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ergo/traditional.yaml
Shivaram Lingamneni 42316bc04f fix #1176
Transition most "is an operator" checks to require a specific operator
capability
2021-02-09 22:07:06 -05:00

919 lines
37 KiB
YAML

# This is the "traditional" or "mainstream" config file for Oragono.
# It tries to replicate the behavior of other ircds, at the cost of not
# taking full advantage of Oragono's features. This config is suitable for use
# in IRCv3 conformance testing.
# network configuration
network:
# name of the network
name: OragonoTest
# server configuration
server:
# server name
name: oragono.test
# addresses to listen on
listeners:
# This version of the config provides a public plaintext listener on
# port 6667 for testing and compatibility with legacy applications.
# We recommend disabling this listener in a production setting
# and replacing it with loopback-only listeners (see default.yaml):
":6667":
# The standard SSL/TLS port for IRC is 6697. This will listen on all interfaces:
":6697":
tls:
cert: fullchain.pem
key: privkey.pem
# 'proxy' should typically be false. It's for cloud load balancers that
# always send a PROXY protocol header ahead of the connection. See the
# manual ("Reverse proxies") for more details.
proxy: false
# Example of a Unix domain socket for proxying:
# "/tmp/oragono_sock":
# Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will
# be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener
# *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain:
# "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock":
# tor: true
# Example of a WebSocket listener:
# ":8097":
# websocket: true
# tls:
# cert: fullchain.pem
# key: privkey.pem
# sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system,
# the default is 0775 or 0755, which prevents other users/groups from connecting
# to the socket. With 0777, it behaves like a normal TCP socket
# where anyone can connect.
unix-bind-mode: 0777
# configure the behavior of Tor listeners (ignored if you didn't enable any):
tor-listeners:
# if this is true, connections from Tor must authenticate with SASL
require-sasl: false
# what hostname should be displayed for Tor connections?
vhost: "tor-network.onion"
# allow at most this many connections at once (0 for no limit):
max-connections: 64
# connection throttling (limit how many connection attempts are allowed at once):
throttle-duration: 10m
# set to 0 to disable throttling:
max-connections-per-duration: 64
# strict transport security, to get clients to automagically use TLS
sts:
# whether to advertise STS
#
# to stop advertising STS, leave this enabled and set 'duration' below to "0". this will
# advertise to connecting users that the STS policy they have saved is no longer valid
enabled: false
# how long clients should be forced to use TLS for.
# setting this to a too-long time will mean bad things if you later remove your TLS.
# the default duration below is 1 month, 2 days and 5 minutes.
duration: 1mo2d5m
# tls port - you should be listening on this port above
port: 6697
# should clients include this STS policy when they ship their inbuilt preload lists?
preload: false
websockets:
# Restrict the origin of WebSocket connections by matching the "Origin" HTTP
# header. This setting causes oragono to reject websocket connections unless
# they originate from a page on one of the whitelisted websites in this list.
# This prevents malicious websites from making their visitors connect to your
# oragono instance without their knowledge. An empty list means there are no
# restrictions.
allowed-origins:
# - "https://oragono.io"
# - "https://*.oragono.io"
# casemapping controls what kinds of strings are permitted as identifiers (nicknames,
# channel names, account names, etc.), and how they are normalized for case.
# with the recommended default of 'precis', UTF8 identifiers that are "sane"
# (according to RFC 8265) are allowed, and the server additionally tries to protect
# against confusable characters ("homoglyph attacks").
# the other options are 'ascii' (traditional ASCII-only identifiers), and 'permissive',
# which allows identifiers to contain unusual characters like emoji, but makes users
# vulnerable to homoglyph attacks. unless you're really confident in your decision,
# we recommend leaving this value at its default (changing it once the network is
# already up and running is problematic).
casemapping: "precis"
# enforce-utf8 controls whether the server will preemptively discard non-UTF8
# messages (since they cannot be relayed to websocket clients), or will allow
# them and relay them to non-websocket clients (as in traditional IRC).
enforce-utf8: true
# whether to look up user hostnames with reverse DNS.
# (disabling this will expose user IPs instead of hostnames;
# to make IP/hostname information private, see the ip-cloaking section)
lookup-hostnames: true
# whether to confirm hostname lookups using "forward-confirmed reverse DNS", i.e., for
# any hostname returned from reverse DNS, resolve it back to an IP address and reject it
# unless it matches the connecting IP
forward-confirm-hostnames: true
# use ident protocol to get usernames
check-ident: true
# ignore the supplied user/ident string from the USER command, always setting user/ident
# to the following literal value; this can potentially reduce confusion and simplify bans.
# the value must begin with a '~' character. comment out / omit to disable:
#coerce-ident: '~u'
# password to login to the server
# generated using "oragono genpasswd"
#password: ""
# motd filename
# if you change the motd, you should move it to ircd.motd
motd: oragono.motd
# motd formatting codes
# if this is true, the motd is escaped using formatting codes like $c, $b, and $i
motd-formatting: true
# relaying using the RELAYMSG command
relaymsg:
# is relaymsg enabled at all?
enabled: true
# which character(s) are reserved for relayed nicks?
separators: "/"
# can channel operators use RELAYMSG in their channels?
# our implementation of RELAYMSG makes it safe for chanops to use without the
# possibility of real users being silently spoofed
available-to-chanops: true
# IPs/CIDRs the PROXY command can be used from
# This should be restricted to localhost (127.0.0.1/8, ::1/128, and unix sockets).
# Unless you have a good reason. you should also add these addresses to the
# connection limits and throttling exemption lists.
proxy-allowed-from:
- localhost
# - "192.168.1.1"
# - "192.168.10.1/24"
# controls the use of the WEBIRC command (by IRC<->web interfaces, bouncers and similar)
webirc:
# one webirc block -- should correspond to one set of gateways
-
# SHA-256 fingerprint of the TLS certificate the gateway must use to connect
# (comment this out to use passwords only)
certfp: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
# password the gateway uses to connect, made with oragono genpasswd
password: "$2a$04$abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcde"
# IPs/CIDRs that can use this webirc command
# you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
hosts:
- localhost
# - "192.168.1.1"
# - "192.168.10.1/24"
# allow use of the RESUME extension over plaintext connections:
# do not enable this unless the ircd is only accessible over internal networks
allow-plaintext-resume: false
# maximum length of clients' sendQ in bytes
# this should be big enough to hold bursts of channel/direct messages
max-sendq: 96k
# compatibility with legacy clients
compatibility:
# many clients require that the final parameter of certain messages be an
# RFC1459 trailing parameter, i.e., prefixed with :, whether or not this is
# actually required. this forces Oragono to send those parameters
# as trailings. this is recommended unless you're testing clients for conformance;
# defaults to true when unset for that reason.
force-trailing: true
# some clients (ZNC 1.6.x and lower, Pidgin 2.12 and lower) do not
# respond correctly to SASL messages with the server name as a prefix:
# https://github.com/znc/znc/issues/1212
# this works around that bug, allowing them to use SASL.
send-unprefixed-sasl: true
# IP-based DoS protection
ip-limits:
# whether to limit the total number of concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
count: true
# maximum concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
max-concurrent-connections: 16
# whether to restrict the rate of new connections per IP/CIDR
throttle: true
# how long to keep track of connections for
window: 10m
# maximum number of new connections per IP/CIDR within the given duration
max-connections-per-window: 32
# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv4 (a /32 is a fully specified IPv4 address)
cidr-len-ipv4: 32
# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv6 (a /64 is the typical prefix assigned
# by an ISP to an individual customer for their LAN)
cidr-len-ipv6: 64
# IPs/networks which are exempted from connection limits
exempted:
- "localhost"
# - "192.168.1.1"
# - "2001:0db8::/32"
# custom connection limits for certain IPs/networks.
custom-limits:
#"irccloud":
# nets:
# - "192.184.9.108" # highgate.irccloud.com
# - "192.184.9.110" # ealing.irccloud.com
# - "192.184.9.112" # charlton.irccloud.com
# - "192.184.10.118" # brockwell.irccloud.com
# - "192.184.10.9" # tooting.irccloud.com
# - "192.184.8.73" # hathersage.irccloud.com
# - "192.184.8.103" # stonehaven.irccloud.com
# - "5.254.36.57" # tinside.irccloud.com
# - "5.254.36.56/29" # additional ipv4 net
# - "2001:67c:2f08::/48"
# - "2a03:5180:f::/64"
# max-concurrent-connections: 2048
# max-connections-per-window: 2048
# pluggable IP ban mechanism, via subprocess invocation
# this can be used to check new connections against a DNSBL, for example
# see the manual for details on how to write an IP ban checking script
ip-check-script:
enabled: false
command: "/usr/local/bin/check-ip-ban"
# constant list of args to pass to the command; the actual query
# and result are transmitted over stdin/stdout:
args: []
# timeout for process execution, after which we send a SIGTERM:
timeout: 9s
# how long after the SIGTERM before we follow up with a SIGKILL:
kill-timeout: 1s
# how many scripts are allowed to run at once? 0 for no limit:
max-concurrency: 64
# IP cloaking hides users' IP addresses from other users and from channel admins
# (but not from server admins), while still allowing channel admins to ban
# offending IP addresses or networks. In place of hostnames derived from reverse
# DNS, users see fake domain names like pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono. These names are
# generated deterministically from the underlying IP address, but if the underlying
# IP is not already known, it is infeasible to recover it from the cloaked name.
ip-cloaking:
# whether to enable IP cloaking
enabled: false
# whether to use these cloak settings (specifically, `netname` and `num-bits`)
# to produce unique hostnames for always-on clients. you can enable this even if
# you disabled IP cloaking for normal clients above. if this is disabled,
# always-on clients will all have an identical hostname (the server name).
enabled-for-always-on: true
# fake TLD at the end of the hostname, e.g., pwbs2ui4377257x8.irc
# you may want to use your network name here
netname: "irc"
# the cloaked hostname is derived only from the CIDR (most significant bits
# of the IP address), up to a configurable number of bits. this is the
# granularity at which bans will take effect for IPv4. Note that changing
# this value will invalidate any stored bans.
cidr-len-ipv4: 32
# analogous granularity for IPv6
cidr-len-ipv6: 64
# number of bits of hash output to include in the cloaked hostname.
# more bits means less likelihood of distinct IPs colliding,
# at the cost of a longer cloaked hostname. if this value is set to 0,
# all users will receive simply `netname` as their cloaked hostname.
num-bits: 64
# secure-nets identifies IPs and CIDRs which are secure at layer 3,
# for example, because they are on a trusted internal LAN or a VPN.
# plaintext connections from these IPs and CIDRs will be considered
# secure (clients will receive the +Z mode and be allowed to resume
# or reattach to secure connections). note that loopback IPs are always
# considered secure:
secure-nets:
# - "10.0.0.0/8"
# oragono will write files to disk under certain circumstances, e.g.,
# CPU profiling or data export. by default, these files will be written
# to the working directory. set this to customize:
#output-path: "/home/oragono/out"
# the hostname used by "services", e.g., NickServ, defaults to "localhost",
# e.g., `NickServ!NickServ@localhost`. uncomment this to override:
#override-services-hostname: "example.network"
# account options
accounts:
# is account authentication enabled, i.e., can users log into existing accounts?
authentication-enabled: true
# account registration
registration:
# can users register new accounts for themselves? if this is false, operators with
# the `accreg` capability can still create accounts with `/NICKSERV SAREGISTER`
enabled: true
# can users use the REGISTER command to register before fully connecting?
allow-before-connect: true
# global throttle on new account creation
throttling:
enabled: true
# window
duration: 10m
# number of attempts allowed within the window
max-attempts: 30
# this is the bcrypt cost we'll use for account passwords
# (note that 4 is the lowest value allowed by the bcrypt library)
bcrypt-cost: 4
# length of time a user has to verify their account before it can be re-registered
verify-timeout: "32h"
# options for email verification of account registrations
email-verification:
enabled: false
sender: "admin@my.network"
require-tls: true
helo-domain: "my.network" # defaults to server name if unset
# options to enable DKIM signing of outgoing emails (recommended, but
# requires creating a DNS entry for the public key):
# dkim:
# domain: "my.network"
# selector: "20200229"
# key-file: "dkim.pem"
# to use an MTA/smarthost instead of sending email directly:
# mta:
# server: localhost
# port: 25
# username: "admin"
# password: "hunter2"
blacklist-regexes:
# - ".*@mailinator.com"
# throttle account login attempts (to prevent either password guessing, or DoS
# attacks on the server aimed at forcing repeated expensive bcrypt computations)
login-throttling:
enabled: true
# window
duration: 1m
# number of attempts allowed within the window
max-attempts: 3
# some clients (notably Pidgin and Hexchat) offer only a single password field,
# which makes it impossible to specify a separate server password (for the PASS
# command) and SASL password. if this option is set to true, a client that
# successfully authenticates with SASL will not be required to send
# PASS as well, so it can be configured to authenticate with SASL only.
skip-server-password: false
# enable login to accounts via the PASS command, e.g., PASS account:password
# this is useful for compatibility with old clients that don't support SASL
login-via-pass-command: false
# require-sasl controls whether clients are required to have accounts
# (and sign into them using SASL) to connect to the server
require-sasl:
# if this is enabled, all clients must authenticate with SASL while connecting
enabled: false
# IPs/CIDRs which are exempted from the account requirement
exempted:
- "localhost"
# - '10.10.0.0/16'
# nick-reservation controls how, and whether, nicknames are linked to accounts
nick-reservation:
# is there any enforcement of reserved nicknames?
enabled: true
# how many nicknames, in addition to the account name, can be reserved?
additional-nick-limit: 2
# method describes how nickname reservation is handled
# strict: users must already be logged in to their account (via
# SASL, PASS account:password, or /NickServ IDENTIFY)
# in order to use their reserved nickname(s)
# optional: no enforcement by default, but allow users to opt in to
# the enforcement level of their choice
method: optional
# allow users to set their own nickname enforcement status, e.g.,
# to opt out of strict enforcement
allow-custom-enforcement: true
# format for guest nicknames:
# 1. these nicknames cannot be registered or reserved
# 2. if a client is automatically renamed by the server,
# this is the template that will be used (e.g., Guest-nccj6rgmt97cg)
# 3. if enforce-guest-format (see below) is enabled, clients without
# a registered account will have this template applied to their
# nicknames (e.g., 'katie' will become 'Guest-katie')
guest-nickname-format: "Guest-*"
# when enabled, forces users not logged into an account to use
# a nickname matching the guest template. a caveat: this may prevent
# users from choosing nicknames in scripts different from the guest
# nickname format.
force-guest-format: false
# when enabled, forces users logged into an account to use the
# account name as their nickname. when combined with strict nickname
# enforcement, this lets users treat nicknames and account names
# as equivalent for the purpose of ban/invite/exception lists.
force-nick-equals-account: false
# parallel setting to force-nick-equals-account: if true, this forbids
# anonymous users (i.e., users not logged into an account) to change their
# nickname after the initial connection is complete
forbid-anonymous-nick-changes: false
# multiclient controls whether oragono allows multiple connections to
# attach to the same client/nickname identity; this is part of the
# functionality traditionally provided by a bouncer like ZNC
multiclient:
# when disabled, each connection must use a separate nickname (as is the
# typical behavior of IRC servers). when enabled, a new connection that
# has authenticated with SASL can associate itself with an existing
# client
enabled: true
# if this is disabled, clients have to opt in to bouncer functionality
# using nickserv or the cap system. if it's enabled, they can opt out
# via nickserv
allowed-by-default: false
# whether to allow clients that remain on the server even
# when they have no active connections. The possible values are:
# "disabled", "opt-in", "opt-out", or "mandatory".
always-on: "disabled"
# whether to mark always-on clients away when they have no active connections:
auto-away: "opt-in"
# QUIT always-on clients from the server if they go this long without connecting
# (use 0 or omit for no expiration):
#always-on-expiration: 90d
# vhosts controls the assignment of vhosts (strings displayed in place of the user's
# hostname/IP) by the HostServ service
vhosts:
# are vhosts enabled at all?
enabled: true
# maximum length of a vhost
max-length: 64
# regexp for testing the validity of a vhost
# (make sure any changes you make here are RFC-compliant)
valid-regexp: '^[0-9A-Za-z.\-_/]+$'
# modes that are set by default when a user connects
# if unset, no user modes will be set by default
# +i is invisible (a user's channels are hidden from whois replies)
# see /QUOTE HELP umodes for more user modes
# default-user-modes: +i
# pluggable authentication mechanism, via subprocess invocation
# see the manual for details on how to write an authentication plugin script
auth-script:
enabled: false
command: "/usr/local/bin/authenticate-irc-user"
# constant list of args to pass to the command; the actual authentication
# data is transmitted over stdin/stdout:
args: []
# should we automatically create users if the plugin returns success?
autocreate: true
# timeout for process execution, after which we send a SIGTERM:
timeout: 9s
# how long after the SIGTERM before we follow up with a SIGKILL:
kill-timeout: 1s
# how many scripts are allowed to run at once? 0 for no limit:
max-concurrency: 64
# channel options
channels:
# modes that are set when new channels are created
# +n is no-external-messages and +t is op-only-topic
# see /QUOTE HELP cmodes for more channel modes
default-modes: +nt
# how many channels can a client be in at once?
max-channels-per-client: 100
# if this is true, new channels can only be created by operators with the
# `chanreg` operator capability
operator-only-creation: false
# channel registration - requires an account
registration:
# can users register new channels?
enabled: true
# restrict new channel registrations to operators only?
# (operators can then transfer channels to regular users using /CS TRANSFER)
operator-only: false
# how many channels can each account register?
max-channels-per-account: 15
# as a crude countermeasure against spambots, anonymous connections younger
# than this value will get an empty response to /LIST (a time period of 0 disables)
list-delay: 0s
# INVITE to an invite-only channel expires after this amount of time
# (0 or omit for no expiration):
invite-expiration: 24h
# operator classes
oper-classes:
# chat moderator: can ban/unban users from the server, join channels,
# fix mode issues and sort out vhosts.
"chat-moderator":
# title shown in WHOIS
title: Chat Moderator
# capability names
capabilities:
- "kill"
- "ban"
- "nofakelag"
- "roleplay"
- "relaymsg"
- "vhosts"
- "sajoin"
- "samode"
- "snomasks"
# server admin: has full control of the ircd, including nickname and
# channel registrations
"server-admin":
# title shown in WHOIS
title: Server Admin
# oper class this extends from
extends: "chat-moderator"
# capability names
capabilities:
- "rehash"
- "accreg"
- "chanreg"
- "history"
- "defcon"
# ircd operators
opers:
# default operator named 'admin'; log in with /OPER admin <password>
admin:
# which capabilities this oper has access to
class: "server-admin"
# custom whois line
whois-line: is the server administrator
# custom hostname
vhost: "staff"
# normally, operator status is visible to unprivileged users in WHO and WHOIS
# responses. this can be disabled with 'hidden'. ('hidden' also causes the
# 'vhost' line above to be ignored.)
hidden: false
# modes are modes to auto-set upon opering-up. uncomment this to automatically
# enable snomasks ("server notification masks" that alert you to server events;
# see `/quote help snomasks` while opered-up for more information):
#modes: +is acjknoqtuxv
# operators can be authenticated either by password (with the /OPER command),
# or by certificate fingerprint, or both. if a password hash is set, then a
# password is required to oper up (e.g., /OPER dan mypassword). to generate
# the hash, use `oragono genpasswd`.
password: "$2a$04$0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234"
# if a SHA-256 certificate fingerprint is configured here, then it will be
# required to /OPER. if you comment out the password hash above, then you can
# /OPER without a password.
#certfp: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
# if 'auto' is set (and no password hash is set), operator permissions will be
# granted automatically as soon as you connect with the right fingerprint.
#auto: true
# example of a moderator named 'alice'
# (log in with /OPER alice <password>):
#alice:
# class: "chat-moderator"
# whois-line: "can help with moderation issues!"
# password: "$2a$04$0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234"
# logging, takes inspiration from Insp
logging:
-
# how to log these messages
#
# file log to a file
# stdout log to stdout
# stderr log to stderr
# (you can specify multiple methods, e.g., to log to both stderr and a file)
method: stderr
# filename to log to, if file method is selected
# filename: ircd.log
# type(s) of logs to keep here. you can use - to exclude those types
#
# exclusions take precedent over inclusions, so if you exclude a type it will NEVER
# be logged, even if you explicitly include it
#
# useful types include:
# * everything (usually used with exclusing some types below)
# server server startup, rehash, and shutdown events
# accounts account registration and authentication
# channels channel creation and operations
# commands command calling and operations
# opers oper actions, authentication, etc
# services actions related to NickServ, ChanServ, etc.
# internal unexpected runtime behavior, including potential bugs
# userinput raw lines sent by users
# useroutput raw lines sent to users
type: "* -userinput -useroutput"
# one of: debug info warn error
level: info
#-
# # example of a file log that avoids logging IP addresses
# method: file
# filename: ircd.log
# type: "* -userinput -useroutput -connect-ip"
# level: debug
# debug options
debug:
# when enabled, oragono will attempt to recover from certain kinds of
# client-triggered runtime errors that would normally crash the server.
# this makes the server more resilient to DoS, but could result in incorrect
# behavior. deployments that would prefer to "start from scratch", e.g., by
# letting the process crash and auto-restarting it with systemd, can set
# this to false.
recover-from-errors: true
# optionally expose a pprof http endpoint: https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/pprof/
# it is strongly recommended that you don't expose this on a public interface;
# if you need to access it remotely, you can use an SSH tunnel.
# set to `null`, "", leave blank, or omit to disable
# pprof-listener: "localhost:6060"
# datastore configuration
datastore:
# path to the datastore
path: ircd.db
# if the database schema requires an upgrade, `autoupgrade` will attempt to
# perform it automatically on startup. the database will be backed
# up, and if the upgrade fails, the original database will be restored.
autoupgrade: true
# connection information for MySQL (currently only used for persistent history):
mysql:
enabled: false
host: "localhost"
port: 3306
# if socket-path is set, it will be used instead of host:port
#socket-path: "/var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock"
user: "oragono"
password: "hunter2"
history-database: "oragono_history"
timeout: 3s
# languages config
languages:
# whether to load languages
enabled: true
# default language to use for new clients
# 'en' is the default English language in the code
default: en
# which directory contains our language files
path: languages
# limits - these need to be the same across the network
limits:
# nicklen is the max nick length allowed
nicklen: 32
# identlen is the max ident length allowed
identlen: 20
# channellen is the max channel length allowed
channellen: 64
# awaylen is the maximum length of an away message
awaylen: 390
# kicklen is the maximum length of a kick message
kicklen: 390
# topiclen is the maximum length of a channel topic
topiclen: 390
# maximum number of monitor entries a client can have
monitor-entries: 100
# whowas entries to store
whowas-entries: 100
# maximum length of channel lists (beI modes)
chan-list-modes: 60
# maximum number of messages to accept during registration (prevents
# DoS / resource exhaustion attacks):
registration-messages: 1024
# message length limits for the new multiline cap
multiline:
max-bytes: 4096 # 0 means disabled
max-lines: 100 # 0 means no limit
# fakelag: prevents clients from spamming commands too rapidly
fakelag:
# whether to enforce fakelag
enabled: true
# time unit for counting command rates
window: 1s
# clients can send this many commands without fakelag being imposed
burst-limit: 5
# once clients have exceeded their burst allowance, they can send only
# this many commands per `window`:
messages-per-window: 2
# client status resets to the default state if they go this long without
# sending any commands:
cooldown: 2s
# the roleplay commands are semi-standardized extensions to IRC that allow
# sending and receiving messages from pseudo-nicknames. this can be used either
# for actual roleplaying, or for bridging IRC with other protocols.
roleplay:
# are roleplay commands enabled at all? (channels and clients still have to
# opt in individually with the +E mode)
enabled: false
# require the "roleplay" oper capability to send roleplay messages?
require-oper: false
# require channel operator permissions to send roleplay messages?
require-chanops: false
# add the real nickname, in parentheses, to the end of every roleplay message?
add-suffix: true
# external services can integrate with the ircd using JSON Web Tokens (https://jwt.io).
# in effect, the server can sign a token attesting that the client is present on
# the server, is a member of a particular channel, etc.
extjwt:
# # default service config (for `EXTJWT #channel`).
# # expiration time for the token:
# expiration: 45s
# # you can configure tokens to be signed either with HMAC and a symmetric secret:
# secret: "65PHvk0K1_sM-raTsCEhatVkER_QD8a0zVV8gG2EWcI"
# # or with an RSA private key:
# #rsa-private-key-file: "extjwt.pem"
# # named services (for `EXTJWT #channel service_name`):
# services:
# "jitsi":
# expiration: 30s
# secret: "qmamLKDuOzIzlO8XqsGGewei_At11lewh6jtKfSTbkg"
# history message storage: this is used by CHATHISTORY, HISTORY, znc.in/playback,
# various autoreplay features, and the resume extension
history:
# should we store messages for later playback?
# by default, messages are stored in RAM only; they do not persist
# across server restarts. however, you may want to understand how message
# history interacts with the GDPR and/or any data privacy laws that apply
# in your country and the countries of your users.
enabled: true
# how many channel-specific events (messages, joins, parts) should be tracked per channel?
channel-length: 2048
# how many direct messages and notices should be tracked per user?
client-length: 256
# how long should we try to preserve messages?
# if `autoresize-window` is 0, the in-memory message buffers are preallocated to
# their maximum length. if it is nonzero, the buffers are initially small and
# are dynamically expanded up to the maximum length. if the buffer is full
# and the oldest message is older than `autoresize-window`, then it will overwrite
# the oldest message rather than resize; otherwise, it will expand if possible.
autoresize-window: 3d
# number of messages to automatically play back on channel join (0 to disable):
autoreplay-on-join: 0
# maximum number of CHATHISTORY messages that can be
# requested at once (0 disables support for CHATHISTORY)
chathistory-maxmessages: 100
# maximum number of messages that can be replayed at once during znc emulation
# (znc.in/playback, or automatic replay on initial reattach to a persistent client):
znc-maxmessages: 2048
# options to delete old messages, or prevent them from being retrieved
restrictions:
# if this is set, messages older than this cannot be retrieved by anyone
# (and will eventually be deleted from persistent storage, if that's enabled)
expire-time: 1w
# this restricts access to channel history (it can be overridden by channel
# owners). options are: 'none' (no restrictions), 'registration-time'
# (logged-in users cannot retrieve messages older than their account
# registration date, and anonymous users cannot retrieve messages older than
# their sign-on time, modulo the grace-period described below), and
# 'join-time' (users cannot retrieve messages older than the time they
# joined the channel, so only always-on clients can view history).
query-cutoff: 'none'
# but if this is set, you can retrieve messages that are up to `grace-period`
# older than the above cutoff time. this is recommended to allow logged-out
# users to do session resumption / query history after disconnections.
grace-period: 1h
# options to store history messages in a persistent database (currently only MySQL).
# in order to enable any of this functionality, you must configure a MySQL server
# in the `datastore.mysql` section.
persistent:
enabled: false
# store unregistered channel messages in the persistent database?
unregistered-channels: false
# for a registered channel, the channel owner can potentially customize
# the history storage setting. as the server operator, your options are
# 'disabled' (no persistent storage, regardless of per-channel setting),
# 'opt-in', 'opt-out', and 'mandatory' (force persistent storage, ignoring
# per-channel setting):
registered-channels: "opt-out"
# direct messages are only stored in the database for logged-in clients;
# you can control how they are stored here (same options as above).
# if you enable this, strict nickname reservation is strongly recommended
# as well.
direct-messages: "opt-out"
# options to control how messages are stored and deleted:
retention:
# allow users to delete their own messages from history?
allow-individual-delete: false
# if persistent history is enabled, create additional index tables,
# allowing deletion of JSON export of an account's messages. this
# may be needed for compliance with data privacy regulations.
enable-account-indexing: false
# options to control storage of TAGMSG
tagmsg-storage:
# by default, should TAGMSG be stored?
default: false
# if `default` is false, store TAGMSG containing any of these tags:
whitelist:
- "+draft/react"
- "react"
# if `default` is true, don't store TAGMSG containing any of these tags:
#blacklist:
# - "+draft/typing"
# - "typing"
# whether to allow customization of the config at runtime using environment variables,
# e.g., ORAGONO__SERVER__MAX_SENDQ=128k. see the manual for more details.
allow-environment-overrides: true