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eapol: Validate OCI in STA mode

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This commit is contained in:
Denis Kenzior 2021-09-20 14:30:51 -05:00
parent 923f7b6a11
commit 2aded60c94
1 changed files with 49 additions and 11 deletions
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60
src/eapol.c
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@ -1629,6 +1629,8 @@ static void eapol_handle_ptk_3_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
size_t transition_disable_len; size_t transition_disable_len;
uint8_t gtk_key_index; uint8_t gtk_key_index;
uint16_t igtk_key_index; uint16_t igtk_key_index;
const uint8_t *oci = NULL;
size_t oci_len;
int r; int r;
l_debug("ifindex=%u", hs->ifindex); l_debug("ifindex=%u", hs->ifindex);
@ -1684,6 +1686,9 @@ static void eapol_handle_ptk_3_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
hs->wpa_ie)) hs->wpa_ie))
goto error_ie_different; goto error_ie_different;
oci = handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_OCI, decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size, &oci_len);
if (hs->akm_suite & if (hs->akm_suite &
(IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X | (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK | IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
@ -1720,6 +1725,19 @@ static void eapol_handle_ptk_3_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
hs->authenticator_rsnxe) < 0) hs->authenticator_rsnxe) < 0)
goto error_ie_different; goto error_ie_different;
/*
* 802.11-2020, Section 12.7.6.4
* If dot11RSNAOperatingChannelValidationActivated is true and
* Authenticator RSNE indicates OCVC capability, the Supplicant
* silently discards message 3 if any of the following are true:
* - OCI KDE or FTE OCI subelement is missing in the message
* - Channel information in the OCI does not match current operating
* channel parameters (see 12.2.9)
*/
if (hs->authenticator_ocvc &&
handshake_state_verify_oci(hs, oci, oci_len) < 0)
return;
/* /*
* If ptk_complete is set, then we are receiving Message 3 again. * If ptk_complete is set, then we are receiving Message 3 again.
* It must be a retransmission, otherwise the anonce wouldn't match * It must be a retransmission, otherwise the anonce wouldn't match
@ -1964,6 +1982,7 @@ static void eapol_handle_gtk_1_of_2(struct eapol_sm *sm,
size_t decrypted_key_data_size, size_t decrypted_key_data_size,
bool unencrypted) bool unencrypted)
{ {
struct handshake_state *hs = sm->handshake;
const uint8_t *kck; const uint8_t *kck;
struct eapol_key *step2; struct eapol_key *step2;
uint8_t mic[MIC_MAXLEN]; uint8_t mic[MIC_MAXLEN];
@ -1973,13 +1992,33 @@ static void eapol_handle_gtk_1_of_2(struct eapol_sm *sm,
const uint8_t *igtk; const uint8_t *igtk;
size_t igtk_len; size_t igtk_len;
uint16_t igtk_key_index; uint16_t igtk_key_index;
const uint8_t *oci = NULL;
size_t oci_len;
if (!eapol_verify_gtk_1_of_2(ek, sm->handshake->wpa_ie, sm->mic_len)) { l_debug("ifindex=%u", hs->ifindex);
if (!eapol_verify_gtk_1_of_2(ek, hs->wpa_ie, sm->mic_len)) {
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED); handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
return; return;
} }
if (!sm->handshake->wpa_ie) { oci = handshake_util_find_kde(HANDSHAKE_KDE_OCI, decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size, &oci_len);
/*
* 802.11-2020, Section 12.7.2.2
* If dot11RSNAOperatingChannelValidationActivated is true and
* Authenticator RSNE indicates OCVC capability, the Supplicant
* silently discards message 1 if any of the following are true:
* - OCI KDE is missing in the message
* - Channel information in the OCI KDE does not match current
* operating channel parameters (see 12.2.9)
*/
if (hs->authenticator_ocvc &&
handshake_state_verify_oci(hs, oci, oci_len) < 0)
return;
if (!hs->wpa_ie) {
gtk = handshake_util_find_gtk_kde(decrypted_key_data, gtk = handshake_util_find_gtk_kde(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size, decrypted_key_data_size,
&gtk_len); &gtk_len);
@ -2000,7 +2039,7 @@ static void eapol_handle_gtk_1_of_2(struct eapol_sm *sm,
gtk_key_index = ek->wpa_key_id; gtk_key_index = ek->wpa_key_id;
} }
if (sm->handshake->mfp) { if (hs->mfp) {
igtk = handshake_util_find_igtk_kde(decrypted_key_data, igtk = handshake_util_find_igtk_kde(decrypted_key_data,
decrypted_key_data_size, decrypted_key_data_size,
&igtk_len); &igtk_len);
@ -2034,14 +2073,14 @@ static void eapol_handle_gtk_1_of_2(struct eapol_sm *sm,
step2 = eapol_create_gtk_2_of_2(sm->protocol_version, step2 = eapol_create_gtk_2_of_2(sm->protocol_version,
ek->key_descriptor_version, ek->key_descriptor_version,
sm->replay_counter, sm->replay_counter,
sm->handshake->wpa_ie, ek->wpa_key_id, hs->wpa_ie, ek->wpa_key_id,
sm->mic_len); sm->mic_len);
kck = handshake_state_get_kck(sm->handshake); kck = handshake_state_get_kck(hs);
if (sm->mic_len) { if (sm->mic_len) {
if (!eapol_calculate_mic(sm->handshake->akm_suite, kck, if (!eapol_calculate_mic(hs->akm_suite, kck,
step2, mic, sm->mic_len)) { step2, mic, sm->mic_len)) {
l_debug("MIC calculation failed"); l_debug("MIC calculation failed");
l_free(step2); l_free(step2);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED); handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);
@ -2050,10 +2089,9 @@ static void eapol_handle_gtk_1_of_2(struct eapol_sm *sm,
memcpy(EAPOL_KEY_MIC(step2), mic, sm->mic_len); memcpy(EAPOL_KEY_MIC(step2), mic, sm->mic_len);
} else { } else {
if (!eapol_aes_siv_encrypt( if (!eapol_aes_siv_encrypt(handshake_state_get_kek(hs),
handshake_state_get_kek(sm->handshake), handshake_state_get_kek_len(hs),
handshake_state_get_kek_len(sm->handshake), step2, NULL, 0)) {
step2, NULL, 0)) {
l_debug("AES-SIV encryption failed"); l_debug("AES-SIV encryption failed");
l_free(step2); l_free(step2);
handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED); handshake_failed(sm, MMPDU_REASON_CODE_UNSPECIFIED);