FILS does not use a MIC, as well as requires encrypted data on GTK 2/2.
This updates eapol_create_gtk_2_of_2 to pass in extra data to
eapol_create_common, which will reserve room for this encrypted data.
Extra data is only reserved if mic_len == 0.
FILS does not use a MIC in EAPoL frames and also requires encrypted
data on all EAPoL frames. In the common builder the mic_len is now
checked and the flags are set appropriately.
FILS authentication does away with the MIC, so checking for key_mic
in the eapol key frame does not allow FILS to work. Now we pass in
the mic_len to eapol_verify_gtk_1_of_2, and if it is non-zero we can
check that the MIC is present in the frame.
FILS does not require an eapol_sm for authentication, but rekeys
are still performed using the 4-way handshake. Because of this
FILS needs to create a eapol_sm in a 'started' state, but without
calling eapol_start as this will initialize EAP and create handshake
timeouts.
This allows EAPoL to wait for any 4-way packets, and handle them
as rekeys.
Since eapol_encrypt_key_data already calculates the key data length and
encodes it into the key frame, we can just return this length and avoid
having to obtain it again from the frame.
If we receive handshake message 1/4 after we are already connected
the AP is attempting to rekey. This may not be allowed and if not
we do not process the rekey and emit HANDSHAKE_EVENT_REKEY_FAILED
so any listeners can handle accordingly.
In preparation for OWE supporting multiple groups eapol needed some
additional cases to handle the OWE AKM since OWE dictates the KEK,
KCK and MIC key lengths (depending on group).
Right now the PMK is hard coded to 32 bytes, which works for the vast
majority of cases. The only outlier is OWE which can generate a PMK
of 32, 48 or 64 bytes depending on the ECC group used. The PMK length
is already stored in the handshake, so now we can just pass that to
crypto_derive_pairwise_ptk
The crypto_ptk was hard coded for 16 byte KCK/KEK. Depending on the
AKM these can be up to 32 bytes. This changes completely removes the
crypto_ptk struct and adds getters to the handshake object for the
kck and kek. Like before the PTK is derived into a continuous buffer,
and the kck/kek getters take care of returning the proper key offset
depending on AKM.
To allow for larger than 16 byte keys aes_unwrap needed to be
modified to take the kek length.
The MIC length was hard coded to 16 bytes everywhere, and since several
AKMs require larger MIC's (24/32) this needed to change. The main issue
was that the MIC was hard coded to 16 bytes inside eapol_key. Instead
of doing this, the MIC, key_data_length, and key_data elements were all
bundled into key_data[0]. In order to retrieve the MIC, key_data_len,
or key_data several macros were introduced which account for the MIC
length provided.
A consequence of this is that all the verify functions inside eapol now
require the MIC length as a parameter because without it they cannot
determine the byte offset of key_data or key_data_length.
The MIC length for a given handshake is set inside the SM when starting
EAPoL. This length is determined by the AKM for the handshake.
If we haven't sent a PMKID, and we're not running EAP, then ignore
whatever PMKID the AP sends us. Frequently the APs send us garbage in
this field. For PSK and related AKMs, if the PMK is wrong, then we
simply fail to generate a proper MIC and the handshake would fail at a
later stage anyway.
After moving AP EAPoL code into eapol.c there were a few functions that
no longer needed to be public API's. These were changed to static's and
the header definition was removed.
Currently, netdev triggers the HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE event after completing
the SET_STATION (after setting the pairwise key). Depending on the timing
this may happen before the GTK/IGTK are set which will result in group
traffic not working initially (the GTK/IGTK would still get set, but group
traffic would not work immediately after DBus said you were connected, this
mainly poses a problem with autotests).
In order to fix this, several flags were added in netdev_handshake_state:
ptk_installed, gtk_installed, igtk_installed, and completed. Each of these
flags are set true when their respective keys are set, and in each key
callback we try to trigger the handshake complete event (assuming all the
flags are true). Initially the gtk/igtk flags are set to true, for reasons
explained below.
In the WPA2 case, all the key setter functions are called sequentially from
eapol. With this change, the PTK is now set AFTER the gtk/igtk. This is
because the gtk/igtk are optional and only set if group traffic is allowed.
If the gtk/igtk are not used, we set the PTK and can immediately trigger the
handshake complete event (since gtk_installed/igtk_installed are initialized
as true). When the gtk/igtk are being set, we immediately set their flags to
false and wait for their callbacks in addition to the PTK callback. Doing it
this way handles both group traffic and non group traffic paths.
WPA1 throws a wrench into this since the group keys are obtained in a
separate handshake. For this case a new flag was added to the handshake_state,
'wait_for_gtk'. This allows netdev to set the PTK after the initial 4-way,
but still wait for the gtk/igtk setters to get called before triggering the
handshake complete event. As a precaution, netdev sets a timeout that will
trigger if the gtk/igtk setters are never called. In this case we can still
complete the connection, but print a warning that group traffic will not be
allowed.
To prepare for FT over SAE, several case/if statements needed to include
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE. Also a new macro was introduced to remove
duplicate if statement code checking for both FT_OVER_SAE and SAE AKM's.
To avoid confusion in case of an authenticator side handshake_state
structure and eapol_sm structure, rename own_ie to supplicant_ie and
ap_ie to authenticator_ie. Also rename
handshake_state_set_{own,ap}_{rsn,wpa} and fix when we call
handshake_state_setup_own_ciphers. As a result
handshake_state_set_authenticator, if needed, should be called before
handshake_state_set_{own,ap}_{rsn,wpa}.
After EAPOL logic was moved to eapol.c a check was added to
ap_associate_sta_cb to bitwise compare the AP's RSNE to the RSNE
received in the (Re)Association frame. There is as far as I know no
reason for them to be the same (although they are in our autotest) and
if there was a reason we'd rather validate the (Re)Association RSNE
immediately when received. We also must set different RSNEs as the
"own" (supplicant) and "ap" RSNEs in the handshake_state for validation
of step 2/4 in eapol.c (fixes wpa_supplicant's and MS Windows
connections being rejected)
This removes the authenticator bit in eapol_sm as well as unifies
eapol_register_authenticator and eapol_register. Taking advantage
of the handshake state authenticator bit we no longer have a need
for 2 separate register functions.
ap, and adhoc were also updated to set the authenticator bit in
the handshake and only use eapol_register to register their sm's.
netdev was updated to use the authenticator bit when choosing the
correct key address for adhoc.
This also required passing in the akm suite in case the key description
version was zero. In the zero case the akm must be checked. For now this
only supports the SAE akm.
When the EAPOL-Key data field is encrypted using AES Wrap, check
that the data field is large enough before calculating the expected
plaintext length.
Previously, if the encrypted data field was smaller than 8 bytes, an
integer underflow would occur when calculating the expected plaintext
data length. This would cause iwd to try to allocate a huge amount of
memory, which causes it to abort and terminate. If the data field was
equal to 8 bytes, iwd would try to allocate 0 bytes of memory, making
l_new return NULL, which subsequently causes iwd to crash on a NULL
pointer deference.
Reported-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Many APs don't send properly zerod key_iv elements in EAPoL-Key frames.
In the past iwd has complained, but this broken behavior is so
prevalent, that it is likely a lost cause.
This patch takes out these warnings
Includes:
- support for handling ptk 2/4 and 4/4. Also sending 1/4 and 3/4.
- new API to register an authenticator SM. This automatically
sends 1/4 to kick off authentication with an sta.
Handshake related netdev events were removed in favor of
handshake events. Now events will be emitted on the handshake
object related to the 4-way handshake and key settings. Events
are:
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_STARTED
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_SETTING_KEYS
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_COMPLETE
HANDSHAKE_EVENT_FAILED
Right now, since netdev only operates in station mode, nothing
listens for COMPLETE/FAILED, as device/wsc gets notified by the
connect_cb when the connection was successful. The COMPLETE/
FAILED were added in preperation for AP moving into eapol/netdev.
With the introduction of Control Port Over NL80211 feature, the
transport details need to be moved out of eapol and into netdev.c.
Whether a given WiFi hardware supports transfer of Control Port packets
over NL80211 is Wiphy and kernel version related, so the transport
decisions need to be made elsewhere.
The eapol handshake timeout can now be configured in main.conf
(/etc/iwd/main.conf) using the key eapol_handshake_timeout. This
allows the user to configure a long timeout if debugging.
After an EAP exchange rsn_info would be uninitialized and in the FT case
we'd use it to generate the step 2 IEs which would cause an RSNE
mismatch during FT handshake.
Until now we'd save the second 32 bytes of the MSK as the PMK and use
that for the PMK-R0 as well as the PMKID calculation. The PMKID
actually uses the first 32 bytes of the PMK while the PMK-R0's XXKey
input maps to the second 32 bytes. Add a pmk_len parameter to
handshake_state_set_pmk to handle that. Update the eapol_eap_results_cb
802.11 quotes to the 2016 version.
Move the cancelling of the eapol timeout from the end of step 1 to
step 3 to guard the whole handshake. At the end of step 1 stop the
EAPOL-Start timeout for the case of 802.1X authentication + a cached
PMKSA (not used yet.)
Track the contents and size of the GTK and IGTK and if the Authenticator
(or an adversary) tries to set the same GTK/IGTK, process the packet
normally but do not resubmit the GTK/IGTK to the kernel.
GTK KDE was being checked for being a minimum of 6 bytes. Not quite
sure why since the minimum GTK key length is 16 bytes for CCMP.
Similarly make sure that the maximum length is not more than 32, which
is currently the largest key size (TKIP)
This is a bizarre case since MIC calculation succeeded for the incoming
packet. But just in case MIC calculation fails for the outgoing packet,
kill the handshake.
The comments quoted sections of the specification that indicated STA
behavior for verifying Message 3 of 4 or GTK 1 of 2. But in reality the
code directly below simply calculated the MIC for Message 4 of 4 or GTK
2 of 2.
Use eapol_frame_watch_add/eapol_frame_watch_remove in eapol_sm, while
there simplify the early_frame logic and confirm sender address for
received frames.
Add a utility to append a KDE to the key_data field in an EAPoL frame.
The KDE types enum is actually added to handshake.h because we've got
the utilities for finding those KDEs in a buffer there. The new
function is specific to EAPoL-Key frames though and perhaps to simple to
be split across handshake.c and eapol.c. Also it didn't seem useful to
use the ie_tlv_builder here.
Refactor management frame structures to take into account optional
presence of some parts of the header:
* drop the single structure for management header and body since
the body offset is variable.
* add mmpdu_get_body to locate the start of frame body.
* drop the union of different management frame type bodies.
* prefix names specific to management frames with "mmpdu" instead
of "mpdu" including any enums based on 802.11-2012 section 8.4.
* move the FC field to the mmpdu_header structure.
Function to allow netdev.c to explicitly tell eapol.c whether to expect
EAP / 4-Way handshake. This is to potentially make the code more
descriptive, until now we'd look at sm->handshake->ptk_complete to see
if a new PTK was needed.
A 4-Way handshake is required on association to an AP except after FT.
Skip the matching of the PMKID KDE to the PMKID list in the RSNE if
we've seen a new EAP authentication before the step 1/4 was received.
That would mean that the server had not accepted the PMKIDs we submitted
and we performed a new 8021X authentication, producing a new PMKSA which
won't be on the list in the RSNE.
Currently we'd send EAPOL-Start whenever EAP was configured and we
received an EAPOL-Key before EAP negotiation. Instead only do that if
we know we can't respond to the 4-Way handshake because we don't have
a PMK yet or the PMKID doesn't match. Require a PMKID in step 1/4 if
we'd sent a list of PMKIDs in our RSNE.
Modify the packet filter to also accept frames with ethertype of 0x88c7
and pass the ethertype value to __eapol_rx_packet so it can filter out
the frames where this value doesn't match the sm->preauth flag.
Add a wrapper for eapol_start that sets the sm->preauth flag and sends
the EAPOL-Start frame immediately to skip the timeout since we know
that the supplicant has to initiate the authentication.
Fix 1a64c4b771 by setting use_eapol_start
by default only when 8021x authentication is configured. Otherwise we'd
be sending EAPOL-Start even for WPA2 Personal possibly after the 4-Way
Handshake success.
Since caab23f192085e6c8e47c41fc1ae9f795d1cbe86 hostapd is going to set
this bit to zero for RSN networks but both values will obviously be in
use. Only check the value if is_wpa is true - in this case check the
value is exactly 16, see hostapd commit:
commit caab23f192085e6c8e47c41fc1ae9f795d1cbe86
Author: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sun Feb 5 13:52:43 2017 +0200
Set EAPOL-Key Key Length field to 0 for group message 1/2 in RSN
P802.11i/D3.0 described the Key Length as having value 16 for the group
key handshake. However, this was changed to 0 in the published IEEE Std
802.11i-2004 amendment (and still remains 0 in the current standard IEEE
Std 802.11-2016). We need to maintain the non-zero value for WPA (v1)
cases, but the RSN case can be changed to 0 to be closer to the current
standard.
Don't start the handshake timeout in eapol_start if either
handshake->ptk_complete is set (handshake already done) or
handshake->have_snonce is set (steps 1&2 done). This accounts for
eapol_start being called after a Fast Transition when a 4-Way handshake
is not expected.
Split the igtk parameter to handshake_state_install_igtk into one
parameter for the actual IGTK buffer and one for the IPN buffer instead
of requiring the caller to have them both in one continuous buffer.
With FT protocol, one is received encrypted and the other in plain text.
Despite RFC3748 mandating MSKs to be at least 256 bits some EAP methods
return shorter MSKs. Since we call handshake_failed when the MSK is too
short, EAP methods have to be careful with their calls to set_key_material
because it may result in a call to the method's .remove method.
EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLS can't handle that currently and would be difficult to
adapt because of the TLS internals but they always set msk_len to 64 so
handshake_failed will not be called.
Make the use of EAPOL-Start the default and send it when configured for
8021x and either we receive no EAPOL-EAP from from the AP before
timeout, or if the AP tries to start a 4-Way Handshake.
On certain routers, the 4-Way handshake message 3 of 4 contains a key iv
field which is not zero as it is supposed to. This causes us to fail
the handshake.
Since the iv field is not utilized in this particular case, it is safe
to simply warn rather than fail the handshake outright.
Remove the keys and other data from struct eapol_sm, update device.c,
netdev.c and wsc.c to use the handshake_state object instead of
eapol_sm. This also gets rid of eapol_cancel and the ifindex parameter
in some of the eapol functions where sm->handshake->ifindex can be
used instead.
Add space in the eapol_sm struct for the pieces of information required
for the FT 4-Way Handshake and add setters for device.c and netdev.c to
be able to provide the data.
The len parameter was only used so it could be validated against ie[1],
but since it was not checked to be > 2, it must have been validated
already, the check was redundant. In any case all users directly
passed ie[1] as len anyway. This makes it consistent with the ie
parsers and builders which didn't require a length.
Split eapol_start into two calls, one to register the state machine so
that the PAE read handler knows not to discard frames for that ifindex,
and eapol_start to actually start processing the frames. This is needed
because, as per the comment in netdev.c, due to scheduling the PAE
socket read handler may trigger before the CMD_CONNECT event handler,
which needs to parse the FTE from the Associate Response frame and
supply it to the eapol SM before it can do anything with the message 1
of 4 of the FT handshake.
Another issue is that depending on the driver or timing, the underlying
link might not be marked as 'ready' by the kernel. In this case, our
response to Message 1 of the 4-way Handshake is written and accepted by
the kernel, but gets dropped on the floor internally. Which leads to
timeouts if the AP doesn't retransmit.
