mirror of
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162 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
162 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Jeremy Latt
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// Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Edmund Huber
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// Copyright (c) 2017 Daniel Oaks <daniel@danieloaks.net>
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// released under the MIT license
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package irc
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/oragono/oragono/irc/modes"
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"github.com/oragono/oragono/irc/utils"
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)
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var (
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errBadGatewayAddress = errors.New("PROXY/WEBIRC commands are not accepted from this IP address")
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errBadProxyLine = errors.New("Invalid PROXY/WEBIRC command")
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)
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const (
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// https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
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// "a 108-byte buffer is always enough to store all the line and a trailing zero
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// for string processing."
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maxProxyLineLen = 107
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)
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type webircConfig struct {
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PasswordString string `yaml:"password"`
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Password []byte `yaml:"password-bytes"`
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Fingerprint string
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Hosts []string
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allowedNets []net.IPNet
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}
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// Populate fills out our password or fingerprint.
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func (wc *webircConfig) Populate() (err error) {
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if wc.Fingerprint == "" && wc.PasswordString == "" {
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return ErrNoFingerprintOrPassword
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}
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if wc.PasswordString != "" {
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wc.Password, err = decodeLegacyPasswordHash(wc.PasswordString)
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}
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if err == nil {
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wc.allowedNets, err = utils.ParseNetList(wc.Hosts)
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}
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return err
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}
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// ApplyProxiedIP applies the given IP to the client.
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func (client *Client) ApplyProxiedIP(session *Session, proxiedIP string, tls bool) (err error, quitMsg string) {
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// PROXY and WEBIRC are never accepted from a Tor listener, even if the address itself
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// is whitelisted:
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if client.isTor {
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return errBadProxyLine, ""
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}
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// ensure IP is sane
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parsedProxiedIP := net.ParseIP(proxiedIP).To16()
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if parsedProxiedIP == nil {
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return errBadProxyLine, fmt.Sprintf(client.t("Proxied IP address is not valid: [%s]"), proxiedIP)
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}
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isBanned, banMsg := client.server.checkBans(parsedProxiedIP)
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if isBanned {
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return errBanned, banMsg
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}
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// successfully added a limiter entry for the proxied IP;
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// remove the entry for the real IP if applicable (#197)
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client.server.connectionLimiter.RemoveClient(session.realIP)
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// given IP is sane! override the client's current IP
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ipstring := parsedProxiedIP.String()
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client.server.logger.Info("localconnect-ip", "Accepted proxy IP for client", ipstring)
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rawHostname := utils.LookupHostname(ipstring)
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cloakedHostname := client.server.Config().Server.Cloaks.ComputeCloak(parsedProxiedIP)
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client.stateMutex.Lock()
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defer client.stateMutex.Unlock()
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client.proxiedIP = parsedProxiedIP
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client.rawHostname = rawHostname
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session.proxiedIP = parsedProxiedIP
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session.rawHostname = rawHostname
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client.cloakedHostname = cloakedHostname
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// nickmask will be updated when the client completes registration
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// set tls info
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client.certfp = ""
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client.SetMode(modes.TLS, tls)
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return nil, ""
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}
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// handle the PROXY command: http://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
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// PROXY must be sent as the first message in the session and has the syntax:
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// PROXY TCP[46] SOURCEIP DESTIP SOURCEPORT DESTPORT\r\n
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// unfortunately, an ipv6 SOURCEIP can start with a double colon; in this case,
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// the message is invalid IRC and can't be parsed normally, hence the special handling.
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func handleProxyCommand(server *Server, client *Client, session *Session, line string) (err error) {
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var quitMsg string
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defer func() {
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if err != nil {
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if quitMsg == "" {
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quitMsg = client.t("Bad or unauthorized PROXY command")
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}
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client.Quit(quitMsg, session)
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}
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}()
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params := strings.Fields(line)
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if len(params) != 6 {
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return errBadProxyLine
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}
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if utils.IPInNets(client.realIP, server.Config().Server.proxyAllowedFromNets) {
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// assume PROXY connections are always secure
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err, quitMsg = client.ApplyProxiedIP(session, params[2], true)
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return
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} else {
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// real source IP is not authorized to issue PROXY:
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return errBadGatewayAddress
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}
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}
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// read a PROXY line one byte at a time, to ensure we don't read anything beyond
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// that into a buffer, which would break the TLS handshake
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func readRawProxyLine(conn net.Conn) (result string) {
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// normally this is covered by ping timeouts, but we're doing this outside
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// of the normal client goroutine:
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conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(time.Minute))
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defer conn.SetDeadline(time.Time{})
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var buf [maxProxyLineLen]byte
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oneByte := make([]byte, 1)
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i := 0
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for i < maxProxyLineLen {
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n, err := conn.Read(oneByte)
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if err != nil {
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return
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} else if n == 1 {
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buf[i] = oneByte[0]
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if buf[i] == '\n' {
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candidate := string(buf[0 : i+1])
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if strings.HasPrefix(candidate, "PROXY") {
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return candidate
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} else {
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return
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}
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}
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i += 1
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}
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}
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// no \r\n, fail out
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return
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}
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