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eap-wsc: split out R_Hash verification

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So it can be used in M6 processing
This commit is contained in:
Denis Kenzior 2016-08-31 11:17:29 -05:00
parent f8eb76a93a
commit 2ac78e1306
1 changed files with 31 additions and 25 deletions
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56
src/eap-wsc.c
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@ -148,6 +148,35 @@ static inline void keywrap_authenticator_put(struct eap_wsc_state *wsc,
l_checksum_get_digest(wsc->hmac_auth_key, pdu + len - 8, 8);
}
static inline bool r_hash_check(struct eap_wsc_state *wsc,
uint8_t *r_snonce,
uint8_t *psk,
uint8_t *r_hash_expected)
{
struct iovec iov[4];
uint8_t r_hash[32];
/*
* WSC 2.0.5, Section 7.4:
* The Registrar creates two 128-bit secret nonces, R-S1, R-S2 and
* then computes
* R-Hash1 = HMACAuthKey(R-S1 || PSK1 || PKE || PKR)
* R-Hash2 = HMACAuthKey(R-S2 || PSK2 || PKE || PKR)
*/
iov[0].iov_base = r_snonce;
iov[0].iov_len = 16;
iov[1].iov_base = psk;
iov[1].iov_len = 16;
iov[2].iov_base = wsc->m1->public_key;
iov[2].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->m1->public_key);
iov[3].iov_base = wsc->m2->public_key;
iov[3].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->m2->public_key);
l_checksum_updatev(wsc->hmac_auth_key, iov, 4);
l_checksum_get_digest(wsc->hmac_auth_key, r_hash, sizeof(r_hash));
return !memcmp(r_hash, r_hash_expected, sizeof(r_hash));
}
static uint8_t *encrypted_settings_decrypt(struct eap_wsc_state *wsc,
const uint8_t *pdu,
size_t len,
@ -356,8 +385,6 @@ static void eap_wsc_handle_m4(struct eap_state *eap,
uint8_t *decrypted;
size_t decrypted_len;
struct wsc_m4_encrypted_settings m4es;
struct iovec iov[4];
uint8_t r_hash1[32];
/* Spec unclear what to do here, see comments in eap_wsc_send_nack */
if (wsc_parse_m4(pdu, len, &m4, &encrypted) != 0) {
@ -382,27 +409,8 @@ static void eap_wsc_handle_m4(struct eap_state *eap,
l_free(decrypted);
/*
* Since we have obtained R-SNonce1, we can now verify R-Hash1.
*
* WSC 2.0.5, Section 7.4:
* The Registrar creates two 128-bit secret nonces, R-S1, R-S2 and
* then computes
* R-Hash1 = HMACAuthKey(R-S1 || PSK1 || PKE || PKR)
* R-Hash2 = HMACAuthKey(R-S2 || PSK2 || PKE || PKR)
*/
iov[0].iov_base = m4es.r_snonce1;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(m4es.r_snonce1);
iov[1].iov_base = wsc->psk1;
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->psk1);
iov[2].iov_base = wsc->m1->public_key;
iov[2].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->m1->public_key);
iov[3].iov_base = wsc->m2->public_key;
iov[3].iov_len = sizeof(wsc->m2->public_key);
l_checksum_updatev(wsc->hmac_auth_key, iov, 4);
l_checksum_get_digest(wsc->hmac_auth_key, r_hash1, sizeof(r_hash1));
if (memcmp(r_hash1, m4.r_hash1, sizeof(r_hash1))) {
/* Since we have obtained R-SNonce1, we can now verify R-Hash1. */
if (!r_hash_check(wsc, m4es.r_snonce1, wsc->psk1, m4.r_hash1)) {
eap_wsc_send_nack(eap,
WSC_CONFIGURATION_ERROR_DEVICE_PASSWORD_AUTH_FAILURE);
return;
@ -410,9 +418,7 @@ static void eap_wsc_handle_m4(struct eap_state *eap,
/* Now store R_Hash2 so we can verify it when we receive M6 */
memcpy(wsc->r_hash2, m4.r_hash2, sizeof(m4.r_hash2));
eap_wsc_send_m5(eap, pdu, len);
return;
invalid_settings: