2020-10-23 06:18:10 +02:00
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# This is the "traditional" or "mainstream" config file for Oragono.
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# It tries to replicate the behavior of other ircds, at the cost of not
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# taking full advantage of Oragono's features. This config is suitable for use
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# in IRCv3 conformance testing.
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# network configuration
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network:
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# name of the network
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name: OragonoTest
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# server configuration
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server:
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# server name
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name: oragono.test
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# addresses to listen on
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listeners:
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# This version of the config provides a public plaintext listener on
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# port 6667 for testing and compatibility with legacy applications.
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# We recommend disabling this listener in a production setting
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2020-06-15 00:54:36 +02:00
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# and replacing it with loopback-only listeners (see default.yaml):
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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":6667":
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# The standard SSL/TLS port for IRC is 6697. This will listen on all interfaces:
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":6697":
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tls:
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2020-05-24 06:19:58 +02:00
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cert: fullchain.pem
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key: privkey.pem
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# 'proxy' should typically be false. It's only for Kubernetes-style load
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# balancing that does not terminate TLS, but sends an initial PROXY line
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# in plaintext.
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proxy: false
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# Example of a Unix domain socket for proxying:
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# "/tmp/oragono_sock":
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# Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will
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# be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener
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# *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain:
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# "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock":
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# tor: true
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2020-05-05 04:29:10 +02:00
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# Example of a WebSocket listener:
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2020-05-06 20:01:14 +02:00
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# ":8097":
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2020-05-05 04:29:10 +02:00
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# websocket: true
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# tls:
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2020-05-24 06:19:58 +02:00
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# cert: fullchain.pem
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# key: privkey.pem
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2020-04-30 23:21:19 +02:00
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system,
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# the default is 0775 or 0755, which prevents other users/groups from connecting
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# to the socket. With 0777, it behaves like a normal TCP socket
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# where anyone can connect.
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unix-bind-mode: 0777
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# configure the behavior of Tor listeners (ignored if you didn't enable any):
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tor-listeners:
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# if this is true, connections from Tor must authenticate with SASL
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require-sasl: false
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# what hostname should be displayed for Tor connections?
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vhost: "tor-network.onion"
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# allow at most this many connections at once (0 for no limit):
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max-connections: 64
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# connection throttling (limit how many connection attempts are allowed at once):
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throttle-duration: 10m
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# set to 0 to disable throttling:
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max-connections-per-duration: 64
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# strict transport security, to get clients to automagically use TLS
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sts:
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# whether to advertise STS
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#
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# to stop advertising STS, leave this enabled and set 'duration' below to "0". this will
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# advertise to connecting users that the STS policy they have saved is no longer valid
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enabled: false
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# how long clients should be forced to use TLS for.
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# setting this to a too-long time will mean bad things if you later remove your TLS.
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# the default duration below is 1 month, 2 days and 5 minutes.
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duration: 1mo2d5m
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# tls port - you should be listening on this port above
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port: 6697
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# should clients include this STS policy when they ship their inbuilt preload lists?
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preload: false
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2020-05-05 04:29:10 +02:00
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websockets:
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2020-05-05 23:20:50 +02:00
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# Restrict the origin of WebSocket connections by matching the "Origin" HTTP
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# header. This settings makes oragono reject every WebSocket connection,
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# except when it originates from one of the hosts in this list. Use this to
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# prevent malicious websites from making their visitors connect to oragono
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# without their knowledge. An empty list means that there are no restrictions.
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2020-05-05 04:29:10 +02:00
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allowed-origins:
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# - "https://oragono.io"
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# - "https://*.oragono.io"
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# casemapping controls what kinds of strings are permitted as identifiers (nicknames,
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# channel names, account names, etc.), and how they are normalized for case.
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2020-06-22 20:54:43 +02:00
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# with the recommended default of 'precis', UTF8 identifiers that are "sane"
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# (according to RFC 8265) are allowed, and the server additionally tries to protect
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# against confusable characters ("homoglyph attacks").
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# the other options are 'ascii' (traditional ASCII-only identifiers), and 'permissive',
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# which allows identifiers to contain unusual characters like emoji, but makes users
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# vulnerable to homoglyph attacks. unless you're really confident in your decision,
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# we recommend leaving this value at its default (changing it once the network is
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# already up and running is problematic).
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casemapping: "precis"
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2020-06-22 20:54:43 +02:00
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# enforce-utf8 controls whether the server allows non-UTF8 bytes in messages
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# (as in traditional IRC) or preemptively discards non-UTF8 messages (since
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# they cannot be relayed to websocket clients).
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enforce-utf8: true
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2020-05-08 07:26:50 +02:00
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# whether to look up user hostnames with reverse DNS.
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# (disabling this will expose user IPs instead of hostnames;
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# to make IP/hostname information private, see the ip-cloaking section)
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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lookup-hostnames: true
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# whether to confirm hostname lookups using "forward-confirmed reverse DNS", i.e., for
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# any hostname returned from reverse DNS, resolve it back to an IP address and reject it
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# unless it matches the connecting IP
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forward-confirm-hostnames: true
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# use ident protocol to get usernames
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check-ident: true
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2020-10-20 19:48:19 +02:00
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# ignore the supplied user/ident string from the USER command, always setting user/ident
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# to the following literal value; this can potentially reduce confusion and simplify bans.
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# the value must begin with a '~' character. comment out / omit to disable:
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#coerce-ident: '~u'
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2020-09-07 11:59:31 +02:00
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# password to login to the server
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# generated using "oragono genpasswd"
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#password: ""
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# motd filename
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# if you change the motd, you should move it to ircd.motd
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motd: oragono.motd
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# motd formatting codes
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# if this is true, the motd is escaped using formatting codes like $c, $b, and $i
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motd-formatting: true
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2020-06-08 07:17:45 +02:00
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# relaying using the RELAYMSG command
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2020-09-09 10:01:46 +02:00
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relaymsg:
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# is relaymsg enabled at all?
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2020-06-08 07:17:45 +02:00
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enabled: true
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# which character(s) are reserved for relayed nicks?
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separators: "/"
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# can channel operators use RELAYMSG in their channels?
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# our implementation of RELAYMSG makes it safe for chanops to use without the
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# possibility of real users being silently spoofed
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available-to-chanops: true
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# addresses/CIDRs the PROXY command can be used from
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2020-05-07 04:50:23 +02:00
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# this should be restricted to localhost (127.0.0.1/8, ::1/128, and unix sockets),
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# unless you have a good reason. you should also add these addresses to the
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# connection limits and throttling exemption lists.
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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proxy-allowed-from:
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2020-05-06 23:00:03 +02:00
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- localhost
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# - "192.168.1.1"
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# - "192.168.10.1/24"
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# controls the use of the WEBIRC command (by IRC<->web interfaces, bouncers and similar)
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webirc:
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# one webirc block -- should correspond to one set of gateways
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-
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# SHA-256 fingerprint of the TLS certificate the gateway must use to connect
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# (comment this out to use passwords only)
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2020-06-21 21:46:08 +02:00
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certfp: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# password the gateway uses to connect, made with oragono genpasswd
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2020-05-25 00:00:58 +02:00
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password: "$2a$04$abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcde"
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# addresses/CIDRs that can use this webirc command
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# you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
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hosts:
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2020-05-17 05:13:24 +02:00
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- localhost
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# - "192.168.1.1"
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# - "192.168.10.1/24"
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# allow use of the RESUME extension over plaintext connections:
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# do not enable this unless the ircd is only accessible over internal networks
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allow-plaintext-resume: false
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# maximum length of clients' sendQ in bytes
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# this should be big enough to hold bursts of channel/direct messages
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max-sendq: 96k
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# compatibility with legacy clients
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compatibility:
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# many clients require that the final parameter of certain messages be an
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# RFC1459 trailing parameter, i.e., prefixed with :, whether or not this is
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# actually required. this forces Oragono to send those parameters
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# as trailings. this is recommended unless you're testing clients for conformance;
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# defaults to true when unset for that reason.
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force-trailing: true
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# some clients (ZNC 1.6.x and lower, Pidgin 2.12 and lower) do not
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# respond correctly to SASL messages with the server name as a prefix:
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# https://github.com/znc/znc/issues/1212
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# this works around that bug, allowing them to use SASL.
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send-unprefixed-sasl: true
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# IP-based DoS protection
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ip-limits:
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# whether to limit the total number of concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
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count: true
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# maximum concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
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max-concurrent-connections: 16
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# whether to restrict the rate of new connections per IP/CIDR
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throttle: true
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# how long to keep track of connections for
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window: 10m
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# maximum number of new connections per IP/CIDR within the given duration
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max-connections-per-window: 32
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# how long to ban offenders for. after banning them, the number of connections is
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# reset, which lets you use /UNDLINE to unban people
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throttle-ban-duration: 10m
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# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv4 (a /32 is a fully specified IPv4 address)
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cidr-len-ipv4: 32
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# how wide the CIDR should be for IPv6 (a /64 is the typical prefix assigned
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# by an ISP to an individual customer for their LAN)
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cidr-len-ipv6: 64
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# IPs/networks which are exempted from connection limits
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exempted:
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- "localhost"
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# - "192.168.1.1"
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# - "2001:0db8::/32"
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# custom connection limits for certain IPs/networks. note that CIDR
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# widths defined here override the default CIDR width --- the limit
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# will apply to the entire CIDR no matter how large or small it is
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custom-limits:
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# "8.8.0.0/16":
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# max-concurrent-connections: 128
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# max-connections-per-window: 1024
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2020-09-14 10:28:12 +02:00
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# pluggable IP ban mechanism, via subprocess invocation
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# this can be used to check new connections against a DNSBL, for example
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# see the manual for details on how to write an IP ban checking script
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ip-check-script:
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enabled: false
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command: "/usr/local/bin/check-ip-ban"
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# constant list of args to pass to the command; the actual query
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# and result are transmitted over stdin/stdout:
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args: []
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# timeout for process execution, after which we send a SIGTERM:
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timeout: 9s
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# how long after the SIGTERM before we follow up with a SIGKILL:
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kill-timeout: 1s
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# how many scripts are allowed to run at once? 0 for no limit:
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max-concurrency: 64
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|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
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# IP cloaking hides users' IP addresses from other users and from channel admins
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# (but not from server admins), while still allowing channel admins to ban
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# offending IP addresses or networks. In place of hostnames derived from reverse
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# DNS, users see fake domain names like pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono. These names are
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# generated deterministically from the underlying IP address, but if the underlying
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# IP is not already known, it is infeasible to recover it from the cloaked name.
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ip-cloaking:
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# whether to enable IP cloaking
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enabled: false
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|
2020-10-08 22:33:27 +02:00
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# whether to use these cloak settings (specifically, `netname` and `num-bits`)
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# to produce unique hostnames for always-on clients. you can enable this even if
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# you disabled IP cloaking for normal clients above. if this is disabled,
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# always-on clients will all have an identical hostname (the server name).
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enabled-for-always-on: true
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2020-05-08 07:26:50 +02:00
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# fake TLD at the end of the hostname, e.g., pwbs2ui4377257x8.irc
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# you may want to use your network name here
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netname: "irc"
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2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
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# the cloaked hostname is derived only from the CIDR (most significant bits
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# of the IP address), up to a configurable number of bits. this is the
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# granularity at which bans will take effect for IPv4. Note that changing
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# this value will invalidate any stored bans.
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cidr-len-ipv4: 32
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# analogous granularity for IPv6
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cidr-len-ipv6: 64
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# number of bits of hash output to include in the cloaked hostname.
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# more bits means less likelihood of distinct IPs colliding,
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# at the cost of a longer cloaked hostname. if this value is set to 0,
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# all users will receive simply `netname` as their cloaked hostname.
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num-bits: 64
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# secure-nets identifies IPs and CIDRs which are secure at layer 3,
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# for example, because they are on a trusted internal LAN or a VPN.
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# plaintext connections from these IPs and CIDRs will be considered
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# secure (clients will receive the +Z mode and be allowed to resume
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# or reattach to secure connections). note that loopback IPs are always
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# considered secure:
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secure-nets:
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# - "10.0.0.0/8"
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|
|
2020-05-12 18:05:40 +02:00
|
|
|
# oragono will write files to disk under certain circumstances, e.g.,
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|
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# CPU profiling or data export. by default, these files will be written
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|
|
# to the working directory. set this to customize:
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# output-path: "/home/oragono/out"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
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# account options
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accounts:
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|
# is account authentication enabled, i.e., can users log into existing accounts?
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|
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authentication-enabled: true
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# account registration
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registration:
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# can users register new accounts for themselves? if this is false, operators with
|
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|
|
# the `accreg` capability can still create accounts with `/NICKSERV SAREGISTER`
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-07 00:04:29 +02:00
|
|
|
# can users use the REGISTER command to register before fully connecting?
|
|
|
|
allow-before-connect: true
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# global throttle on new account creation
|
|
|
|
throttling:
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
# window
|
|
|
|
duration: 10m
|
|
|
|
# number of attempts allowed within the window
|
|
|
|
max-attempts: 30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# this is the bcrypt cost we'll use for account passwords
|
|
|
|
bcrypt-cost: 9
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# length of time a user has to verify their account before it can be re-registered
|
|
|
|
verify-timeout: "32h"
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-07 00:04:29 +02:00
|
|
|
# options for email verification of account registrations
|
|
|
|
email-verification:
|
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
sender: "admin@my.network"
|
|
|
|
require-tls: true
|
|
|
|
helo-domain: "my.network" # defaults to server name if unset
|
|
|
|
# options to enable DKIM signing of outgoing emails (recommended, but
|
|
|
|
# requires creating a DNS entry for the public key):
|
|
|
|
# dkim:
|
|
|
|
# domain: "my.network"
|
|
|
|
# selector: "20200229"
|
|
|
|
# key-file: "dkim.pem"
|
|
|
|
# to use an MTA/smarthost instead of sending email directly:
|
|
|
|
# mta:
|
|
|
|
# server: localhost
|
|
|
|
# port: 25
|
|
|
|
# username: "admin"
|
|
|
|
# password: "hunter2"
|
|
|
|
blacklist-regexes:
|
|
|
|
# - ".*@mailinator.com"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# throttle account login attempts (to prevent either password guessing, or DoS
|
|
|
|
# attacks on the server aimed at forcing repeated expensive bcrypt computations)
|
|
|
|
login-throttling:
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# window
|
|
|
|
duration: 1m
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# number of attempts allowed within the window
|
|
|
|
max-attempts: 3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# some clients (notably Pidgin and Hexchat) offer only a single password field,
|
|
|
|
# which makes it impossible to specify a separate server password (for the PASS
|
|
|
|
# command) and SASL password. if this option is set to true, a client that
|
|
|
|
# successfully authenticates with SASL will not be required to send
|
|
|
|
# PASS as well, so it can be configured to authenticate with SASL only.
|
|
|
|
skip-server-password: false
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-18 00:06:20 +02:00
|
|
|
# enable login to accounts via the PASS command, e.g., PASS account:password
|
2020-07-09 03:48:08 +02:00
|
|
|
# this is useful for compatibility with old clients that don't support SASL
|
2020-05-18 00:06:20 +02:00
|
|
|
login-via-pass-command: false
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# require-sasl controls whether clients are required to have accounts
|
|
|
|
# (and sign into them using SASL) to connect to the server
|
|
|
|
require-sasl:
|
|
|
|
# if this is enabled, all clients must authenticate with SASL while connecting
|
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# IPs/CIDRs which are exempted from the account requirement
|
|
|
|
exempted:
|
|
|
|
- "localhost"
|
|
|
|
# - '10.10.0.0/16'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# nick-reservation controls how, and whether, nicknames are linked to accounts
|
|
|
|
nick-reservation:
|
|
|
|
# is there any enforcement of reserved nicknames?
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# how many nicknames, in addition to the account name, can be reserved?
|
|
|
|
additional-nick-limit: 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# method describes how nickname reservation is handled
|
|
|
|
# strict: don't let the user change to the registered nickname unless they're
|
|
|
|
# already logged-in using SASL or NickServ
|
|
|
|
# optional: no enforcement by default, but allow users to opt in to
|
|
|
|
# the enforcement level of their choice
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# 'optional' matches the behavior of other NickServs, but 'strict' is
|
|
|
|
# preferable if all your users can enable SASL.
|
|
|
|
method: optional
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# allow users to set their own nickname enforcement status, e.g.,
|
|
|
|
# to opt out of strict enforcement
|
|
|
|
allow-custom-enforcement: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# format for guest nicknames:
|
|
|
|
# 1. these nicknames cannot be registered or reserved
|
|
|
|
# 2. if a client is automatically renamed by the server,
|
|
|
|
# this is the template that will be used (e.g., Guest-nccj6rgmt97cg)
|
|
|
|
# 3. if enforce-guest-format (see below) is enabled, clients without
|
|
|
|
# a registered account will have this template applied to their
|
|
|
|
# nicknames (e.g., 'katie' will become 'Guest-katie')
|
|
|
|
guest-nickname-format: "Guest-*"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# when enabled, forces users not logged into an account to use
|
|
|
|
# a nickname matching the guest template. a caveat: this may prevent
|
|
|
|
# users from choosing nicknames in scripts different from the guest
|
|
|
|
# nickname format.
|
|
|
|
force-guest-format: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# when enabled, forces users logged into an account to use the
|
|
|
|
# account name as their nickname. when combined with strict nickname
|
|
|
|
# enforcement, this lets users treat nicknames and account names
|
|
|
|
# as equivalent for the purpose of ban/invite/exception lists.
|
|
|
|
force-nick-equals-account: false
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-19 16:52:38 +02:00
|
|
|
# parallel setting to force-nick-equals-account: if true, this forbids
|
|
|
|
# anonymous users (i.e., users not logged into an account) to change their
|
|
|
|
# nickname after the initial connection is complete
|
2020-10-23 06:18:10 +02:00
|
|
|
forbid-anonymous-nick-changes: false
|
2020-10-19 16:52:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# multiclient controls whether oragono allows multiple connections to
|
|
|
|
# attach to the same client/nickname identity; this is part of the
|
|
|
|
# functionality traditionally provided by a bouncer like ZNC
|
|
|
|
multiclient:
|
|
|
|
# when disabled, each connection must use a separate nickname (as is the
|
|
|
|
# typical behavior of IRC servers). when enabled, a new connection that
|
|
|
|
# has authenticated with SASL can associate itself with an existing
|
|
|
|
# client
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if this is disabled, clients have to opt in to bouncer functionality
|
|
|
|
# using nickserv or the cap system. if it's enabled, they can opt out
|
|
|
|
# via nickserv
|
|
|
|
allowed-by-default: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# whether to allow clients that remain on the server even
|
|
|
|
# when they have no active connections. The possible values are:
|
|
|
|
# "disabled", "opt-in", "opt-out", or "mandatory".
|
|
|
|
always-on: "disabled"
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-19 20:12:20 +02:00
|
|
|
# whether to mark always-on clients away when they have no active connections:
|
2020-05-20 13:56:22 +02:00
|
|
|
auto-away: "opt-in"
|
2020-05-19 20:12:20 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# vhosts controls the assignment of vhosts (strings displayed in place of the user's
|
|
|
|
# hostname/IP) by the HostServ service
|
|
|
|
vhosts:
|
|
|
|
# are vhosts enabled at all?
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# maximum length of a vhost
|
|
|
|
max-length: 64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# regexp for testing the validity of a vhost
|
|
|
|
# (make sure any changes you make here are RFC-compliant)
|
|
|
|
valid-regexp: '^[0-9A-Za-z.\-_/]+$'
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-30 06:38:19 +02:00
|
|
|
# modes that are set by default when a user connects
|
|
|
|
# if unset, no user modes will be set by default
|
|
|
|
# +i is invisible (a user's channels are hidden from whois replies)
|
|
|
|
# see /QUOTE HELP umodes for more user modes
|
|
|
|
# default-user-modes: +i
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-04 07:18:24 +02:00
|
|
|
# pluggable authentication mechanism, via subprocess invocation
|
|
|
|
# see the manual for details on how to write an authentication plugin script
|
|
|
|
auth-script:
|
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
command: "/usr/local/bin/authenticate-irc-user"
|
|
|
|
# constant list of args to pass to the command; the actual authentication
|
|
|
|
# data is transmitted over stdin/stdout:
|
|
|
|
args: []
|
|
|
|
# should we automatically create users if the plugin returns success?
|
|
|
|
autocreate: true
|
|
|
|
# timeout for process execution, after which we send a SIGTERM:
|
|
|
|
timeout: 9s
|
|
|
|
# how long after the SIGTERM before we follow up with a SIGKILL:
|
|
|
|
kill-timeout: 1s
|
2020-09-14 10:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
# how many scripts are allowed to run at once? 0 for no limit:
|
|
|
|
max-concurrency: 64
|
2020-06-04 07:18:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# channel options
|
|
|
|
channels:
|
|
|
|
# modes that are set when new channels are created
|
|
|
|
# +n is no-external-messages and +t is op-only-topic
|
|
|
|
# see /QUOTE HELP cmodes for more channel modes
|
|
|
|
default-modes: +nt
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# how many channels can a client be in at once?
|
|
|
|
max-channels-per-client: 100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if this is true, new channels can only be created by operators with the
|
|
|
|
# `chanreg` operator capability
|
|
|
|
operator-only-creation: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# channel registration - requires an account
|
|
|
|
registration:
|
|
|
|
# can users register new channels?
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# restrict new channel registrations to operators only?
|
|
|
|
# (operators can then transfer channels to regular users using /CS TRANSFER)
|
|
|
|
operator-only: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# how many channels can each account register?
|
|
|
|
max-channels-per-account: 15
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-26 09:00:00 +02:00
|
|
|
# as a crude countermeasure against spambots, anonymous connections younger
|
|
|
|
# than this value will get an empty response to /LIST (a time period of 0 disables)
|
2020-04-26 08:19:10 +02:00
|
|
|
list-delay: 0s
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# operator classes
|
|
|
|
oper-classes:
|
|
|
|
# local operator
|
|
|
|
"local-oper":
|
|
|
|
# title shown in WHOIS
|
|
|
|
title: Local Operator
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# capability names
|
|
|
|
capabilities:
|
|
|
|
- "local_kill"
|
|
|
|
- "local_ban"
|
|
|
|
- "local_unban"
|
|
|
|
- "nofakelag"
|
|
|
|
- "roleplay"
|
2020-10-01 15:42:08 +02:00
|
|
|
- "relaymsg"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# network operator
|
|
|
|
"network-oper":
|
|
|
|
# title shown in WHOIS
|
|
|
|
title: Network Operator
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# oper class this extends from
|
|
|
|
extends: "local-oper"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# capability names
|
|
|
|
capabilities:
|
|
|
|
- "remote_kill"
|
|
|
|
- "remote_ban"
|
|
|
|
- "remote_unban"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# server admin
|
|
|
|
"server-admin":
|
|
|
|
# title shown in WHOIS
|
|
|
|
title: Server Admin
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# oper class this extends from
|
|
|
|
extends: "local-oper"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# capability names
|
|
|
|
capabilities:
|
|
|
|
- "rehash"
|
|
|
|
- "die"
|
|
|
|
- "accreg"
|
|
|
|
- "sajoin"
|
|
|
|
- "samode"
|
|
|
|
- "vhosts"
|
|
|
|
- "chanreg"
|
2020-05-12 18:05:40 +02:00
|
|
|
- "history"
|
2020-07-08 11:32:14 +02:00
|
|
|
- "defcon"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ircd operators
|
|
|
|
opers:
|
2020-03-31 19:35:24 +02:00
|
|
|
# operator named 'admin'; log in with /OPER admin [password]
|
|
|
|
admin:
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# which capabilities this oper has access to
|
|
|
|
class: "server-admin"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# custom whois line
|
2020-10-09 14:03:26 +02:00
|
|
|
whois-line: is a server admin
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# custom hostname
|
2020-10-09 14:09:30 +02:00
|
|
|
vhost: "staff"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-09 14:03:26 +02:00
|
|
|
# normally, operator status is visible to unprivileged users in WHO and WHOIS
|
|
|
|
# responses. this can be disabled with 'hidden'. ('hidden' also causes the
|
|
|
|
# 'vhost' line above to be ignored.)
|
|
|
|
hidden: false
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-09 14:34:45 +02:00
|
|
|
# modes are modes to auto-set upon opering-up. uncomment this to automatically
|
|
|
|
# enable snomasks ("server notification masks" that alert you to server events;
|
|
|
|
# see `/quote help snomasks` while opered-up for more information):
|
|
|
|
#modes: +is acjknoqtuxv
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# operators can be authenticated either by password (with the /OPER command),
|
|
|
|
# or by certificate fingerprint, or both. if a password hash is set, then a
|
|
|
|
# password is required to oper up (e.g., /OPER dan mypassword). to generate
|
|
|
|
# the hash, use `oragono genpasswd`.
|
2020-05-25 00:00:58 +02:00
|
|
|
password: "$2a$04$0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if a SHA-256 certificate fingerprint is configured here, then it will be
|
|
|
|
# required to /OPER. if you comment out the password hash above, then you can
|
|
|
|
# /OPER without a password.
|
2020-06-21 21:46:08 +02:00
|
|
|
#certfp: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# if 'auto' is set (and no password hash is set), operator permissions will be
|
|
|
|
# granted automatically as soon as you connect with the right fingerprint.
|
|
|
|
#auto: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# logging, takes inspiration from Insp
|
|
|
|
logging:
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
# how to log these messages
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# file log to a file
|
|
|
|
# stdout log to stdout
|
|
|
|
# stderr log to stderr
|
|
|
|
# (you can specify multiple methods, e.g., to log to both stderr and a file)
|
|
|
|
method: stderr
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# filename to log to, if file method is selected
|
|
|
|
# filename: ircd.log
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# type(s) of logs to keep here. you can use - to exclude those types
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# exclusions take precedent over inclusions, so if you exclude a type it will NEVER
|
|
|
|
# be logged, even if you explicitly include it
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# useful types include:
|
|
|
|
# * everything (usually used with exclusing some types below)
|
|
|
|
# server server startup, rehash, and shutdown events
|
|
|
|
# accounts account registration and authentication
|
|
|
|
# channels channel creation and operations
|
|
|
|
# commands command calling and operations
|
|
|
|
# opers oper actions, authentication, etc
|
|
|
|
# services actions related to NickServ, ChanServ, etc.
|
|
|
|
# internal unexpected runtime behavior, including potential bugs
|
|
|
|
# userinput raw lines sent by users
|
|
|
|
# useroutput raw lines sent to users
|
|
|
|
type: "* -userinput -useroutput"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# one of: debug info warn error
|
|
|
|
level: info
|
|
|
|
#-
|
|
|
|
# # example of a file log that avoids logging IP addresses
|
|
|
|
# method: file
|
|
|
|
# filename: ircd.log
|
2020-04-12 19:58:35 +02:00
|
|
|
# type: "* -userinput -useroutput -connect-ip"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# level: debug
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# debug options
|
|
|
|
debug:
|
|
|
|
# when enabled, oragono will attempt to recover from certain kinds of
|
|
|
|
# client-triggered runtime errors that would normally crash the server.
|
|
|
|
# this makes the server more resilient to DoS, but could result in incorrect
|
|
|
|
# behavior. deployments that would prefer to "start from scratch", e.g., by
|
|
|
|
# letting the process crash and auto-restarting it with systemd, can set
|
|
|
|
# this to false.
|
|
|
|
recover-from-errors: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# optionally expose a pprof http endpoint: https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/pprof/
|
|
|
|
# it is strongly recommended that you don't expose this on a public interface;
|
|
|
|
# if you need to access it remotely, you can use an SSH tunnel.
|
|
|
|
# set to `null`, "", leave blank, or omit to disable
|
|
|
|
# pprof-listener: "localhost:6060"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# datastore configuration
|
|
|
|
datastore:
|
|
|
|
# path to the datastore
|
|
|
|
path: ircd.db
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if the database schema requires an upgrade, `autoupgrade` will attempt to
|
|
|
|
# perform it automatically on startup. the database will be backed
|
|
|
|
# up, and if the upgrade fails, the original database will be restored.
|
|
|
|
autoupgrade: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# connection information for MySQL (currently only used for persistent history):
|
|
|
|
mysql:
|
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
host: "localhost"
|
2020-05-17 07:13:10 +02:00
|
|
|
port: 3306
|
2020-05-17 07:00:04 +02:00
|
|
|
# if socket-path is set, it will be used instead of host:port
|
|
|
|
#socket-path: "/var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock"
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
user: "oragono"
|
|
|
|
password: "hunter2"
|
|
|
|
history-database: "oragono_history"
|
|
|
|
timeout: 3s
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# languages config
|
|
|
|
languages:
|
|
|
|
# whether to load languages
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# default language to use for new clients
|
|
|
|
# 'en' is the default English language in the code
|
|
|
|
default: en
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# which directory contains our language files
|
|
|
|
path: languages
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# limits - these need to be the same across the network
|
|
|
|
limits:
|
|
|
|
# nicklen is the max nick length allowed
|
|
|
|
nicklen: 32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# identlen is the max ident length allowed
|
|
|
|
identlen: 20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# channellen is the max channel length allowed
|
|
|
|
channellen: 64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# awaylen is the maximum length of an away message
|
2020-06-04 16:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
awaylen: 390
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# kicklen is the maximum length of a kick message
|
2020-06-04 16:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
kicklen: 390
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# topiclen is the maximum length of a channel topic
|
2020-06-04 16:18:35 +02:00
|
|
|
topiclen: 390
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of monitor entries a client can have
|
|
|
|
monitor-entries: 100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# whowas entries to store
|
|
|
|
whowas-entries: 100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# maximum length of channel lists (beI modes)
|
|
|
|
chan-list-modes: 60
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of messages to accept during registration (prevents
|
|
|
|
# DoS / resource exhaustion attacks):
|
|
|
|
registration-messages: 1024
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# message length limits for the new multiline cap
|
|
|
|
multiline:
|
|
|
|
max-bytes: 4096 # 0 means disabled
|
|
|
|
max-lines: 100 # 0 means no limit
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# fakelag: prevents clients from spamming commands too rapidly
|
|
|
|
fakelag:
|
|
|
|
# whether to enforce fakelag
|
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# time unit for counting command rates
|
|
|
|
window: 1s
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# clients can send this many commands without fakelag being imposed
|
|
|
|
burst-limit: 5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# once clients have exceeded their burst allowance, they can send only
|
|
|
|
# this many commands per `window`:
|
|
|
|
messages-per-window: 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# client status resets to the default state if they go this long without
|
|
|
|
# sending any commands:
|
|
|
|
cooldown: 2s
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# the roleplay commands are semi-standardized extensions to IRC that allow
|
|
|
|
# sending and receiving messages from pseudo-nicknames. this can be used either
|
|
|
|
# for actual roleplaying, or for bridging IRC with other protocols.
|
|
|
|
roleplay:
|
|
|
|
# are roleplay commands enabled at all? (channels and clients still have to
|
|
|
|
# opt in individually with the +E mode)
|
2020-09-09 09:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# require the "roleplay" oper capability to send roleplay messages?
|
|
|
|
require-oper: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# require channel operator permissions to send roleplay messages?
|
|
|
|
require-chanops: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# add the real nickname, in parentheses, to the end of every roleplay message?
|
|
|
|
add-suffix: true
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-15 20:16:02 +02:00
|
|
|
# external services can integrate with the ircd using JSON Web Tokens (https://jwt.io).
|
|
|
|
# in effect, the server can sign a token attesting that the client is present on
|
|
|
|
# the server, is a member of a particular channel, etc.
|
|
|
|
extjwt:
|
2020-06-16 04:32:06 +02:00
|
|
|
# # default service config (for `EXTJWT #channel`).
|
|
|
|
# # expiration time for the token:
|
2020-06-15 20:16:02 +02:00
|
|
|
# expiration: 45s
|
2020-06-16 04:32:06 +02:00
|
|
|
# # you can configure tokens to be signed either with HMAC and a symmetric secret:
|
2020-06-15 20:16:02 +02:00
|
|
|
# secret: "65PHvk0K1_sM-raTsCEhatVkER_QD8a0zVV8gG2EWcI"
|
2020-06-16 04:32:06 +02:00
|
|
|
# # or with an RSA private key:
|
2020-06-15 20:16:02 +02:00
|
|
|
# #rsa-private-key-file: "extjwt.pem"
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-16 04:32:06 +02:00
|
|
|
# # named services (for `EXTJWT #channel service_name`):
|
2020-06-15 20:16:02 +02:00
|
|
|
# services:
|
|
|
|
# "jitsi":
|
|
|
|
# expiration: 30s
|
|
|
|
# secret: "qmamLKDuOzIzlO8XqsGGewei_At11lewh6jtKfSTbkg"
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-12 18:05:40 +02:00
|
|
|
# history message storage: this is used by CHATHISTORY, HISTORY, znc.in/playback,
|
|
|
|
# various autoreplay features, and the resume extension
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
history:
|
|
|
|
# should we store messages for later playback?
|
|
|
|
# by default, messages are stored in RAM only; they do not persist
|
2020-05-19 13:57:44 +02:00
|
|
|
# across server restarts. however, you may want to understand how message
|
|
|
|
# history interacts with the GDPR and/or any data privacy laws that apply
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
# in your country and the countries of your users.
|
2020-05-19 13:57:44 +02:00
|
|
|
enabled: true
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# how many channel-specific events (messages, joins, parts) should be tracked per channel?
|
2020-05-19 13:57:44 +02:00
|
|
|
channel-length: 2048
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# how many direct messages and notices should be tracked per user?
|
|
|
|
client-length: 256
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# how long should we try to preserve messages?
|
|
|
|
# if `autoresize-window` is 0, the in-memory message buffers are preallocated to
|
|
|
|
# their maximum length. if it is nonzero, the buffers are initially small and
|
|
|
|
# are dynamically expanded up to the maximum length. if the buffer is full
|
|
|
|
# and the oldest message is older than `autoresize-window`, then it will overwrite
|
|
|
|
# the oldest message rather than resize; otherwise, it will expand if possible.
|
2020-05-19 13:57:44 +02:00
|
|
|
autoresize-window: 3d
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# number of messages to automatically play back on channel join (0 to disable):
|
|
|
|
autoreplay-on-join: 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of CHATHISTORY messages that can be
|
|
|
|
# requested at once (0 disables support for CHATHISTORY)
|
|
|
|
chathistory-maxmessages: 100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# maximum number of messages that can be replayed at once during znc emulation
|
|
|
|
# (znc.in/playback, or automatic replay on initial reattach to a persistent client):
|
|
|
|
znc-maxmessages: 2048
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# options to delete old messages, or prevent them from being retrieved
|
|
|
|
restrictions:
|
|
|
|
# if this is set, messages older than this cannot be retrieved by anyone
|
|
|
|
# (and will eventually be deleted from persistent storage, if that's enabled)
|
2020-05-19 13:57:44 +02:00
|
|
|
expire-time: 1w
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if this is set, logged-in users cannot retrieve messages older than their
|
|
|
|
# account registration date, and logged-out users cannot retrieve messages
|
|
|
|
# older than their sign-on time (modulo grace-period, see below):
|
|
|
|
enforce-registration-date: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# but if this is set, you can retrieve messages that are up to `grace-period`
|
|
|
|
# older than the above cutoff time. this is recommended to allow logged-out
|
|
|
|
# users to do session resumption / query history after disconnections.
|
|
|
|
grace-period: 1h
|
|
|
|
|
2020-08-24 00:10:01 +02:00
|
|
|
# options to store history messages in a persistent database (currently only MySQL).
|
|
|
|
# in order to enable any of this functionality, you must configure a MySQL server
|
|
|
|
# in the `datastore.mysql` section.
|
2020-03-30 23:20:42 +02:00
|
|
|
persistent:
|
|
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# store unregistered channel messages in the persistent database?
|
|
|
|
unregistered-channels: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# for a registered channel, the channel owner can potentially customize
|
|
|
|
# the history storage setting. as the server operator, your options are
|
|
|
|
# 'disabled' (no persistent storage, regardless of per-channel setting),
|
|
|
|
# 'opt-in', 'opt-out', and 'mandatory' (force persistent storage, ignoring
|
|
|
|
# per-channel setting):
|
|
|
|
registered-channels: "opt-out"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# direct messages are only stored in the database for logged-in clients;
|
|
|
|
# you can control how they are stored here (same options as above).
|
|
|
|
# if you enable this, strict nickname reservation is strongly recommended
|
|
|
|
# as well.
|
|
|
|
direct-messages: "opt-out"
|
2020-05-12 18:05:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# options to control how messages are stored and deleted:
|
|
|
|
retention:
|
|
|
|
# allow users to delete their own messages from history?
|
|
|
|
allow-individual-delete: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if persistent history is enabled, create additional index tables,
|
|
|
|
# allowing deletion of JSON export of an account's messages. this
|
|
|
|
# may be needed for compliance with data privacy regulations.
|
|
|
|
enable-account-indexing: false
|
2020-07-10 00:36:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# options to control storage of TAGMSG
|
|
|
|
tagmsg-storage:
|
|
|
|
# by default, should TAGMSG be stored?
|
|
|
|
default: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if `default` is false, store TAGMSG containing any of these tags:
|
|
|
|
whitelist:
|
|
|
|
- "+draft/react"
|
|
|
|
- "react"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if `default` is true, don't store TAGMSG containing any of these tags:
|
|
|
|
#blacklist:
|
|
|
|
# - "+draft/typing"
|
|
|
|
# - "typing"
|