mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git
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eap-aka: Updated EAP-AKA to use simauth module
This commit is contained in:
James Prestwood
Denis Kenzior
parent
80aa03edd8
commit
1fa218fc8d
321
src/eap-aka.c
321
src/eap-aka.c
@ -31,14 +31,11 @@
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "simutil.h"
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#include "simauth.h"
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/*
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* EAP-AKA specific values
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*/
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#define EAP_AKA_KI_LEN 16
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#define EAP_AKA_OPC_LEN 16
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#define EAP_AKA_AMF_LEN 2
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#define EAP_AKA_SQN_LEN 6
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#define EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN 16
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#define EAP_AKA_RES_LEN 8
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#define EAP_AKA_K_RE_LEN 32
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@ -91,46 +88,37 @@ struct eap_aka_handle {
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/* Flag to indicate protected status indications */
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bool protected : 1;
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/* Subscriber key */
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uint8_t ki[EAP_AKA_KI_LEN];
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/* Key derived from OP and ki */
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uint8_t opc[EAP_AKA_OPC_LEN];
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/* Authentication management field */
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uint8_t amf[EAP_AKA_AMF_LEN];
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/* Sequence number */
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uint8_t sqn[EAP_AKA_SQN_LEN];
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/* Integrity key */
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uint8_t ik[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN];
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/* Signed response */
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uint8_t res[EAP_AKA_RES_LEN];
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/* Confidentiality key */
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uint8_t ck[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN];
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/* Authentication value from AuC */
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uint8_t autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
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/* re-auth key */
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uint8_t k_re[EAP_AKA_K_RE_LEN];
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char *kdf_in;
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uint8_t *chal_pkt;
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uint32_t pkt_len;
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struct iwd_sim_auth *auth;
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unsigned int auth_watch;
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};
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static void eap_aka_free(struct eap_state *eap)
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{
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struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
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if (aka->auth)
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sim_auth_unregistered_watch_remove(aka->auth, aka->auth_watch);
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l_free(aka->identity);
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l_free(aka->kdf_in);
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l_free(aka);
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eap_set_data(eap, NULL);
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}
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static bool derive_aka_mk(const char *identity, uint8_t *ik, uint8_t *ck,
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uint8_t *mk)
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static bool derive_aka_mk(const char *identity, const uint8_t *ik,
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const uint8_t *ck, uint8_t *mk)
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{
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int ret;
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struct iovec iov[5];
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@ -162,6 +150,102 @@ mk_error:
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return false;
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}
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static void check_milenage_cb(const uint8_t *res, const uint8_t *ck,
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const uint8_t *ik, const uint8_t *auts, void *data)
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{
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struct eap_state *eap = data;
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struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
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uint8_t prng_buf[160];
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size_t resp_len = aka->protected ? 44 : 40;
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uint8_t response[resp_len + 4];
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uint8_t *pos = response;
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uint8_t ik_p[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN];
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uint8_t ck_p[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN];
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if (!res || !ck || !ik) {
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l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
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goto chal_error;
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}
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if (aka->type == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
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if (!eap_aka_derive_primes(ck, ik, aka->autn,
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(uint8_t *)aka->kdf_in, strlen(aka->kdf_in),
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ck_p, ik_p)) {
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l_error("could not derive primes");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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if (!eap_aka_prf_prime(ik_p, ck_p, aka->identity, aka->k_encr,
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aka->k_aut, aka->k_re, aka->msk, aka->emsk)) {
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l_error("could not derive encryption keys");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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} else {
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if (!derive_aka_mk(aka->identity, ik, ck, aka->mk)) {
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l_error("error deriving MK");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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eap_sim_fips_prf(aka->mk, 20, prng_buf, 160);
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if (!eap_sim_get_encryption_keys(prng_buf, aka->k_encr,
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aka->k_aut, aka->msk, aka->emsk)) {
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l_error("could not derive encryption keys");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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}
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if (!eap_sim_verify_mac(eap, aka->type, aka->chal_pkt, aka->pkt_len,
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aka->k_aut, NULL, 0)) {
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l_error("MAC was not valid");
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l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
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goto chal_error;
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}
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aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_CHALLENGE;
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pos += eap_sim_build_header(eap, aka->type, EAP_AKA_ST_CHALLENGE,
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pos, resp_len);
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pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_RES,
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EAP_SIM_PAD_LENGTH_BITS, res, EAP_AKA_RES_LEN);
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if (aka->protected)
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pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND,
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EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE, NULL, 2);
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pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC, EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE,
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NULL, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
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if (!eap_sim_derive_mac(aka->type, response, resp_len, aka->k_aut,
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pos - EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN)) {
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l_error("error deriving MAC");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
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eap_send_response(eap, aka->type, response, resp_len);
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if (!aka->protected) {
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eap_method_success(eap);
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eap_set_key_material(eap, aka->msk, 32, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
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aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_SUCCESS;
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}
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return;
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chal_fatal:
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eap_method_error(eap);
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aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR;
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return;
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chal_error:
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eap_sim_client_error(eap, aka->type, EAP_SIM_ERROR_PROCESS);
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}
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/*
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* Handles EAP-AKA Challenge subtype
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*/
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@ -170,17 +254,10 @@ static void handle_challenge(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
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{
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struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
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struct eap_sim_tlv_iter iter;
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uint8_t prng_buf[160];
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size_t resp_len = 40;
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uint8_t response[resp_len + 4];
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uint8_t *pos = response;
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const uint8_t *rand = NULL;
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const uint8_t *autn = NULL;
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bool kdf_func = false;
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const uint8_t *kdf_in = NULL;
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uint16_t kdf_in_len = 0;
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uint8_t ik_p[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN];
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uint8_t ck_p[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN];
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if (len < 3) {
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l_error("packet is too small");
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@ -226,7 +303,6 @@ static void handle_challenge(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
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}
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aka->protected = 1;
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resp_len += 4;
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break;
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@ -268,7 +344,8 @@ static void handle_challenge(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
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goto chal_error;
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}
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kdf_in = contents + 2;
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aka->kdf_in = strndup((const char *)(contents + 2),
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kdf_in_len);
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break;
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@ -300,86 +377,23 @@ static void handle_challenge(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
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goto chal_error;
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}
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if (aka->type == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME && (!kdf_in || !kdf_func)) {
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if (aka->type == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME && (!aka->kdf_in || !kdf_func)) {
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l_error("AT_KDF or AT_KDF_INPUT were not found");
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goto chal_error;
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}
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eap_aka_get_milenage(aka->opc, aka->ki, rand, aka->sqn, aka->amf,
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aka->autn, aka->ck, aka->ik, aka->res);
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aka->chal_pkt = l_memdup(pkt, len);
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aka->pkt_len = len;
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if (memcmp(autn, aka->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN)) {
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l_error("EAP_SIM_AT_AUTN is not valid");
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/* AKA' needs AUTN for prime derivation */
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memcpy(aka->autn, autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN);
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if (sim_auth_check_milenage(aka->auth, rand, autn, check_milenage_cb,
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eap) < 0) {
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l_free(aka->chal_pkt);
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goto chal_error;
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}
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if (aka->type == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
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if (!eap_aka_derive_primes(aka->ck, aka->ik, aka->autn, kdf_in,
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kdf_in_len, ck_p, ik_p)) {
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l_error("could not derive primes");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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if (!eap_aka_prf_prime(ik_p, ck_p, aka->identity, aka->k_encr,
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aka->k_aut, aka->k_re, aka->msk, aka->emsk)) {
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l_error("could not derive encryption keys");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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} else {
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if (!derive_aka_mk(aka->identity, aka->ik, aka->ck, aka->mk)) {
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l_error("error deriving MK");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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eap_sim_fips_prf(aka->mk, 20, prng_buf, 160);
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if (!eap_sim_get_encryption_keys(prng_buf, aka->k_encr,
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aka->k_aut, aka->msk, aka->emsk)) {
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l_error("could not derive encryption keys");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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}
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if (!eap_sim_verify_mac(eap, aka->type, pkt, len, aka->k_aut, NULL,
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0)) {
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l_error("MAC was not valid");
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goto chal_error;
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}
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aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_CHALLENGE;
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pos += eap_sim_build_header(eap, aka->type, EAP_AKA_ST_CHALLENGE,
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pos, resp_len);
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pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_RES,
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EAP_SIM_PAD_LENGTH_BITS, aka->res, EAP_AKA_RES_LEN);
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if (aka->protected)
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pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND,
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EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE, NULL, 2);
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pos += eap_sim_add_attribute(pos, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC, EAP_SIM_PAD_NONE,
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NULL, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
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if (!eap_sim_derive_mac(aka->type, response, resp_len, aka->k_aut,
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pos - EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN)) {
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l_error("error deriving MAC");
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goto chal_fatal;
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}
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eap_send_response(eap, aka->type, response, resp_len);
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if (!aka->protected) {
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eap_method_success(eap);
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eap_set_key_material(eap, aka->msk, 32, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
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aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_SUCCESS;
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}
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return;
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chal_fatal:
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eap_method_error(eap);
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aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR;
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return;
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chal_error:
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@ -543,58 +557,53 @@ req_error:
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eap_sim_client_error(eap, aka->type, EAP_SIM_ERROR_PROCESS);
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}
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static bool eap_aka_common_load_settings(struct eap_aka_handle *aka,
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static const char *eap_aka_get_identity(struct eap_state *eap)
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{
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struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
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return aka->identity;
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}
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static void auth_destroyed(void *data)
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{
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struct eap_state *eap = data;
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struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
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/*
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* If AKA was already successful we can return. Also if the state
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* has been set to ERROR, then eap_method_error has already been called,
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* so we can return.
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*/
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if (aka->state == EAP_AKA_STATE_SUCCESS ||
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aka->state == EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR)
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return;
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l_error("auth provider destroyed before AKA could finish");
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aka->state = EAP_AKA_STATE_ERROR;
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eap_method_error(eap);
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}
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static bool eap_aka_common_load_settings(struct eap_state *eap,
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struct l_settings *settings,
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const char *prefix)
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{
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char setting[64];
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const char *imsi;
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const char *ki;
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const char *opc;
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const char *amf;
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const char *sqn;
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size_t len;
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struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
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snprintf(setting, sizeof(setting), "%sAKA-IMSI", prefix);
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imsi = l_settings_get_value(settings, "Security", setting);
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if (imsi)
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aka->identity = l_strdup(imsi);
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/*
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* No specific settings for EAP-SIM, the auth provider will have all
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* required data.
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*/
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snprintf(setting, sizeof(setting), "%sAKA-KI", prefix);
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ki = l_settings_get_value(settings, "Security", setting);
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if (ki) {
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uint8_t *val = l_util_from_hexstring(ki, &len);
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memcpy(aka->ki, val, len);
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l_free(val);
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aka->auth = iwd_sim_auth_find(false, true);
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if (!aka->auth) {
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l_debug("no AKA driver available for %s", aka->identity);
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return false;
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}
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snprintf(setting, sizeof(setting), "%sAKA-OPC", prefix);
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opc = l_settings_get_value(settings, "Security", setting);
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if (opc) {
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uint8_t *val = l_util_from_hexstring(opc, &len);
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memcpy(aka->opc, val, len);
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l_free(val);
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}
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snprintf(setting, sizeof(setting), "%sAKA-AMF", prefix);
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amf = l_settings_get_value(settings, "Security", setting);
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if (amf) {
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uint8_t *val = l_util_from_hexstring(amf, &len);
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memcpy(aka->amf, val, len);
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l_free(val);
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}
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snprintf(setting, sizeof(setting), "%sAKA-SQN", prefix);
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sqn = l_settings_get_value(settings, "Security", setting);
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if (sqn) {
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uint8_t *val = l_util_from_hexstring(sqn, &len);
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memcpy(aka->sqn, val, len);
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l_free(val);
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}
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aka->auth_watch = sim_auth_unregistered_watch_add(aka->auth,
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auth_destroyed, eap);
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aka->identity = l_strdup(iwd_sim_auth_get_nai(aka->auth));
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return true;
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}
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@ -608,7 +617,7 @@ static bool eap_aka_load_settings(struct eap_state *eap,
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aka->type = EAP_TYPE_AKA;
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eap_set_data(eap, aka);
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return eap_aka_common_load_settings(aka, settings, prefix);
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return eap_aka_common_load_settings(eap, settings, prefix);
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}
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static bool eap_aka_prime_load_settings(struct eap_state *eap,
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@ -620,7 +629,7 @@ static bool eap_aka_prime_load_settings(struct eap_state *eap,
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aka->type = EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME;
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eap_set_data(eap, aka);
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return eap_aka_common_load_settings(aka, settings, prefix);
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return eap_aka_common_load_settings(eap, settings, prefix);
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}
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static struct eap_method eap_aka = {
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@ -630,6 +639,7 @@ static struct eap_method eap_aka = {
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.free = eap_aka_free,
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.handle_request = eap_aka_handle_request,
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.load_settings = eap_aka_load_settings,
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.get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity
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};
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static struct eap_method eap_aka_prime = {
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@ -639,6 +649,7 @@ static struct eap_method eap_aka_prime = {
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.free = eap_aka_free,
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.handle_request = eap_aka_handle_request,
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.load_settings = eap_aka_prime_load_settings,
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.get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity
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};
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static int eap_aka_init(void)
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