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handshake: update FT derivation functions for FILS-FT

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FILS-FT could derive a longer PMKR0/R1 key, as well as uses a special
xxkey that it derives during FILS.
This commit is contained in:
James Prestwood 2019-05-10 13:19:30 -07:00 committed by Denis Kenzior
parent 0e9ed03e60
commit 5d2b995175
2 changed files with 56 additions and 14 deletions
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66
src/handshake.c
View File

@ -390,25 +390,31 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
size_t ptk_size;
enum l_checksum_type type;
if (!s->have_snonce || !s->have_pmk)
return false;
if (!(s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384)))
if (!s->have_snonce || !s->have_pmk)
return false;
if ((s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256)) &&
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384)) &&
(!s->mde || !s->fte))
return false;
s->ptk_complete = false;
if (s->akm_suite & IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA384)
if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA384 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384))
type = L_CHECKSUM_SHA384;
else if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256))
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256))
type = L_CHECKSUM_SHA256;
else
type = L_CHECKSUM_SHA1;
@ -417,10 +423,15 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256)) {
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384)) {
uint16_t mdid;
uint8_t ptk_name[16];
const uint8_t *xxkey = s->pmk;
size_t xxkey_len = 32;
bool sha384 = (s->akm_suite &
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384);
/*
* In a Fast Transition initial mobility domain association
@ -433,24 +444,30 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
*/
if (s->akm_suite == IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X)
xxkey = s->pmk + 32;
else if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384)) {
xxkey = s->fils_ft;
xxkey_len = s->fils_ft_len;
}
ie_parse_mobility_domain_from_data(s->mde, s->mde[1] + 2,
&mdid, NULL, NULL);
if (!crypto_derive_pmk_r0(xxkey, 32, s->ssid, s->ssid_len, mdid,
if (!crypto_derive_pmk_r0(xxkey, xxkey_len, s->ssid,
s->ssid_len, mdid,
s->r0khid, s->r0khid_len,
s->spa, false,
s->spa, sha384,
s->pmk_r0, s->pmk_r0_name))
return false;
if (!crypto_derive_pmk_r1(s->pmk_r0, s->r1khid, s->spa,
s->pmk_r0_name, false,
s->pmk_r0_name, sha384,
s->pmk_r1, s->pmk_r1_name))
return false;
if (!crypto_derive_ft_ptk(s->pmk_r1, s->pmk_r1_name, s->aa,
s->spa, s->snonce, s->anonce,
false, s->ptk, ptk_size,
sha384, s->ptk, ptk_size,
ptk_name))
return false;
} else
@ -833,6 +850,24 @@ void handshake_util_build_gtk_kde(enum crypto_cipher cipher, const uint8_t *key,
memcpy(to, key, key_len);
}
static const uint8_t *handshake_state_get_ft_fils_kek(struct handshake_state *s,
size_t *len)
{
if (s->akm_suite & IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256) {
if (len)
*len = 16;
return s->ptk + 64;
} else if (s->akm_suite & IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384) {
if (len)
*len = 32;
return s->ptk + 104;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Unwrap a GTK / IGTK included in an FTE following 802.11-2012, Section 12.8.5:
*
@ -849,10 +884,17 @@ void handshake_util_build_gtk_kde(enum crypto_cipher cipher, const uint8_t *key,
bool handshake_decode_fte_key(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *wrapped,
size_t key_len, uint8_t *key_out)
{
const uint8_t *kek = handshake_state_get_kek(s);
const uint8_t *kek;
size_t kek_len = 16;
size_t padded_len = key_len < 16 ? 16 : align_len(key_len, 8);
if (!aes_unwrap(kek, 16, wrapped, padded_len + 8, key_out))
if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384))
kek = handshake_state_get_ft_fils_kek(s, &kek_len);
else
kek = handshake_state_get_kek(s);
if (!aes_unwrap(kek, kek_len, wrapped, padded_len + 8, key_out))
return false;
if (key_len < padded_len && key_out[key_len++] != 0xdd)

4
src/handshake.h
View File

@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ struct handshake_state {
uint8_t snonce[32];
uint8_t anonce[32];
uint8_t ptk[136];
uint8_t pmk_r0[32];
uint8_t pmk_r0[48];
uint8_t pmk_r0_name[16];
uint8_t pmk_r1[32];
uint8_t pmk_r1[48];
uint8_t pmk_r1_name[16];
uint8_t pmkid[16];
uint8_t fils_ft[48];