mirror of
https://github.com/ergochat/ergo.git
synced 2024-12-22 18:52:41 +01:00
792 lines
32 KiB
YAML
792 lines
32 KiB
YAML
# oragono IRCd config
|
|
|
|
# network configuration
|
|
network:
|
|
# name of the network
|
|
name: OragonoTest
|
|
|
|
# server configuration
|
|
server:
|
|
# server name
|
|
name: oragono.test
|
|
|
|
# addresses to listen on
|
|
listeners:
|
|
# The standard plaintext port for IRC is 6667. Allowing plaintext over the
|
|
# public Internet poses serious security and privacy issues. Accordingly,
|
|
# we recommend using plaintext only on local (loopback) interfaces:
|
|
"127.0.0.1:6667": # (loopback ipv4, localhost-only)
|
|
"[::1]:6667": # (loopback ipv6, localhost-only)
|
|
# If you need to serve plaintext on public interfaces, comment out the above
|
|
# two lines and uncomment the line below (which listens on all interfaces):
|
|
# ":6667":
|
|
# Alternately, if you have a TLS certificate issued by a recognized CA,
|
|
# you can configure port 6667 as an STS-only listener that only serves
|
|
# "redirects" to the TLS port, but doesn't allow chat. See the manual
|
|
# for details.
|
|
|
|
# The standard SSL/TLS port for IRC is 6697. This will listen on all interfaces:
|
|
":6697":
|
|
tls:
|
|
key: tls.key
|
|
cert: tls.crt
|
|
# 'proxy' should typically be false. It's only for Kubernetes-style load
|
|
# balancing that does not terminate TLS, but sends an initial PROXY line
|
|
# in plaintext.
|
|
proxy: false
|
|
|
|
# Example of a Unix domain socket for proxying:
|
|
# "/tmp/oragono_sock":
|
|
|
|
# Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will
|
|
# be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener
|
|
# *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain:
|
|
# "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock":
|
|
# tor: true
|
|
|
|
# sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system,
|
|
# the default is 0775 or 0755, which prevents other users/groups from connecting
|
|
# to the socket. With 0777, it behaves like a normal TCP socket
|
|
# where anyone can connect.
|
|
unix-bind-mode: 0777
|
|
|
|
# configure the behavior of Tor listeners (ignored if you didn't enable any):
|
|
tor-listeners:
|
|
# if this is true, connections from Tor must authenticate with SASL
|
|
require-sasl: false
|
|
|
|
# what hostname should be displayed for Tor connections?
|
|
vhost: "tor-network.onion"
|
|
|
|
# allow at most this many connections at once (0 for no limit):
|
|
max-connections: 64
|
|
|
|
# connection throttling (limit how many connection attempts are allowed at once):
|
|
throttle-duration: 10m
|
|
# set to 0 to disable throttling:
|
|
max-connections-per-duration: 64
|
|
|
|
# strict transport security, to get clients to automagically use TLS
|
|
sts:
|
|
# whether to advertise STS
|
|
#
|
|
# to stop advertising STS, leave this enabled and set 'duration' below to "0". this will
|
|
# advertise to connecting users that the STS policy they have saved is no longer valid
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
# how long clients should be forced to use TLS for.
|
|
# setting this to a too-long time will mean bad things if you later remove your TLS.
|
|
# the default duration below is 1 month, 2 days and 5 minutes.
|
|
duration: 1mo2d5m
|
|
|
|
# tls port - you should be listening on this port above
|
|
port: 6697
|
|
|
|
# should clients include this STS policy when they ship their inbuilt preload lists?
|
|
preload: false
|
|
|
|
# casemapping controls what kinds of strings are permitted as identifiers (nicknames,
|
|
# channel names, account names, etc.), and how they are normalized for case.
|
|
# with the recommended default of 'precis', utf-8 identifiers that are "sane"
|
|
# (according to RFC 8265) are allowed, and the server additionally tries to protect
|
|
# against confusable characters ("homoglyph attacks").
|
|
# the other options are 'ascii' (traditional ASCII-only identifiers), and 'permissive',
|
|
# which allows identifiers to contain unusual characters like emoji, but makes users
|
|
# vulnerable to homoglyph attacks. unless you're really confident in your decision,
|
|
# we recommend leaving this value at its default (changing it once the network is
|
|
# already up and running is problematic).
|
|
casemapping: "precis"
|
|
|
|
# whether to look up user hostnames with reverse DNS
|
|
# (to suppress this for privacy purposes, use the ip-cloaking options below)
|
|
lookup-hostnames: true
|
|
# whether to confirm hostname lookups using "forward-confirmed reverse DNS", i.e., for
|
|
# any hostname returned from reverse DNS, resolve it back to an IP address and reject it
|
|
# unless it matches the connecting IP
|
|
forward-confirm-hostnames: true
|
|
|
|
# use ident protocol to get usernames
|
|
check-ident: false
|
|
|
|
# password to login to the server
|
|
# generated using "oragono genpasswd"
|
|
#password: ""
|
|
|
|
# motd filename
|
|
# if you change the motd, you should move it to ircd.motd
|
|
motd: oragono.motd
|
|
|
|
# motd formatting codes
|
|
# if this is true, the motd is escaped using formatting codes like $c, $b, and $i
|
|
motd-formatting: true
|
|
|
|
# addresses/CIDRs the PROXY command can be used from
|
|
# this should be restricted to 127.0.0.1/8 and ::1/128 (unless you have a good reason)
|
|
# you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
|
|
proxy-allowed-from:
|
|
# - localhost
|
|
# - "192.168.1.1"
|
|
# - "192.168.10.1/24"
|
|
|
|
# controls the use of the WEBIRC command (by IRC<->web interfaces, bouncers and similar)
|
|
webirc:
|
|
# one webirc block -- should correspond to one set of gateways
|
|
-
|
|
# SHA-256 fingerprint of the TLS certificate the gateway must use to connect
|
|
# (comment this out to use passwords only)
|
|
fingerprint: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
|
|
|
|
# password the gateway uses to connect, made with oragono genpasswd
|
|
password: "$2a$04$sLEFDpIOyUp55e6gTMKbOeroT6tMXTjPFvA0eGvwvImVR9pkwv7ee"
|
|
|
|
# addresses/CIDRs that can use this webirc command
|
|
# you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
|
|
hosts:
|
|
# - localhost
|
|
# - "192.168.1.1"
|
|
# - "192.168.10.1/24"
|
|
|
|
# allow use of the RESUME extension over plaintext connections:
|
|
# do not enable this unless the ircd is only accessible over internal networks
|
|
allow-plaintext-resume: false
|
|
|
|
# maximum length of clients' sendQ in bytes
|
|
# this should be big enough to hold bursts of channel/direct messages
|
|
max-sendq: 96k
|
|
|
|
# compatibility with legacy clients
|
|
compatibility:
|
|
# many clients require that the final parameter of certain messages be an
|
|
# RFC1459 trailing parameter, i.e., prefixed with :, whether or not this is
|
|
# actually required. this forces Oragono to send those parameters
|
|
# as trailings. this is recommended unless you're testing clients for conformance;
|
|
# defaults to true when unset for that reason.
|
|
force-trailing: true
|
|
|
|
# some clients (ZNC 1.6.x and lower, Pidgin 2.12 and lower) do not
|
|
# respond correctly to SASL messages with the server name as a prefix:
|
|
# https://github.com/znc/znc/issues/1212
|
|
# this works around that bug, allowing them to use SASL.
|
|
send-unprefixed-sasl: true
|
|
|
|
# IP-based DoS protection
|
|
ip-limits:
|
|
# whether to limit the total number of concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
|
|
count: true
|
|
# maximum concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
|
|
max-concurrent-connections: 16
|
|
|
|
# whether to restrict the rate of new connections per IP/CIDR
|
|
throttle: true
|
|
# how long to keep track of connections for
|
|
window: 10m
|
|
# maximum number of new connections per IP/CIDR within the given duration
|
|
max-connections-per-window: 32
|
|
# how long to ban offenders for. after banning them, the number of connections is
|
|
# reset, which lets you use /UNDLINE to unban people
|
|
throttle-ban-duration: 10m
|
|
|
|
# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv4 (a /32 is a fully specified IPv4 address)
|
|
cidr-len-ipv4: 32
|
|
# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv6 (a /64 is the typical prefix assigned
|
|
# by an ISP to an individual customer for their LAN)
|
|
cidr-len-ipv6: 64
|
|
|
|
# IPs/networks which are exempted from connection limits
|
|
exempted:
|
|
- "localhost"
|
|
# - "192.168.1.1"
|
|
# - "2001:0db8::/32"
|
|
|
|
# custom connection limits for certain IPs/networks. note that CIDR
|
|
# widths defined here override the default CIDR width --- the limit
|
|
# will apply to the entire CIDR no matter how large or small it is
|
|
custom-limits:
|
|
# "8.8.0.0/16":
|
|
# max-concurrent-connections: 128
|
|
# max-connections-per-window: 1024
|
|
|
|
# IP cloaking hides users' IP addresses from other users and from channel admins
|
|
# (but not from server admins), while still allowing channel admins to ban
|
|
# offending IP addresses or networks. In place of hostnames derived from reverse
|
|
# DNS, users see fake domain names like pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono. These names are
|
|
# generated deterministically from the underlying IP address, but if the underlying
|
|
# IP is not already known, it is infeasible to recover it from the cloaked name.
|
|
ip-cloaking:
|
|
# whether to enable IP cloaking
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
# fake TLD at the end of the hostname, e.g., pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono
|
|
netname: "oragono"
|
|
|
|
# secret key to prevent dictionary attacks against cloaked IPs
|
|
# any high-entropy secret is valid for this purpose:
|
|
# you MUST generate a new one for your installation.
|
|
# suggestion: use the output of `oragono mksecret`
|
|
# note that rotating this key will invalidate all existing ban masks.
|
|
secret: "siaELnk6Kaeo65K3RCrwJjlWaZ-Bt3WuZ2L8MXLbNb4"
|
|
|
|
# name of an environment variable to pull the secret from, for use with
|
|
# k8s secret distribution:
|
|
# secret-environment-variable: "ORAGONO_CLOAKING_SECRET"
|
|
|
|
# the cloaked hostname is derived only from the CIDR (most significant bits
|
|
# of the IP address), up to a configurable number of bits. this is the
|
|
# granularity at which bans will take effect for IPv4. Note that changing
|
|
# this value will invalidate any stored bans.
|
|
cidr-len-ipv4: 32
|
|
|
|
# analogous granularity for IPv6
|
|
cidr-len-ipv6: 64
|
|
|
|
# number of bits of hash output to include in the cloaked hostname.
|
|
# more bits means less likelihood of distinct IPs colliding,
|
|
# at the cost of a longer cloaked hostname. if this value is set to 0,
|
|
# all users will receive simply `netname` as their cloaked hostname.
|
|
num-bits: 64
|
|
|
|
# secure-nets identifies IPs and CIDRs which are secure at layer 3,
|
|
# for example, because they are on a trusted internal LAN or a VPN.
|
|
# plaintext connections from these IPs and CIDRs will be considered
|
|
# secure (clients will receive the +Z mode and be allowed to resume
|
|
# or reattach to secure connections). note that loopback IPs are always
|
|
# considered secure:
|
|
secure-nets:
|
|
# - "10.0.0.0/8"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# account options
|
|
accounts:
|
|
# is account authentication enabled, i.e., can users log into existing accounts?
|
|
authentication-enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# account registration
|
|
registration:
|
|
# can users register new accounts for themselves? if this is false, operators with
|
|
# the `accreg` capability can still create accounts with `/NICKSERV SAREGISTER`
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# this is the bcrypt cost we'll use for account passwords
|
|
bcrypt-cost: 9
|
|
|
|
# length of time a user has to verify their account before it can be re-registered
|
|
verify-timeout: "32h"
|
|
|
|
# callbacks to allow
|
|
enabled-callbacks:
|
|
- none # no verification needed, will instantly register successfully
|
|
|
|
# example configuration for sending verification emails via a local mail relay
|
|
# callbacks:
|
|
# mailto:
|
|
# server: localhost
|
|
# port: 25
|
|
# tls:
|
|
# enabled: false
|
|
# username: ""
|
|
# password: ""
|
|
# sender: "admin@my.network"
|
|
|
|
# throttle account login attempts (to prevent either password guessing, or DoS
|
|
# attacks on the server aimed at forcing repeated expensive bcrypt computations)
|
|
login-throttling:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# window
|
|
duration: 1m
|
|
|
|
# number of attempts allowed within the window
|
|
max-attempts: 3
|
|
|
|
# some clients (notably Pidgin and Hexchat) offer only a single password field,
|
|
# which makes it impossible to specify a separate server password (for the PASS
|
|
# command) and SASL password. if this option is set to true, a client that
|
|
# successfully authenticates with SASL will not be required to send
|
|
# PASS as well, so it can be configured to authenticate with SASL only.
|
|
skip-server-password: false
|
|
|
|
# require-sasl controls whether clients are required to have accounts
|
|
# (and sign into them using SASL) to connect to the server
|
|
require-sasl:
|
|
# if this is enabled, all clients must authenticate with SASL while connecting
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
# IPs/CIDRs which are exempted from the account requirement
|
|
exempted:
|
|
- "localhost"
|
|
# - '10.10.0.0/16'
|
|
|
|
# nick-reservation controls how, and whether, nicknames are linked to accounts
|
|
nick-reservation:
|
|
# is there any enforcement of reserved nicknames?
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# how many nicknames, in addition to the account name, can be reserved?
|
|
additional-nick-limit: 2
|
|
|
|
# method describes how nickname reservation is handled
|
|
# timeout: let the user change to the registered nickname, give them X seconds
|
|
# to login and then rename them if they haven't done so
|
|
# strict: don't let the user change to the registered nickname unless they're
|
|
# already logged-in using SASL or NickServ
|
|
# optional: no enforcement by default, but allow users to opt in to
|
|
# the enforcement level of their choice
|
|
#
|
|
# 'optional' matches the behavior of other NickServs, but 'strict' is
|
|
# preferable if all your users can enable SASL.
|
|
method: strict
|
|
|
|
# allow users to set their own nickname enforcement status, e.g.,
|
|
# to opt out of strict enforcement
|
|
allow-custom-enforcement: true
|
|
|
|
# rename-timeout - this is how long users have 'til they're renamed
|
|
rename-timeout: 30s
|
|
|
|
# format for guest nicknames:
|
|
# 1. these nicknames cannot be registered or reserved
|
|
# 2. if a client is automatically renamed by the server,
|
|
# this is the template that will be used (e.g., Guest-nccj6rgmt97cg)
|
|
# 3. if enforce-guest-format (see below) is enabled, clients without
|
|
# a registered account will have this template applied to their
|
|
# nicknames (e.g., 'katie' will become 'Guest-katie')
|
|
guest-nickname-format: "Guest-*"
|
|
|
|
# when enabled, forces users not logged into an account to use
|
|
# a nickname matching the guest template. a caveat: this may prevent
|
|
# users from choosing nicknames in scripts different from the guest
|
|
# nickname format.
|
|
force-guest-format: false
|
|
|
|
# when enabled, forces users logged into an account to use the
|
|
# account name as their nickname. when combined with strict nickname
|
|
# enforcement, this lets users treat nicknames and account names
|
|
# as equivalent for the purpose of ban/invite/exception lists.
|
|
force-nick-equals-account: false
|
|
|
|
# multiclient controls whether oragono allows multiple connections to
|
|
# attach to the same client/nickname identity; this is part of the
|
|
# functionality traditionally provided by a bouncer like ZNC
|
|
multiclient:
|
|
# when disabled, each connection must use a separate nickname (as is the
|
|
# typical behavior of IRC servers). when enabled, a new connection that
|
|
# has authenticated with SASL can associate itself with an existing
|
|
# client
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# if this is disabled, clients have to opt in to bouncer functionality
|
|
# using nickserv or the cap system. if it's enabled, they can opt out
|
|
# via nickserv
|
|
allowed-by-default: true
|
|
|
|
# whether to allow clients that remain on the server even
|
|
# when they have no active connections. The possible values are:
|
|
# "disabled", "opt-in", "opt-out", or "mandatory".
|
|
always-on: "disabled"
|
|
|
|
# vhosts controls the assignment of vhosts (strings displayed in place of the user's
|
|
# hostname/IP) by the HostServ service
|
|
vhosts:
|
|
# are vhosts enabled at all?
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# maximum length of a vhost
|
|
max-length: 64
|
|
|
|
# regexp for testing the validity of a vhost
|
|
# (make sure any changes you make here are RFC-compliant)
|
|
valid-regexp: '^[0-9A-Za-z.\-_/]+$'
|
|
|
|
# options controlling users requesting vhosts:
|
|
user-requests:
|
|
# can users request vhosts at all? if this is false, operators with the
|
|
# 'vhosts' capability can still assign vhosts manually
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
# if uncommented, all new vhost requests will be dumped into the given
|
|
# channel, so opers can review them as they are sent in. ensure that you
|
|
# have registered and restricted the channel appropriately before you
|
|
# uncomment this.
|
|
#channel: "#vhosts"
|
|
|
|
# after a user's vhost has been approved or rejected, they need to wait
|
|
# this long (starting from the time of their original request)
|
|
# before they can request a new one.
|
|
cooldown: 168h
|
|
|
|
# vhosts that users can take without approval, using `/HS TAKE`
|
|
offer-list:
|
|
#- "oragono.test"
|
|
|
|
# support for deferring password checking to an external LDAP server
|
|
# you should probably ignore this section! consult the grafana docs for details:
|
|
# https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/auth/ldap/
|
|
# you will probably want to set require-sasl and disable accounts.registration.enabled
|
|
# ldap:
|
|
# enabled: true
|
|
# # should we automatically create users if their LDAP login succeeds?
|
|
# autocreate: true
|
|
# # example configuration that works with Forum Systems's testing server:
|
|
# # https://www.forumsys.com/tutorials/integration-how-to/ldap/online-ldap-test-server/
|
|
# host: "ldap.forumsys.com"
|
|
# port: 389
|
|
# timeout: 30s
|
|
# # example "single-bind" configuration, where we bind directly to the user's entry:
|
|
# bind-dn: "uid=%s,dc=example,dc=com"
|
|
# # example "admin bind" configuration, where we bind to an initial admin user,
|
|
# # then search for the user's entry with a search filter:
|
|
# #search-base-dns:
|
|
# # - "dc=example,dc=com"
|
|
# #bind-dn: "cn=read-only-admin,dc=example,dc=com"
|
|
# #bind-password: "password"
|
|
# #search-filter: "(uid=%s)"
|
|
# # example of requiring that users be in a particular group
|
|
# # (note that this is an OR over the listed groups, not an AND):
|
|
# #require-groups:
|
|
# # - "ou=mathematicians,dc=example,dc=com"
|
|
# #group-search-filter-user-attribute: "dn"
|
|
# #group-search-filter: "(uniqueMember=%s)"
|
|
# #group-search-base-dns:
|
|
# # - "dc=example,dc=com"
|
|
# # example of group membership testing via user attributes, as in AD
|
|
# # or with OpenLDAP's "memberOf overlay" (overrides group-search-filter):
|
|
# attributes:
|
|
# member-of: "memberOf"
|
|
|
|
# channel options
|
|
channels:
|
|
# modes that are set when new channels are created
|
|
# +n is no-external-messages and +t is op-only-topic
|
|
# see /QUOTE HELP cmodes for more channel modes
|
|
default-modes: +nt
|
|
|
|
# how many channels can a client be in at once?
|
|
max-channels-per-client: 100
|
|
|
|
# if this is true, new channels can only be created by operators with the
|
|
# `chanreg` operator capability
|
|
operator-only-creation: false
|
|
|
|
# channel registration - requires an account
|
|
registration:
|
|
# can users register new channels?
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# restrict new channel registrations to operators only?
|
|
# (operators can then transfer channels to regular users using /CS TRANSFER)
|
|
operator-only: false
|
|
|
|
# how many channels can each account register?
|
|
max-channels-per-account: 15
|
|
|
|
# operator classes
|
|
oper-classes:
|
|
# local operator
|
|
"local-oper":
|
|
# title shown in WHOIS
|
|
title: Local Operator
|
|
|
|
# capability names
|
|
capabilities:
|
|
- "local_kill"
|
|
- "local_ban"
|
|
- "local_unban"
|
|
- "nofakelag"
|
|
- "roleplay"
|
|
|
|
# network operator
|
|
"network-oper":
|
|
# title shown in WHOIS
|
|
title: Network Operator
|
|
|
|
# oper class this extends from
|
|
extends: "local-oper"
|
|
|
|
# capability names
|
|
capabilities:
|
|
- "remote_kill"
|
|
- "remote_ban"
|
|
- "remote_unban"
|
|
|
|
# server admin
|
|
"server-admin":
|
|
# title shown in WHOIS
|
|
title: Server Admin
|
|
|
|
# oper class this extends from
|
|
extends: "local-oper"
|
|
|
|
# capability names
|
|
capabilities:
|
|
- "rehash"
|
|
- "die"
|
|
- "accreg"
|
|
- "sajoin"
|
|
- "samode"
|
|
- "vhosts"
|
|
- "chanreg"
|
|
|
|
# ircd operators
|
|
opers:
|
|
# operator named 'dan'
|
|
dan:
|
|
# which capabilities this oper has access to
|
|
class: "server-admin"
|
|
|
|
# custom whois line
|
|
whois-line: is a cool dude
|
|
|
|
# custom hostname
|
|
vhost: "n"
|
|
|
|
# modes are the modes to auto-set upon opering-up
|
|
modes: +is acjknoqtuxv
|
|
|
|
# operators can be authenticated either by password (with the /OPER command),
|
|
# or by certificate fingerprint, or both. if a password hash is set, then a
|
|
# password is required to oper up (e.g., /OPER dan mypassword). to generate
|
|
# the hash, use `oragono genpasswd`.
|
|
password: "$2a$04$LiytCxaY0lI.guDj2pBN4eLRD5cdM2OLDwqmGAgB6M2OPirbF5Jcu"
|
|
|
|
# if a SHA-256 certificate fingerprint is configured here, then it will be
|
|
# required to /OPER. if you comment out the password hash above, then you can
|
|
# /OPER without a password.
|
|
#fingerprint: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
|
|
# if 'auto' is set (and no password hash is set), operator permissions will be
|
|
# granted automatically as soon as you connect with the right fingerprint.
|
|
#auto: true
|
|
|
|
# logging, takes inspiration from Insp
|
|
logging:
|
|
-
|
|
# how to log these messages
|
|
#
|
|
# file log to a file
|
|
# stdout log to stdout
|
|
# stderr log to stderr
|
|
# (you can specify multiple methods, e.g., to log to both stderr and a file)
|
|
method: stderr
|
|
|
|
# filename to log to, if file method is selected
|
|
# filename: ircd.log
|
|
|
|
# type(s) of logs to keep here. you can use - to exclude those types
|
|
#
|
|
# exclusions take precedent over inclusions, so if you exclude a type it will NEVER
|
|
# be logged, even if you explicitly include it
|
|
#
|
|
# useful types include:
|
|
# * everything (usually used with exclusing some types below)
|
|
# server server startup, rehash, and shutdown events
|
|
# accounts account registration and authentication
|
|
# channels channel creation and operations
|
|
# commands command calling and operations
|
|
# opers oper actions, authentication, etc
|
|
# services actions related to NickServ, ChanServ, etc.
|
|
# internal unexpected runtime behavior, including potential bugs
|
|
# userinput raw lines sent by users
|
|
# useroutput raw lines sent to users
|
|
type: "* -userinput -useroutput"
|
|
|
|
# one of: debug info warn error
|
|
level: info
|
|
#-
|
|
# # example of a file log that avoids logging IP addresses
|
|
# method: file
|
|
# filename: ircd.log
|
|
# type: "* -userinput -useroutput -localconnect -localconnect-ip"
|
|
# level: debug
|
|
|
|
# debug options
|
|
debug:
|
|
# when enabled, oragono will attempt to recover from certain kinds of
|
|
# client-triggered runtime errors that would normally crash the server.
|
|
# this makes the server more resilient to DoS, but could result in incorrect
|
|
# behavior. deployments that would prefer to "start from scratch", e.g., by
|
|
# letting the process crash and auto-restarting it with systemd, can set
|
|
# this to false.
|
|
recover-from-errors: true
|
|
|
|
# optionally expose a pprof http endpoint: https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/pprof/
|
|
# it is strongly recommended that you don't expose this on a public interface;
|
|
# if you need to access it remotely, you can use an SSH tunnel.
|
|
# set to `null`, "", leave blank, or omit to disable
|
|
# pprof-listener: "localhost:6060"
|
|
|
|
# datastore configuration
|
|
datastore:
|
|
# path to the datastore
|
|
path: ircd.db
|
|
|
|
# if the database schema requires an upgrade, `autoupgrade` will attempt to
|
|
# perform it automatically on startup. the database will be backed
|
|
# up, and if the upgrade fails, the original database will be restored.
|
|
autoupgrade: true
|
|
|
|
# connection information for MySQL (currently only used for persistent history):
|
|
mysql:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
host: "localhost"
|
|
# port is unnecessary for connections via unix domain socket:
|
|
#port: 3306
|
|
user: "oragono"
|
|
password: "hunter2"
|
|
history-database: "oragono_history"
|
|
timeout: 3s
|
|
|
|
# languages config
|
|
languages:
|
|
# whether to load languages
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# default language to use for new clients
|
|
# 'en' is the default English language in the code
|
|
default: en
|
|
|
|
# which directory contains our language files
|
|
path: languages
|
|
|
|
# limits - these need to be the same across the network
|
|
limits:
|
|
# nicklen is the max nick length allowed
|
|
nicklen: 32
|
|
|
|
# identlen is the max ident length allowed
|
|
identlen: 20
|
|
|
|
# channellen is the max channel length allowed
|
|
channellen: 64
|
|
|
|
# awaylen is the maximum length of an away message
|
|
awaylen: 500
|
|
|
|
# kicklen is the maximum length of a kick message
|
|
kicklen: 1000
|
|
|
|
# topiclen is the maximum length of a channel topic
|
|
topiclen: 1000
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of monitor entries a client can have
|
|
monitor-entries: 100
|
|
|
|
# whowas entries to store
|
|
whowas-entries: 100
|
|
|
|
# maximum length of channel lists (beI modes)
|
|
chan-list-modes: 60
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of messages to accept during registration (prevents
|
|
# DoS / resource exhaustion attacks):
|
|
registration-messages: 1024
|
|
|
|
# message length limits for the new multiline cap
|
|
multiline:
|
|
max-bytes: 4096 # 0 means disabled
|
|
max-lines: 100 # 0 means no limit
|
|
|
|
# fakelag: prevents clients from spamming commands too rapidly
|
|
fakelag:
|
|
# whether to enforce fakelag
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# time unit for counting command rates
|
|
window: 1s
|
|
|
|
# clients can send this many commands without fakelag being imposed
|
|
burst-limit: 5
|
|
|
|
# once clients have exceeded their burst allowance, they can send only
|
|
# this many commands per `window`:
|
|
messages-per-window: 2
|
|
|
|
# client status resets to the default state if they go this long without
|
|
# sending any commands:
|
|
cooldown: 2s
|
|
|
|
# the roleplay commands are semi-standardized extensions to IRC that allow
|
|
# sending and receiving messages from pseudo-nicknames. this can be used either
|
|
# for actual roleplaying, or for bridging IRC with other protocols.
|
|
roleplay:
|
|
# are roleplay commands enabled at all? (channels and clients still have to
|
|
# opt in individually with the +E mode)
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# require the "roleplay" oper capability to send roleplay messages?
|
|
require-oper: false
|
|
|
|
# require channel operator permissions to send roleplay messages?
|
|
require-chanops: false
|
|
|
|
# add the real nickname, in parentheses, to the end of every roleplay message?
|
|
add-suffix: true
|
|
|
|
# message history tracking, for the RESUME extension and possibly other uses in future
|
|
history:
|
|
# should we store messages for later playback?
|
|
# by default, messages are stored in RAM only; they do not persist
|
|
# across server restarts. however, you should not enable this unless you understand
|
|
# how it interacts with the GDPR and/or any data privacy laws that apply
|
|
# in your country and the countries of your users.
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
# how many channel-specific events (messages, joins, parts) should be tracked per channel?
|
|
channel-length: 1024
|
|
|
|
# how many direct messages and notices should be tracked per user?
|
|
client-length: 256
|
|
|
|
# how long should we try to preserve messages?
|
|
# if `autoresize-window` is 0, the in-memory message buffers are preallocated to
|
|
# their maximum length. if it is nonzero, the buffers are initially small and
|
|
# are dynamically expanded up to the maximum length. if the buffer is full
|
|
# and the oldest message is older than `autoresize-window`, then it will overwrite
|
|
# the oldest message rather than resize; otherwise, it will expand if possible.
|
|
autoresize-window: 1h
|
|
|
|
# number of messages to automatically play back on channel join (0 to disable):
|
|
autoreplay-on-join: 0
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of CHATHISTORY messages that can be
|
|
# requested at once (0 disables support for CHATHISTORY)
|
|
chathistory-maxmessages: 100
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of messages that can be replayed at once during znc emulation
|
|
# (znc.in/playback, or automatic replay on initial reattach to a persistent client):
|
|
znc-maxmessages: 2048
|
|
|
|
# options to delete old messages, or prevent them from being retrieved
|
|
restrictions:
|
|
# if this is set, messages older than this cannot be retrieved by anyone
|
|
# (and will eventually be deleted from persistent storage, if that's enabled)
|
|
#expire-time: 1w
|
|
|
|
# if this is set, logged-in users cannot retrieve messages older than their
|
|
# account registration date, and logged-out users cannot retrieve messages
|
|
# older than their sign-on time (modulo grace-period, see below):
|
|
enforce-registration-date: false
|
|
|
|
# but if this is set, you can retrieve messages that are up to `grace-period`
|
|
# older than the above cutoff time. this is recommended to allow logged-out
|
|
# users to do session resumption / query history after disconnections.
|
|
grace-period: 1h
|
|
|
|
# options to store history messages in a persistent database (currently only MySQL):
|
|
persistent:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
# store unregistered channel messages in the persistent database?
|
|
unregistered-channels: false
|
|
|
|
# for a registered channel, the channel owner can potentially customize
|
|
# the history storage setting. as the server operator, your options are
|
|
# 'disabled' (no persistent storage, regardless of per-channel setting),
|
|
# 'opt-in', 'opt-out', and 'mandatory' (force persistent storage, ignoring
|
|
# per-channel setting):
|
|
registered-channels: "opt-out"
|
|
|
|
# direct messages are only stored in the database for logged-in clients;
|
|
# you can control how they are stored here (same options as above).
|
|
# if you enable this, strict nickname reservation is strongly recommended
|
|
# as well.
|
|
direct-messages: "opt-out"
|