iwd/src/handshake.c

/*
 *
 *  Wireless daemon for Linux
 *
 *  Copyright (C) 2013-2014  Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
 *
 *  This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 *  modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
 *  License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
 *  version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
 *
 *  This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
 *  Lesser General Public License for more details.
 *
 *  You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
 *  License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
 *  Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301  USA
 *
 */

#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include <config.h>
#endif

#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <ell/ell.h>

#include "crypto.h"
#include "ie.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "handshake.h"

static bool handshake_get_nonce(uint8_t nonce[])
{
	return l_getrandom(nonce, 32);
}

static handshake_get_nonce_func_t get_nonce = handshake_get_nonce;
static handshake_install_tk_func_t install_tk = NULL;
static handshake_install_gtk_func_t install_gtk = NULL;
static handshake_install_igtk_func_t install_igtk = NULL;

void __handshake_set_get_nonce_func(handshake_get_nonce_func_t func)
{
	get_nonce = func;
}

void __handshake_set_install_tk_func(handshake_install_tk_func_t func)
{
	install_tk = func;
}

void __handshake_set_install_gtk_func(handshake_install_gtk_func_t func)
{
	install_gtk = func;
}

void __handshake_set_install_igtk_func(handshake_install_igtk_func_t func)
{
	install_igtk = func;
}

struct handshake_state *handshake_state_new(uint32_t ifindex)
{
	struct handshake_state *s;

	s = l_new(struct handshake_state, 1);

	s->ifindex = ifindex;

	return s;
}

void handshake_state_free(struct handshake_state *s)
{
	l_free(s->ap_ie);
	l_free(s->own_ie);
	l_free(s->mde);
	l_free(s->fte);

	l_free(s);
}

void handshake_state_set_supplicant_address(struct handshake_state *s,
						const uint8_t *spa)
{
	memcpy(s->spa, spa, sizeof(s->spa));
}

void handshake_state_set_authenticator_address(struct handshake_state *s,
						const uint8_t *aa)
{
	memcpy(s->aa, aa, sizeof(s->aa));
}

void handshake_state_set_pmk(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *pmk,
				size_t pmk_len)
{
	memcpy(s->pmk, pmk, pmk_len);
	s->have_pmk = true;
}

void handshake_state_set_8021x_config(struct handshake_state *s,
					struct l_settings *settings)
{
	s->settings_8021x = settings;
}

struct l_settings *handshake_state_get_8021x_config(struct handshake_state *s)
{
	return s->settings_8021x;
}

static void handshake_state_set_ap_ie(struct handshake_state *s,
					const uint8_t *ie, bool is_wpa)
{
	l_free(s->ap_ie);
	s->ap_ie = l_memdup(ie, ie[1] + 2u);
	s->wpa_ie = is_wpa;
}

static void handshake_state_set_own_ie(struct handshake_state *s,
					const uint8_t *ie, bool is_wpa)
{
	l_free(s->own_ie);
	s->own_ie = l_memdup(ie, ie[1] + 2u);
	s->wpa_ie = is_wpa;
}

void handshake_state_set_ap_rsn(struct handshake_state *s,
				const uint8_t *rsn_ie)
{
	handshake_state_set_ap_ie(s, rsn_ie, false);
}

static bool handshake_state_setup_own_ciphers(struct handshake_state *s,
						const struct ie_rsn_info *info)
{
	if (__builtin_popcount(info->pairwise_ciphers) != 1)
		return false;

	if (__builtin_popcount(info->akm_suites) != 1)
		return false;

	s->akm_suite = info->akm_suites;
	s->pairwise_cipher = info->pairwise_ciphers;
	s->group_cipher = info->group_cipher;
	s->group_management_cipher = info->group_management_cipher;
	s->mfp = info->mfpc;

	return true;
}

bool handshake_state_set_own_rsn(struct handshake_state *s,
					const uint8_t *rsn_ie)
{
	struct ie_rsn_info info;

	handshake_state_set_own_ie(s, rsn_ie, false);

	if (ie_parse_rsne_from_data(rsn_ie, rsn_ie[1] + 2, &info) < 0)
		return false;

	return handshake_state_setup_own_ciphers(s, &info);
}

void handshake_state_set_ap_wpa(struct handshake_state *s,
				const uint8_t *wpa_ie)
{
	handshake_state_set_ap_ie(s, wpa_ie, true);
}

bool handshake_state_set_own_wpa(struct handshake_state *s,
					const uint8_t *wpa_ie)
{
	struct ie_rsn_info info;

	handshake_state_set_own_ie(s, wpa_ie, true);

	if (ie_parse_wpa_from_data(wpa_ie, wpa_ie[1] + 2, &info) < 0)
		return false;

	return handshake_state_setup_own_ciphers(s, &info);
}

void handshake_state_set_user_data(struct handshake_state *s, void *user_data)
{
	s->user_data = user_data;
}

void handshake_state_set_ssid(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *ssid,
				size_t ssid_len)
{
	memcpy(s->ssid, ssid, ssid_len);
	s->ssid_len = ssid_len;
}

void handshake_state_set_mde(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *mde)
{
	if (s->mde)
		l_free(s->mde);

	s->mde = mde ? l_memdup(mde, mde[1] + 2) : NULL;
}

void handshake_state_set_fte(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *fte)
{
	if (s->fte)
		l_free(s->fte);

	s->fte = fte ? l_memdup(fte, fte[1] + 2) : NULL;
}

void handshake_state_set_kh_ids(struct handshake_state *s,
				const uint8_t *r0khid, size_t r0khid_len,
				const uint8_t *r1khid)
{
	memcpy(s->r0khid, r0khid, r0khid_len);
	s->r0khid_len = r0khid_len;

	memcpy(s->r1khid, r1khid, 6);
}

void handshake_state_new_snonce(struct handshake_state *s)
{
	get_nonce(s->snonce);

	s->have_snonce = true;
}

void handshake_state_set_anonce(struct handshake_state *s,
				const uint8_t *anonce)
{
	memcpy(s->anonce, anonce, 32);
}

bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
{
	struct crypto_ptk *ptk = (struct crypto_ptk *) s->ptk;
	enum crypto_cipher cipher;
	size_t ptk_size;
	bool use_sha256;

	if (!s->have_snonce || !s->have_pmk)
		return false;

	if ((s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256)) &&
			(!s->mde || !s->fte))
		return false;

	s->ptk_complete = false;

	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256 |
			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256 |
			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256))
		use_sha256 = true;
	else
		use_sha256 = false;

	cipher = ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(s->pairwise_cipher);

	ptk_size = sizeof(struct crypto_ptk) + crypto_cipher_key_len(cipher);

	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256)) {
		uint16_t mdid;
		uint8_t ptk_name[16];
		const uint8_t *xxkey = s->pmk;

		/*
		 * In a Fast Transition initial mobility domain association
		 * the PMK maps to the XXKey, except with EAP:
		 * 802.11-2016 12.7.1.7.3:
		 *    "If the AKM negotiated is 00-0F-AC:3, then [...] XXKey
		 *    shall be the second 256 bits of the MSK (which is
		 *    derived from the IEEE 802.1X authentication), i.e.,
		 *    XXKey = L(MSK, 256, 256)."
		 */
		if (s->akm_suite == IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X)
			xxkey = s->pmk + 32;

		ie_parse_mobility_domain_from_data(s->mde, s->mde[1] + 2,
							&mdid, NULL, NULL);

		if (!crypto_derive_pmk_r0(xxkey, s->ssid, s->ssid_len, mdid,
						s->r0khid, s->r0khid_len,
						s->spa,
						s->pmk_r0, s->pmk_r0_name))
			return false;

		if (!crypto_derive_pmk_r1(s->pmk_r0, s->r1khid, s->spa,
						s->pmk_r0_name,
						s->pmk_r1, s->pmk_r1_name))
			return false;

		if (!crypto_derive_ft_ptk(s->pmk_r1, s->pmk_r1_name, s->aa,
						s->spa, s->snonce, s->anonce,
						ptk, ptk_size, ptk_name))
			return false;
	} else
		if (!crypto_derive_pairwise_ptk(s->pmk, s->spa, s->aa,
						s->anonce, s->snonce,
						ptk, ptk_size, use_sha256))
			return false;

	return true;
}

const struct crypto_ptk *handshake_state_get_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
{
	return (struct crypto_ptk *) s->ptk;
}

void handshake_state_install_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
{
	struct crypto_ptk *ptk = (struct crypto_ptk *) s->ptk;

	s->ptk_complete = true;

	if (install_tk) {
		uint32_t cipher = ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(
							s->pairwise_cipher);

		install_tk(s->ifindex, s->aa, ptk->tk, cipher, s->user_data);
	}
}

void handshake_state_install_gtk(struct handshake_state *s,
					uint8_t gtk_key_index,
					const uint8_t *gtk, size_t gtk_len,
					const uint8_t *rsc, uint8_t rsc_len)
{
	if (install_gtk) {
		uint32_t cipher =
			ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(s->group_cipher);

		install_gtk(s->ifindex, gtk_key_index, gtk, gtk_len,
				rsc, rsc_len, cipher, s->user_data);
	}
}

void handshake_state_install_igtk(struct handshake_state *s,
					uint8_t igtk_key_index,
					const uint8_t *igtk, size_t igtk_len,
					const uint8_t *ipn)
{
	if (install_igtk) {
		uint32_t cipher =
			ie_rsn_cipher_suite_to_cipher(
						s->group_management_cipher);

		install_igtk(s->ifindex, igtk_key_index, igtk, igtk_len,
				ipn, 6, cipher, s->user_data);
	}
}

void handshake_state_override_pairwise_cipher(struct handshake_state *s,
					enum ie_rsn_cipher_suite pairwise)
{
	s->pairwise_cipher = pairwise;
}

bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
{
	bool use_sha256;

	if (!s->have_pmk)
		return false;

	/*
	 * Note 802.11 section 11.6.1.3:
	 * "When the PMKID is calculated for the PMKSA as part of RSN
	 * preauthentication, the AKM has not yet been negotiated. In this
	 * case, the HMAC-SHA1-128 based derivation is used for the PMKID
	 * calculation."
	 */

	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256))
		use_sha256 = true;
	else
		use_sha256 = false;

	return crypto_derive_pmkid(s->pmk, s->spa, s->aa, out_pmkid,
					use_sha256);
}

/*
 * This function performs a match of the RSN/WPA IE obtained from the scan
 * results vs the RSN/WPA IE obtained as part of the 4-way handshake.  If they
 * don't match, the EAPoL packet must be silently discarded.
 */
bool handshake_util_ap_ie_matches(const uint8_t *msg_ie,
					const uint8_t *scan_ie, bool is_wpa)
{
	struct ie_rsn_info msg_info;
	struct ie_rsn_info scan_info;

	/*
	 * First check that the sizes match, if they do, run a bitwise
	 * comparison.
	 */
	if (msg_ie[1] == scan_ie[1] &&
			!memcmp(msg_ie + 2, scan_ie + 2, msg_ie[1]))
		return true;

	/*
	 * Otherwise we have to parse the IEs and compare the individual
	 * fields
	 */
	if (!is_wpa) {
		if (ie_parse_rsne_from_data(msg_ie, msg_ie[1] + 2,
						&msg_info) < 0)
			return false;

		if (ie_parse_rsne_from_data(scan_ie, scan_ie[1] + 2,
						&scan_info) < 0)
			return false;
	} else {
		if (ie_parse_wpa_from_data(msg_ie, msg_ie[1] + 2,
						&msg_info) < 0)
			return false;

		if (ie_parse_wpa_from_data(scan_ie, scan_ie[1] + 2,
						&scan_info) < 0)
			return false;
	}

	if (msg_info.group_cipher != scan_info.group_cipher)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.pairwise_ciphers != scan_info.pairwise_ciphers)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.akm_suites != scan_info.akm_suites)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.preauthentication != scan_info.preauthentication)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.no_pairwise != scan_info.no_pairwise)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.ptksa_replay_counter != scan_info.ptksa_replay_counter)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.gtksa_replay_counter != scan_info.gtksa_replay_counter)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.mfpr != scan_info.mfpr)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.mfpc != scan_info.mfpc)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.peerkey_enabled != scan_info.peerkey_enabled)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.spp_a_msdu_capable != scan_info.spp_a_msdu_capable)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.spp_a_msdu_required != scan_info.spp_a_msdu_required)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.pbac != scan_info.pbac)
		return false;

	if (msg_info.extended_key_id != scan_info.extended_key_id)
		return false;

	/* We don't check the PMKIDs since these might actually be different */

	if (msg_info.group_management_cipher !=
			scan_info.group_management_cipher)
		return false;

	return true;
}

static const uint8_t *find_kde(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
				size_t *out_len, const unsigned char *oui)
{
	struct ie_tlv_iter iter;
	const uint8_t *result;
	unsigned int len;

	ie_tlv_iter_init(&iter, data, data_len);

	while (ie_tlv_iter_next(&iter)) {
		if (ie_tlv_iter_get_tag(&iter) != IE_TYPE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC)
			continue;

		len = ie_tlv_iter_get_length(&iter);
		if (len < 4)		/* Take care of padding */
			return NULL;

		/* Check OUI */
		result = ie_tlv_iter_get_data(&iter);
		if (memcmp(result, oui, 4))
			continue;

		if (out_len)
			*out_len = len - 4;

		return result + 4;
	}

	return NULL;
}

const uint8_t *handshake_util_find_gtk_kde(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
						size_t *out_gtk_len)
{
	static const unsigned char gtk_oui[] = { 0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x01 };
	size_t gtk_len;
	const uint8_t *gtk = find_kde(data, data_len, &gtk_len, gtk_oui);

	if (!gtk)
		return NULL;

	/*
	 * Account for KeyId, TX and Reserved octet
	 * See 802.11-2016, Figure 12-35
	 */
	if (gtk_len < CRYPTO_MIN_GTK_LEN + 2)
		return NULL;

	if (gtk_len > CRYPTO_MAX_GTK_LEN + 2)
		return NULL;

	if (out_gtk_len)
		*out_gtk_len = gtk_len;

	return gtk;
}

const uint8_t *handshake_util_find_igtk_kde(const uint8_t *data,
						size_t data_len,
						size_t *out_igtk_len)
{
	static const unsigned char igtk_oui[] = { 0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x09 };
	size_t igtk_len;
	const uint8_t *igtk = find_kde(data, data_len, &igtk_len, igtk_oui);

	if (!igtk)
		return NULL;

	/*
	 * Account for KeyId and IPN
	 * See 802.11-2016, Figure 12-42
	 */
	if (igtk_len < CRYPTO_MIN_IGTK_LEN + 8)
		return NULL;

	if (igtk_len > CRYPTO_MAX_IGTK_LEN + 8)
		return NULL;

	if (out_igtk_len)
		*out_igtk_len = igtk_len;

	return igtk;
}

const uint8_t *handshake_util_find_pmkid_kde(const uint8_t *data,
						size_t data_len)
{
	static const unsigned char pmkid_oui[] = { 0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x04 };
	const uint8_t *pmkid;
	size_t pmkid_len;

	pmkid = find_kde(data, data_len, &pmkid_len, pmkid_oui);

	if (pmkid && pmkid_len != 16)
		return NULL;

	return pmkid;
}

/*
 * Unwrap a GTK / IGTK included in an FTE following 802.11-2012, Section 12.8.5:
 *
 * "If a GTK or an IGTK are included, the Key field of the subelement shall be
 * encrypted using KEK and the NIST AES key wrap algorithm. The Key field shall
 * be padded before encrypting if the key length is less than 16 octets or if
 * it is not a multiple of 8. The padding consists of appending a single octet
 * 0xdd followed by zero or more 0x00 octets. When processing a received
 * message, the receiver shall ignore this trailing padding. Addition of
 * padding does not change the value of the Key Length field. Note that the
 * length of the encrypted Key field can be determined from the length of the
 * GTK or IGTK subelement.
 */
bool handshake_decode_fte_key(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *wrapped,
				size_t key_len, uint8_t *key_out)
{
	const struct crypto_ptk *ptk = handshake_state_get_ptk(s);
	size_t padded_len = key_len < 16 ? 16 : align_len(key_len, 8);

	if (!aes_unwrap(ptk->kek, wrapped, padded_len + 8, key_out))
		return false;

	if (key_len < padded_len && key_out[key_len++] != 0xdd)
		return false;

	while (key_len < padded_len)
		if (key_out[key_len++] != 0x00)
			return false;

	return true;
}