mk, 20, prng_buf, 160);
r = eap_sim_get_encryption_keys(prng_buf, aka->k_encr,
aka->k_aut, aka->msk, aka->emsk);
explicit_bzero(prng_buf, sizeof(prng_buf));
if (!r) {
l_error("could not derive encryption keys");
goto chal_fatal;
}
}
if (!eap_sim_verify_mac(eap, aka->type, aka->chal_pkt, aka->pkt_len,
aka->k_aut, NULL, 0)) {
l_error("MAC was not valid");
goto chal_error;
}
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_CHALLENGE;
pos += eap_sim_build_header(eap, aka->type, EAP_AKA_ST_CHALLENGE,
pos, resp_len);
pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_RES,
EAP_SIM_PAD_LENGTH_BITS, res, EAP_AKA_RES_LEN);
if (aka->protected)
pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND,
EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE, NULL, 2);
pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC, EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE,
NULL, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
if (!eap_sim_derive_mac(aka->type, response, resp_len, aka->k_aut,
pos - EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN)) {
l_error("error deriving MAC");
goto chal_fatal;
}
l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
aka->chal_pkt = NULL;
eap_method_respond(eap, response, resp_len);
if (!aka->protected) {
eap_aka_finish(eap);
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_SUCCESS;
}
return;
chal_fatal:
eap_method_error(eap);
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR;
return;
chal_error:
l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
aka->chal_pkt = NULL;
eap_sim_client_error(eap, aka->type, EAP_SIM_ERROR_PROCESS);
}
/*
* Handles EAP-AKA Challenge subtype
*/
static void handle_challenge(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
size_t len)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
struct eap_sim_tlv_iter iter;
const uint8_t *rand = NULL;
const uint8_t *autn = NULL;
bool kdf_func = false;
uint16_t kdf_in_len = 0;
if (len < 3) {
l_error("packet is too small");
goto chal_error;
}
if (aka->state != EAP_AKA_STATE_IDENTITY) {
l_error("invalid packet for EAP-AKA state");
goto chal_error;
}
eap_sim_tlv_iter_init(&iter, pkt + 3, len - 3);
while (eap_sim_tlv_iter_next(&iter)) {
const uint8_t *contents = eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter);
uint16_t length = eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_length(&iter);
switch (eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_type(&iter)) {
case EAP_SIM_AT_AUTN:
if (length < EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN + 2) {
l_error("malformed AT_AUTN");
goto chal_error;
}
autn = contents + 2;
break;
case EAP_SIM_AT_RAND:
if (length < EAP_SIM_RAND_LEN + 2) {
l_error("malformed AT_RAND");
goto chal_error;
}
rand = contents + 2;
break;
case EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND:
if (length < 2) {
l_error("malformed AT_RESULT_IND");
goto chal_error;
}
aka->protected = 1;
break;
case EAP_SIM_AT_KDF:
if (aka->type != EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
l_error("invalid attribute found for EAP-AKA");
goto chal_error;
}
if (length < 2) {
l_error("malformed AT_KDF");
goto chal_error;
}
if (l_get_be16(contents) != EAP_AKA_KDF_DEFAULT) {
l_error("KDF requested is not supported");
goto chal_error;
}
kdf_func = true;
break;
case EAP_SIM_AT_KDF_INPUT:
if (aka->type != EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
l_error("invalid attribute found for EAP-AKA");
goto chal_error;
}
if (length < 3) {
l_error("malformed AT_KDF_INPUT");
goto chal_error;
}
kdf_in_len = l_get_be16(contents);
if (length < kdf_in_len + 2) {
l_error("malformed AT_KDF_INPUT");
goto chal_error;
}
aka->kdf_in = l_strndup((const char *)(contents + 2),
kdf_in_len);
break;
case EAP_SIM_AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM:
case EAP_SIM_AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID:
case EAP_SIM_AT_IV:
case EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA:
case EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING:
case EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE:
case EAP_SIM_AT_MAC:
/*
* AT_BIDDING is defined in RFC 5448 (AKA'). It is used to
* communicate support for AKA', if supported.
*/
case EAP_SIM_AT_BIDDING:
/* RFC 4187, Section 10.1 */
break;
default:
l_error("attribute %u was found in Challenge",
eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_type(&iter));
goto chal_error;
}
}
/* check that the right attributes were found */
if (!rand || !autn) {
l_error("AT_RAND or AT_AUTN were not found");
goto chal_error;
}
if (aka->type == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME && (!aka->kdf_in || !kdf_func)) {
l_error("AT_KDF or AT_KDF_INPUT were not found");
goto chal_error;
}
aka->chal_pkt = l_memdup(pkt, len);
aka->pkt_len = len;
/* AKA' needs AUTN for prime derivation */
memcpy(aka->autn, autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
/* Keep RAND for session ID derivation */
memcpy(aka->rand, rand, EAP_SIM_RAND_LEN);
if (sim_auth_check_milenage(aka->auth, rand, autn, check_milenage_cb,
eap) < 0) {
l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
aka->chal_pkt = NULL;
goto chal_error;
}
return;
chal_error:
eap_sim_client_error(eap, aka->type, EAP_SIM_ERROR_PROCESS);
}
/*
* Handles Notification subtype
*/
static void handle_notification(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
size_t len)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
struct eap_sim_tlv_iter iter;
int32_t value = -1;
if (len < 3) {
l_error("packet is too small");
goto notif_error;
}
eap_sim_tlv_iter_init(&iter, pkt + 3, len - 3);
while (eap_sim_tlv_iter_next(&iter)) {
const uint8_t *contents = eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter);
uint16_t length = eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_length(&iter);
switch (eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_type(&iter)) {
case EAP_SIM_AT_NOTIFICATION:
if (length < 2) {
l_error("malformed AT_NOTIFICATION");
goto notif_error;
}
value = l_get_be16(contents);
break;
case EAP_SIM_AT_IV:
case EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA:
case EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING:
case EAP_SIM_AT_MAC:
/* RFC 4186, Section 10.1 */
break;
default:
l_error("attribute type %u not allowed in Notification",
eap_sim_tlv_iter_get_type(&iter));
goto notif_error;
}
}
if (value == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS && aka->protected &&
aka->state == EAP_AKA_STATE_CHALLENGE) {
/* header + MAC + MAC header */
uint8_t response[EAP_SIM_ROUND(8 + EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN + 4)];
uint8_t *pos = response;
/*
* Server sent successful result indication
*/
eap_aka_finish(eap);
/*
* Build response packet
*/
pos += eap_sim_build_header(eap, aka->type,
EAP_AKA_ST_NOTIFICATION, pos, 20);
pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC,
EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE, NULL, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
if (!eap_sim_derive_mac(aka->type, response, pos - response,
aka->k_aut, response + 12)) {
l_error("could not derive MAC");
eap_method_error(eap);
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR;
return;
}
eap_method_respond(eap, response, pos - response);
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_SUCCESS;
return;
} else if (value == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS) {
/*
* Unexpected success notification, what should
* be done here?
*/
l_error("Unexpected success notification");
} else {
/*
* All other values are error conditions.
* Nothing unique can be done for any error so
* print the code and signal EAP failure.
*/
l_error("Error authenticating: code=%u", value);
}
notif_error:
eap_sim_client_error(eap, aka->type, EAP_SIM_ERROR_PROCESS);
}
static void handle_identity(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
size_t len)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
uint8_t response[EAP_SIM_ROUND(8 + strlen(aka->identity) + 4)];
uint8_t *pos = response;
if (aka->state != EAP_AKA_STATE_UNCONNECTED) {
l_error("invalid packet for EAP-AKA state");
eap_sim_client_error(eap, aka->type, EAP_SIM_ERROR_PROCESS);
return;
}
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_IDENTITY;
/*
* Build response packet
*/
pos += eap_sim_build_header(eap, aka->type, EAP_AKA_ST_IDENTITY, pos,
20);
pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_IDENTITY,
EAP_SIM_PAD_LENGTH, (uint8_t *)aka->identity,
strlen(aka->identity));
eap_method_respond(eap, response, pos - response);
}
static void eap_aka_handle_request(struct eap_state *eap,
const uint8_t *pkt, size_t len)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
if (len < 1) {
l_error("packet is too small");
goto req_error;
}
switch (pkt[0]) {
case EAP_AKA_ST_IDENTITY:
handle_identity(eap, pkt, len);
break;
case EAP_AKA_ST_CHALLENGE:
handle_challenge(eap, pkt, len);
break;
case EAP_AKA_ST_NOTIFICATION:
handle_notification(eap, pkt, len);
break;
default:
l_error("unknown EAP-SIM subtype: %u", pkt[0]);
goto req_error;
}
return;
req_error:
eap_sim_client_error(eap, aka->type, EAP_SIM_ERROR_PROCESS);
}
static const char *eap_aka_get_identity(struct eap_state *eap)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
return aka->identity;
}
static void auth_destroyed(void *data)
{
struct eap_state *eap = data;
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
/*
* If AKA was already successful we can return. Also if the state
* has been set to ERROR, then eap_method_error has already been called,
* so we can return.
*/
if (aka->state == EAP_AKA_STATE_SUCCESS ||
aka->state == EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR)
return;
l_error("auth provider destroyed before AKA could finish");
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR;
eap_method_error(eap);
}
static int eap_aka_check_settings(struct l_settings *settings,
struct l_queue *secrets,
const char *prefix,
struct l_queue **out_missing)
{
struct iwd_sim_auth *auth;
auth = iwd_sim_auth_find(false, true);
if (!auth) {
l_debug("No SIM driver available for EAP-AKA");
return -EUNATCH;
}
if (!iwd_sim_auth_get_nai(auth)) {
l_error("SIM driver didn't provide NAI");
return -ENOENT;
}
return 0;
}
static bool eap_aka_common_load_settings(struct eap_state *eap,
struct l_settings *settings,
const char *prefix)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
/*
* RFC 4187 Section 4.1.1.6
* For AKA, the permanent username prefix is '0'
*
* RFC 5448 Section 3
* For AKA', the permanent username prefix is '6'
*/
char id_prefix = (aka->type == EAP_TYPE_AKA) ? '0' : '6';
/*
* No specific settings for EAP-SIM, the auth provider will have all
* required data.
*/
aka->auth = iwd_sim_auth_find(false, true);
if (!aka->auth)
return false;
aka->auth_watch = sim_auth_unregistered_watch_add(aka->auth,
auth_destroyed, eap);
aka->identity = l_strdup_printf("%c%s", id_prefix,
iwd_sim_auth_get_nai(aka->auth));
return true;
}
static bool eap_aka_load_settings(struct eap_state *eap,
struct l_settings *settings,
const char *prefix)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = l_new(struct eap_aka_handle, 1);
aka->type = EAP_TYPE_AKA;
eap_set_data(eap, aka);
return eap_aka_common_load_settings(eap, settings, prefix);
}
static bool eap_aka_prime_load_settings(struct eap_state *eap,
struct l_settings *settings,
const char *prefix)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = l_new(struct eap_aka_handle, 1);
aka->type = EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME;
eap_set_data(eap, aka);
return eap_aka_common_load_settings(eap, settings, prefix);
}
static bool eap_aka_reset_state(struct eap_state *eap)
{
struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_UNCONNECTED;
l_free(aka->kdf_in);
aka->kdf_in = NULL;
l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
aka->chal_pkt = NULL;
eap_aka_clear_secrets(aka);
memset(aka->autn, 0, sizeof(aka->autn));
return true;
}
static struct eap_method eap_aka = {
.request_type = EAP_TYPE_AKA,
.exports_msk = true,
.name = "AKA",
.free = eap_aka_free,
.handle_request = eap_aka_handle_request,
.check_settings = eap_aka_check_settings,
.load_settings = eap_aka_load_settings,
.get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity,
.reset_state = eap_aka_reset_state
};
static struct eap_method eap_aka_prime = {
.request_type = EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
.exports_msk = true,
.name = "AKA'",
.free = eap_aka_free,
.handle_request = eap_aka_handle_request,
.check_settings = eap_aka_check_settings,
.load_settings = eap_aka_prime_load_settings,
.get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity,
.reset_state = eap_aka_reset_state
};
static int eap_aka_init(void)
{
l_debug("");
return eap_register_method(&eap_aka);
}
static void eap_aka_exit(void)
{
l_debug("");
eap_unregister_method(&eap_aka);
}
static int eap_aka_prime_init(void)
{
l_debug("");
return eap_register_method(&eap_aka_prime);
}
static void eap_aka_prime_exit(void)
{
l_debug("");
eap_unregister_method(&eap_aka_prime);
}
EAP_METHOD_BUILTIN(eap_aka, eap_aka_init, eap_aka_exit);
EAP_METHOD_BUILTIN(eap_aka_prime, eap_aka_prime_init, eap_aka_prime_exit);