Kernel/iwd
3
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git synced 2025-10-31 13:17:25 +01:00
Code Releases Activity

eap-wsc: Handle M4 messages

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Denis Kenzior 2016-08-30 21:52:24 -05:00
parent 48c3f4a55a
commit 62623e0eb3
1 changed files with 74 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

74
src/eap-wsc.c
View File

@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ struct eap_wsc_state {
uint8_t e_snonce2[16];
uint8_t psk1[16];
uint8_t psk2[16];
uint8_t r_hash2[32];
enum state state;
struct l_checksum *hmac_auth_key;
struct l_cipher *aes_cbc_128;
@ -267,6 +268,78 @@ static void eap_wsc_send_nack(struct eap_state *eap,
return;
}
static void eap_wsc_handle_m4(struct eap_state *eap,
const uint8_t *pdu, size_t len)
{
struct eap_wsc_state *wsc = eap_get_data(eap);
struct wsc_m4 m4;
struct iovec encrypted;
uint8_t *decrypted;
size_t decrypted_len;
struct wsc_m4_encrypted_settings m4es;
struct iovec iov[4];
uint8_t r_hash1[32];
/* Spec unclear what to do here, see comments in eap_wsc_send_nack */
if (wsc_parse_m4(pdu, len, &m4, &encrypted) != 0) {
eap_wsc_send_nack(eap, WSC_CONFIGURATION_ERROR_NO_ERROR);
return;
}
if (!authenticator_check(wsc, pdu, len))
return;
decrypted = encrypted_settings_decrypt(wsc, encrypted.iov_base,
encrypted.iov_len,
&decrypted_len);
if (!decrypted)
goto send_nack;
if (wsc_parse_m4_encrypted_settings(decrypted, decrypted_len, &m4es))
goto invalid_settings;
if (!keywrap_authenticator_check(wsc, decrypted, decrypted_len))
goto invalid_settings;
l_free(decrypted);
/*
* Since we have obtained R-SNonce1, we can now verify R-Hash1.
*
* WSC 2.0.5, Section 7.4:
* The Registrar creates two 128-bit secret nonces, R-S1, R-S2 and
* then computes
* R-Hash1 = HMACAuthKey(R-S1 || PSK1 || PKE || PKR)
* R-Hash2 = HMACAuthKey(R-S2 || PSK2 || PKE || PKR)
*/
iov[0].iov_base = m4es.r_snonce1;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(m4es.r_snonce1);
iov[1].iov_base = wsc->psk1;
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->psk1);
iov[2].iov_base = wsc->m1->public_key;
iov[2].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->m1->public_key);
iov[3].iov_base = wsc->m2->public_key;
iov[3].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->m2->public_key);
l_checksum_updatev(wsc->hmac_auth_key, iov, 4);
l_checksum_get_digest(wsc->hmac_auth_key, r_hash1, sizeof(r_hash1));
if (memcmp(r_hash1, m4.r_hash1, sizeof(r_hash1))) {
eap_wsc_send_nack(eap,
WSC_CONFIGURATION_ERROR_DEVICE_PASSWORD_AUTH_FAILURE);
return;
}
/* Now store R_Hash2 so we can verify it when we receive M6 */
memcpy(wsc->r_hash2, m4.r_hash2, sizeof(m4.r_hash2));
return;
invalid_settings:
l_free(decrypted);
send_nack:
eap_wsc_send_nack(eap, WSC_CONFIGURATION_ERROR_DECRYPTION_CRC_FAILURE);
}
static void eap_wsc_send_m3(struct eap_state *eap,
const uint8_t *m2_pdu, size_t m2_len)
{
@ -488,6 +561,7 @@ static void eap_wsc_handle_request(struct eap_state *eap,
eap_wsc_handle_m2(eap, pkt + 2, len - 2);
break;
case STATE_EXPECT_M4:
eap_wsc_handle_m4(eap, pkt + 2, len - 2);
break;
}
}