Again the hs->support_ip_allocation flag is used for two purposes here,
first the user signals whether to support this mechanism through this
flag, then it reads the flag to find out if an IP was allocated.
Support IP allocation during the 4-Way Handshake as defined in the P2P
spec. This is the supplicant side implementation.
The API requires the user to set hs->support_ip_allocation true before
eapol_start(). On HANDSHAKE_EVENT_COMPLETE, if this same flag is still
set, we've received the IP lease, the netmask and the authenticator's
IP from the authenticator and there's no need to start DHCP. If the
flag is cleared, the user needs to use DHCP.
Reuse this flag on the authenticator side with a slightly different
meaning: when it's true we're forced to wait for the EAPoL-Start before
sending the first EAPoL-EAP frame to the supplicant, such as is required
in a WSC enrollee registration when the Association Request didn't have
a v2.0 WSC IE.
Handle EAPoL-EAP frames using our eap.c methods in authenticator mode
same as we do on the supplicant side. The user (ap.c) will only need to
set a valid 8021x_settings in the handshake object, same as on the
supplicant side.
On the supplicant side eapol_register would only register the eapol_sm
on a given netdev to start receiving frames and an eapol_start call is
required for the state machine to start executing. On the authenticator
side we shouldn't have the "early frame" problem but there's no reason
for the semantics of the two methods to be different. Somehow we were
doing everything in eapol_register and not using eapol_start if
hs->authenticator was true, so bring this in line with the supplicant
side and require eapol_start to be called also from ap.c.
Throughout the supplicant mode we'd use the eapol_sm_write wrapper but
in the authenticator mode we'd call __eapol_tx_packet directly. Adapt
eapol_sm_write to use the right destination address and use it
consistently.
sm->handshake already contains our RSN/WPA IE so there's no need to
rebuild it for msg 3/4, especially since we hardcode the fact that we
only support one pairwise cipher. If we start declaring more supported
ciphers and need to include a second RSNE we can first parse
sm->hs->authenticator_ie into a struct ir_rsn_info, overwrite the cipher
and rebuild it from that struct.
This way we duplicate less code and we hardcode fewer facts about the AP
in eapol.c which also helps in adding EAP-WSC.
In both FT or FILS EAPoL isn't used for the initial handshake and only
for the later re-keys. For FT we added the
eapol_sm_set_require_handshake mechanism to tell EAPoL to not require
the initial handshake and we can re-use it for FILS.
Currently an adversary can retransmit EAPOL Msg4/4 to make the AP
reinstall the PTK. Against older Linux kernels this can subsequently
be used to decrypt, replay, and possibly decrypt frames. See the
KRACK attacks research at krackattacks.com for attack scenarios.
In this case no machine-in-the-middle position is needed to trigger
the key reinstallation.
Fix this by using the ptk_complete boolean to track when the 4-way
handshake has completed (similar to its usage for clients). When
receiving a retransmitted Msg4/4 accept this frame but do not reinstall
the PTK.
Credits to Chris M. Stone, Sam Thomas, and Tom Chothia of Birmingham
University to help discover this issue.
On EAP events, call the handshake_event handler with the new event type
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_EAP_NOTIFY isntead of the eapol_event callback.
This allows the handler to be set before calling
netdev_connect/netdev_connect_wsc. It's also in theory more type-safe
because we don't need the cast in netdev_connect_wsc anymore.
Convert the handshake event callback type to use variable argument
list to allow for more flexibility in event-specific arguments
passed to the callbacks.
Note the uint16_t reason code is promoted to an int when using variable
arguments so va_arg(args, int) has to be used.
A recent change checked the return value of ie_parse_rsne_from_data
inside the ptk 1/4 handler. This seemed safe, but actually caused
the eapol unit test to fail.
The reason was because eapol was parsing the IEs assuming they were
an RSN, when they could be a WPA IE (WPA1 not WPA2). The WPA case
does not end up using the rsn_info at all, so having rsn_info
uninitialized did not pose a problem. After adding the return value
check it was found this fails every time for WPA1.
Since the rsn_info is not needed for WPA1 we can only do the RSN
parse for WPA2 and leave rsn_info uninitialized.
Technically there's no problem here as l_queue_remove does not
dereference the pointer. Still, it confuses certain static analysis
tools in the current form. Reordering this will not change the behavior
at all.
We were not using or taking into account the noencrypt flag obtained
from the kernel via CONTROL_PORT events. For the most part this still
worked as the kernel would never include NO_ENCRYPT flag (due to a bug).
However, this was actually incorrect and led to loss of synchronization
between the AP and STA 4-Way handshake state machines when certain
packets were lost and had to be re-transmitted.
The OSEN AKM uses the vendor specific IE, so when finding the RSNE
element we need to handle it specially to ensure that its both
a vendor specific element and it matches the WFA OUI since other
vendor specific elements may be included.
A new eapol API was added specifically for FILS (eapol_set_started). Since
either way is special cased for FILS, its a bit cleaner to just check the
AKM inside eapol_start and, if FILS, dont start any timeouts or start the
handshake (effectively what eapol_set_started was doing).
FILS needs to allocate an extra 16 bytes of key data for the AES-SIV
vector. Instead of leaving it up to the caller to figure this out (as
was done with the GTK builder) eapol_create_common can allocate the
extra space since it knows the MIC length.
This also updates _create_gtk_2_of_2 as it no longer needs to create
an extra data array.
Since FILS does not use a MIC, the 1/4 handler would always get called
for FILS PTK rekeys. We can use the fact that message 1/4 has no MIC as
well as no encrypted data to determine which packet it is. Both no MIC
and no encrypted data means its message 1/4. Anything else is 3/4.
crypto_derive_pairwise_ptk was taking a boolean to decide whether to
use SHA1 or SHA256, but for FILS SHA384 may also be required for
rekeys depending on the AKM.
crypto_derive_pairwise_ptk was changed to take l_checksum_type instead
of a boolean to allow for all 3 SHA types.
FILS-SHA384 got overlooked and the kek length was being hard coded
to 32 bytes when encrypting the key data. There was also one occurence
where the kek_len was just being set incorrectly.
In eapol_key_handle, 'have_snonce' is checked before decrypting the
key data. For FILS, there will be no snonce so this check can be
skipped if mic_len == 0.
The GTK handshake for FILS uses AES-SIV to encrypt the key data, and
does away with the MIC completely. Now, when finalizing the 2/2 GTK
packet we check the MIC length, and if zero we assume FILS is being
used and we use AES-SIV to encrypt the key data.
For FILS, there is no actual data being encrypted for GTK 2/2 (hence
why the input data length is zero). This results in only the SIV
being generated, which essentially serves the same purpose as a MIC.
FILS does not use a MIC, as well as requires encrypted data on GTK 2/2.
This updates eapol_create_gtk_2_of_2 to pass in extra data to
eapol_create_common, which will reserve room for this encrypted data.
Extra data is only reserved if mic_len == 0.
FILS does not use a MIC in EAPoL frames and also requires encrypted
data on all EAPoL frames. In the common builder the mic_len is now
checked and the flags are set appropriately.
FILS authentication does away with the MIC, so checking for key_mic
in the eapol key frame does not allow FILS to work. Now we pass in
the mic_len to eapol_verify_gtk_1_of_2, and if it is non-zero we can
check that the MIC is present in the frame.
FILS does not require an eapol_sm for authentication, but rekeys
are still performed using the 4-way handshake. Because of this
FILS needs to create a eapol_sm in a 'started' state, but without
calling eapol_start as this will initialize EAP and create handshake
timeouts.
This allows EAPoL to wait for any 4-way packets, and handle them
as rekeys.
